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Summary 
In the field of administrative law, the judiciary has traditionally exercised control over the 
administrative actions of the executive through judicial review. However, judicial review is 
neither the most effective nor the most efficient primary control mechanism for systemic 
administrative improvement. In a country faced with a task of ‗transformative 
constitutionalism‘, and hindered with scarce resources, there is good cause to limit judicial 
intervention as the first response to administrative disputes.  The major theme of this thesis is 
to investigate the feasibility of administrative tribunal reform in South Africa, using two other 
commonwealth countries, Australia and England, as a basis for comparison.  
 
Australia and England have been chosen for comparison because they share similar 
administrative law traditions and they can provide working models of coherent tribunal 
structures. The Australian tribunal system is well-established and consists of tribunals which 
fall under the control of the executive, while tribunals in England have recently undergone a 
significant transformation, and are now part of the independent judiciary.  
The South African government currently spends, indeed wastes, a significant amount of 
money on administrative law litigation. Due to the limitations of judicial review, even after 
the high costs of litigation and the long duration of court proceedings, the results achieved 
may still be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, judicial review is unsuited to giving effect to 
systemic administrative change and the improvement of initial decision-making.  
Australia and England have begun to move away from the traditional court model for the 
resolution of administrative disputes. Both have indicated a preference for the important role 
of tribunals in the administration of disputes. Tribunals have been shown to offer the 
advantage of being speedier, cheaper, more efficient, more participatory and more accessible 
than traditional courts, which contributes to tribunals being a more available resource for lay 
people or people without sophisticated legal knowledge, and provides wider access to 
remedies than courts.  
The English and Australian models indicate a few important trends which need to be applied 
universally to ensure a sustained tribunal reform and a system which provides a higher level 
of administrative redress than the over-burdened and institutionally inept courts currently do. 
These include co-operation among government departments and tribunals; open and 
accountable systemic change; the need for supervision and evaluation of the whole of 
administrative law by an independent and competent body; and ultimately a focus on the 
needs of users of state services.  
At the same time, there are arguments against administrative tribunal reform. These include 
the costs of reform; the ways to establish tribunals; and the level of independence shown by 
the tribunals. These arguments are especially relevant in the South African context, where the 
government faces huge social problems and a scarcity of resources. However, after an 
analysis of the valuable characteristics of tribunals and the role that they serve in the day to 
day administration of justice, it is difficult to see how these objections to tribunals can 
outweigh their potential importance in the administrative justice system.  
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The need for sustained systematic reform in South Africa is one that cannot be ignored. 
Tribunals offer a valuable alternative to judicial review for the resolution of administrative 
disputes. Furthermore, the tribunal systems of Australia and England demonstrate how the 
effective creation and continued use of comprehensive tribunal structures contributes firstly to 
cost reduction and secondly to ease the administrative burden on courts who are not suited to 
cure large-scale administrative error. 
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Opsomming 
In die administratiefreg oefen die regsprekende gesag tradisioneel beheer uit oor die 
uitvoerende gesag deur middel van geregtelike hersiening.  Geregtelike hersiening is egter nie 
die mees doeltreffende of effektiewe primêre beheermeganisme om sistemiese 
administratiewe verbetering teweeg te bring nie.  In ‗n land met die uitdagings van 
‗transformatiewe konstitusionalisme‘ en skaars hulpbronne, kan ‗n goeie argument gevoer 
word dat geregtelike inmenging as die eerste antwoord op administratiewe dispute beperk 
moet word.  Die deurlopende tema van hierdie tesis is ‗n ondersoek na die lewensvatbaarheid 
van hervorming van administratiewe tribunale in Suid-Afrika, in vergelyking met die posisie 
in Australië en Engeland, waarvan beide ook, tesame met Suid-Afrika, deel vorm van die 
Statebond. 
Hierdie lande is gekies vir regsvergelykende studie aangesien hulle ‗n administratiefregtelike 
tradisie met Suid-Afrika deel en beide werkende modelle van duidelike tribunale strukture 
daarstel.  Die Australiese tribunale stelsel is goed gevestig en bestaan uit tribunale onder die 
beheer van die uitvoerende gesag, terwyl die tribunale stelsel in Engeland onlangs ‗n 
beduidende hervorming ondergaan het en nou deel van die onafhanklike regsprekende gesag 
is. 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering mors aansienlike hoeveelhede geld op administratiefregtelike 
litigasie.  Selfs na hoë koste en lang vertragings van litigasie mag die resultate steeds 
onbevredigend wees as gevolg van die beperkings inherent aan geregtelike hersiening.  
Tesame met hierdie oorwegings is geregtelike hersiening ook nie gerig op sistemiese 
administratiewe verandering en verbetering van aanvanklike besluitneming nie. 
Australië en Engeland het onlangs begin wegbeweeg van die tradisionele hof-gebaseerde 
model vir die oplossing van administratiewe dispute.  Beide toon ‗n voorkeur vir die 
belangrike rol wat tribunale in die administrasie van dispute kan speel Tribunale bied die 
bewese voordele om vinniger, goedkoper, meer doeltreffend, meer deelnemend en meer 
toeganklik te wees as tradisionele howe, sodat tribunale ‗n meer beskikbare hulpbron is vir 
leke, oftewel, persone sonder gesofistikeerde regskennis en dus beter toegang tot remedies as 
tradisionele howe verskaf. 
Die Engelse en Australiese modelle dui op enkele belangrike tendense wat universeel 
toegepas moet word om volgehoue tribunale hervorming te verseker en om ‗n stelsel te skep 
wat ‗n hoër vlak van administratiewe geregtigheid daarstel as wat oorlaaide en institusioneel 
onbekwame howe kan. Dit verwys bepaald na samewerking tussen staatsdepartemente en 
tibunale; deursigtige en verantwoordbare sistemiese veranderinge; die behoefte aan 
toesighouding en evaluasie van die hele administratiefreg deur ‗n onafhanklike, bevoegde 
liggaam; en uiteindelik ‗n fokus op die behoeftes van die gebruikers van staatsdienste. 
Daar is egter terselfdertyd ook argumente teen administratiewe tribunale hervorming.  Hierdie 
argumente sluit in die koste van hervorming; die wyses waarop tribunale gevestig word; en 
die vlak van onafhanklikheid voorgehou deur tribunale.  Hierdie argumente is veral relevant 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks waar die regering voor groot sosiale probleme te staan kom en 
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daarby ingesluit, ‗n tekort aan hulpbronne ook moet hanteer.  Daarenteen is dit moeilik om in 
te sien hoe enige teenkanting en teenargumente met betrekking tot die vestiging van 
administratiewe tribunale swaarder kan weeg as die potensiële belang van sulke tribunale in 
die administratiewe geregtigheidstelsel, veral nadat ‗n analise van die waardevolle 
karaktereienskappe van tribunale en die rol wat hulle speel in die dag-tot-dag administrasie 
van geregtigheid onderneem is. 
Die behoefte aan volhoubare sistemiese hervorming in Suid-Afrika kan nie geïgnoreer word 
nie.  Tribunale bied ‗n waardevolle alternatief tot geregtelike hersiening met die oog op die 
oplossing van administratiewe dispute.  Tesame hiermee demonstreer die tribunale stelsels in 
Australië en Engeland hoe die doeltreffende vestiging en deurlopende gebruik van 
omvattende tribunale bydra, eerstens om kostes verbonde aan die oplossing van 
administratiewe dispute te verlaag en tweedens, om die administratiewe las op die howe, wat 
nie aangelê is daarvoor om grootskaalse administratiewe foute reg te stel nie, te verlig. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1 1 Introduction 
In the field of administrative law, the judiciary has traditionally exercised control over the 
administrative actions of the executive through judicial review.
1
 However, judicial review is 
not the most effective or efficient primary control mechanism for systemic administrative 
improvement. In a country faced with a task of ‗transformative constitutionalism‘,2 and 
hindered with scarce resources, there is good cause to limit judicial intervention as the first 
response to administrative disputes.  The major theme of this thesis is to investigate the 
feasibility of administrative tribunal reform in South Africa, using two other commonwealth 
countries, Australia and England, as a basis for comparison.  
 
Judicial review is problematic as the primary mechanism dealing with an administrative 
complaint, and the reasons for this will be examined. Several South African, as well as 
international law sources will form the basis for the argument against judicial review as a 
primary control mechanism. Although there are other alternatives to judicial review in dispute 
resolution of administrative law, this thesis will focus on the role of tribunals.  
 
Tribunals are informal investigative or quasi-judicial bodies which deal almost exclusively 
with administrative law, and usually on a highly specialised level. Tribunals need to have the 
following features in order to be efficient and effective agents of administrative justice and to 
provide a valuable alternative to courts: they must be accessible, cost-efficient, speedy, and 
approachable; consist of specialised tribunal members with particular expertise; give adequate 
reasons for their results; present a unified and coherent structure; and provide opportunities 
for review.  
 
The particular countries which have been selected for comparison have been chosen because 
they share similar administrative law traditions and they can provide working models of 
coherent tribunal structures. A comparative study of commonwealth jurisdictions will be 
highly relevant as they ―present the comparativist with a significant degree of doctrinal and 
                                                     
1
 This position is explained in Hoexter ―The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative law‖ 
(2000) 117 SALJ 484 and Hoexter ―Judicial Policy Revisited: Transformative Adjudication in Administrative 
Law‖ (2008) 24 SAJHR 281.  
2
 Klare ―Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism‖ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146.  
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institutional similarity, overlying a substratum of considerable cultural difference.‖3 Because 
they share concepts, legal language and institutions, commonwealth jurisdictions offer 
important lessons to each other and new institutions and systems can be imported with more 
ease than from non-commonwealth countries. Australia and England will be examined with 
regard to their respective systems of tribunals. The Australian tribunal system is well-
established and consists of tribunals which fall under the control of the executive, while 
tribunals in England have recently undergone a significant transformation,
4
 and are members 
of the independent judiciary. This difference will be briefly discussed.  
 
In South Africa, one of the greatest concerns would be a department with severely limited 
resources and budget. The Department of Justice has already expressed these concerns, and 
the thesis will analyse the relative advantages and disadvantages of tribunal reform. Another 
major concern is the concept of the separation of powers. However, this thesis will not delve 
deeply into the complex myriad of separation of powers concerns as there is not sufficient 
space to do them justice.
5
  
 
1 2 Rationale 
 
The major rationale behind this thesis is that in order to give justice to the vast array of rights 
in our Constitutional Bill of Rights, there must be sufficient mechanisms to give practical 
effect to the rights of claimants. Whether the dispute exists with regard to the right to water, 
to housing or to any other constitutionally entrenched right, unless there is fair, accessible and 
efficient dispute resolution machinery, such rights will not bear any fruit.  
 
                                                     
3
 Saunders ―Apples, Oranges and Comparative Administrative Law‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative 
Justice Across the Commonwealth (2007) 427.  
4
 Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.   
5
 The doctrine of the separation of powers is one of the driving forces behind the position of tribunals as 
members of the executive in Australia. However, the traditional tripartite distinction of functions has been 
brought into question recently, with authors expressing support for a fourth ‗integrity branch‘ of government. 
This fourth branch would explain the existence of the myriad of other institutions that provide administrative 
support and control functions. For a discussion on this see Spigelman, 'The Integrity Branch of Government' 
(2004) Australian Institute of Administrative Law National Lecture Series on Administrative Law No 2; Creyke 
―Administrative Justice: Beyond the Courtroom Door‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across 
the Commonwealth (2007) 262; McMillan ―Re-thinking the Separation of Powers‖ Federal LR (2010) 12.  
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In certain provinces, especially the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal, judicial review 
arguably results in more detrimental protection of important socio-economic rights than 
advancing them. An analysis of four social assistance cases will illustrate the limits and 
limitations of judicial review in Chapter 2. If judicial review is not the most effective 
mechanism, it then becomes apparent that alternative systems must be investigated.  
 
Two commonwealth countries, Australia and England, who share a legal background, legal 
language and legal institutions, especially in administrative law, have incorporated a system 
of administrative tribunals into their legal structure and place importance on both their 
effective functioning and the coherence of their structure. Australia and England have 
structured their tribunal systems differently and each falls under a different sphere of 
government. The comparison between then will allow for greater understanding of which 
aspects of the system could provide useful information for reform of the South African 
tribunal system.  
 
1 3 Research Aims 
 
The thesis aims to address one major issue, namely the suitability and feasibility of tribunal 
reform in administrative law in South Africa. In doing so, the thesis will attempt to; assess the 
current South African position regarding judicial review as the primary mode of distributing 
administrative justice in order to show that it is dissatisfactory and that alternative systems 
may require consideration; consider the nature and function of tribunals generally to create a 
basic standard against which tribunals can be measured; describe and evaluate the Australian 
system of tribunal justice; describe and evaluate the English system of tribunal justice; 
evaluate the current South African position regarding tribunals and to draw comparisons with 
the systems of Australia and England; and lastly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
the various options of tribunal reform.  
 
1 4  Hypotheses 
 
Certain underlying assumptions inform the research in this thesis. Firstly, judicial review is 
not ideally suited as the primary control mechanism of the administrative actions of the 
executive by the judiciary. Judicial review has occupied a prominent position in South 
African administrative law historically, but cannot solely provide the level of administrative 
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justice that is guaranteed in the Constitution. S33 guarantees a right to administrative justice
6
 
which calls for a comprehensive system which provides for more than the retrogressive 
control function provided by judicial review.
7
  
 
A comparative study of commonwealth jurisdictions will prove highly relevant and useful as 
they often share contexts, legal language and legal institutions. Particularly in administrative 
law, Australia, England and South Africa share a common heritage and a similar 
understanding of the underlying principles of commonwealth administrative law.  
 
Cost
8
 and budgetary considerations are pivotal concerns of any government when considering 
changing an old, and implementing a new, legal institution. This is especially true of South 
Africa‘s young democratic government.  
 
The separation of powers doctrine is an important safeguard against the abuse of power. Any 
form of tribunal system which is instituted in South Africa should be done with careful 
consideration of where exactly tribunals integrate into the composition of government, and 
should not in any way undermine the value of the separation of powers. However, this 
underlying assumption will inform the research in this thesis, but a full discussion of the 
implications of the doctrine is beyond the scope of the study.  
 
1 5 Methodology 
 
The thesis consists largely of literature-based analysis of three commonwealth jurisdictions‘ 
respective approaches, procedures and institutions regarding tribunal justice and its 
relationship with administrative law. The thesis will consist mainly of comparative law 
research.  
 
                                                     
6
 S33(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―the Constitution‖).  
7
 The nature of judicial review, the problems it encounters and the reasons behind these failures will be explained 
in Ch 2.  
8
 ‗Cost‘ in this context will refer to more than the actual budgetary allocation and will reflect the costs involved 
in proper administration.  Ch 7 explains this more clearly.  
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In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 a brief historical perspective of the development of each jurisdiction 
will be considered in order to evaluate the reasons why, and the manner how, each 
incorporates tribunals to give effect to administrative justice.   
 
1 6  Division of Chapters 
Chapter 2 aims to assess the current South African position regarding administrative justice. 
Judicial review occupies a primary place in administrative law as the main control mechanism 
of the judiciary against actions of the executive.  The criticism against judicial review, as well 
as case law illustrating this point, will be examined in order to show why it should not retain 
this prime position. 
Chapter 3 will outline the general nature and composition of tribunals. Different theoretical 
conceptions of tribunals will be considered and the most important features of tribunals will 
be highlighted. A basic standard against which tribunals should measure up will be identified 
and delineated with reference to the features most commonly regarded as the key elements of 
tribunals.  
Chapter 4 discusses Australia‘s fairly well-established and structured system of tribunal 
justice. The Australian administrative law system consists of ‗courts administering rights of 
review and appeal, alongside a range of other, often more accessible, mechanisms to enable 
citizens to scrutinise and challenge decisions by government.‘9 This chapter will engage in a 
descriptive study of the composition and hierarchy of the administrative legal system in place 
in Australia, as well as the supervisory bodies which maintain it. The focus will be on 
tribunals and their position within the Australian executive and arguments for and against the 
Australian conception of tribunal justice will be examined in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 will evaluate the newly-restructured English tribunals. South African 
Administrative Law has to a large extent followed in the footsteps on English administrative 
law generally, albeit lagging slightly behind.
10
 England‘s administrative tribunals have 
recently undergone radical change. Leading up to this change were several pivotal moments 
                                                     
9
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth 259. 
10
 Corder illustrates that although South African administrative law is based on English Administrative Law, it 
largely failed to develop in the same way as the Administrative Law of other commonwealth countries did and 
did not undergo the same progressive changes. Corder ―Comparing Administrative Justice Across the 
Commonwealth: A First Scan‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth 
(2007) 2. 
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in the legal development of administrative and constitutional law in England, the most 
noteworthy of which will be considered in this chapter.
11
  
The structure of the new tribunal system will be described and evaluated. The Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act
12
 creates new structures, namely First-tier and Upper tribunals 
and an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council. Judicial review still retains a prominent 
role in the system, and it remains to be seen what its position will become alongside the new 
developments. Unlike the Australian tribunals, the tribunals in England are not part of the 
executive but fall under the sphere of the judiciary. This difference will also be briefly 
discussed here.  
Chapter 6 will provide an overview of some of the existing tribunals in South Africa. The 
historical development of tribunals is described, as well as the objections to reforming 
administrative appeals and tribunals. The chapter will also discuss why reforms were not 
introduced in the drafting of the constitutionally-ordained administrative law legislation, 
namely the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,
13
 despite being recommended by the 
South African Law Commission.
14
 A further point is that provision is made in the 
Constitution for tribunal justice,
15
 and that its implementation would not be unconstitutional. 
An analysis of some of the current South African tribunals will be provided to illustrate why 
reform of tribunal processes is required. The differences between the various types of 
tribunals will be discussed in order to show their fragmentation and the disparity between 
their procedures. The English tribunals suffered from similar deficiencies prior to their recent 
restructuring. Unlike the coherent and organised Australian system, it will be argued that the 
ad-hoc establishment and the lack of a coherent overarching structure in South African 
tribunals hinders and detracts from the standard of administrative justice which they are 
implemented to administer.   
                                                     
11
 Report of the Committee on Tribunals and Inquiries Cmnd 218 (1957) ―Franks Report‖; Leggatt Tribunals for 
Users: One System, One Service (2001); Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007; Constitutional Reform Act 
2005.    
12
 2007.  
13
 3 of 2000.  
14
 South African Law Reform Commission Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice August (1999).  
15
 S33(3) of the Constitution. 
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Chapter 7: While comparative analysis of commonwealth countries is useful and relevant, 
there is considerable danger in merely importing legal concepts and institutions into the 
domestic scene. Rather, the valuable and insightful knowledge and experience should be 
collated into a coherent collection, and then should be critically evaluated as to its suitability 
in the South African context.  
This chapter seeks to analyse the various objections to tribunal reform in South Africa. The 
objections are largely to the proliferation of government departments and to the cost involved 
in establishing a reformed tribunal system. Through analysis of the establishment and 
successful implementation of the Australian and English tribunal systems, the chapter will 
provide counter-arguments to those objections. Furthermore, the advantages and 
disadvantages of both the English and Australian systems will be evaluated and conclusions 
will be drawn about the possibility of reform in South African tribunals.  
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CHAPTER 2: LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: SOUTH 
AFRICAN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
2 1   Introduction 
The courts in common law countries have historically employed judicial review as a primary 
control mechanism of the actions of the executive. In South Africa this is especially true in 
light of the role that courts played during the rule of Apartheid.
1
  
This chapter seeks to analyse judicial review as a general administrative control process by 
looking generally at its common-law origins, features and criticisms. Judicial review of social 
assistance decisions in the Eastern Cape will provide the basis for an explanation as to why 
judicial review may not be the most effective or efficient primary control mechanism in the 
South African context. A proper role for judicial review will be carved out, and space created 
for the consideration of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  
An underlying assumption of this chapter is that judicial review is being used in a manner for 
which it was not designed. As a primary avenue of administrative justice, it fails to accord the 
level of justice that it should. The criticisms which relate to judicial review do so largely 
because it is being relied on to perform all the tasks which should be allocated to a larger and 
more integrated system of administrative law.  
The aim is not to argue for the eradication of judicial review,
2
 as there is no doubt that it is a 
necessary and important safeguard to maladministration. The aim is rather to analyse the 
nature of judicial review and its precise functioning. Through this, an appropriate place for the 
courts and judicial review can be determined, both constitutionally and institutionally, within 
a inclusive system of administrative justice.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Hoexter notes ‗…judicial review was given special prominence during the decades of Apartheid, when South 
African lawyers placed great reliance on judicial intervention in administrative matters to remedy the injustices 
of political and legal oppression.‘ Hoexter ―The Future of Judicial Review‖ (2000) SALJ 484.  
2
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 494 ‗the criticisms of review should not be viewed as arguments for its abolition. Rather 
they are arguments for an integrated system in which review can play an appropriate role.‘ 
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2 2   Historical Origins, Underlying Features and Criticism of Judicial Review 
2 2 1 Introduction and Justification of Judicial Review 
In order to understand the South African model of judicial review of administrative action, it 
is important to contextualise it within a broader commonwealth conceptualisation. This 
section is concerned with the general, historical development of judicial review, while a more 
focused discussion of the current South African position will follow in Section 3. For the dual 
reason that it both originated and obtained primacy in England, judicial review was 
transplanted to most other common law countries and has historically been the most important 
instrument to curb administrative power.
3
 Furthermore, there has been a recent trend within 
certain commonwealth countries to capture the judicial review function in legislation.
4
  
Before considering the proper role of courts in reviewing administrative action, it should 
firstly be established why and how courts are empowered to intervene. In a model of 
separation of powers, each branch of government has their own constitutional and 
institutional function.
5
 However, there are times when those strict boundaries will be 
infringed. One such case is when the courts review the acts of the administrative branch.
 6 
 
However, these infringements are part of the concept of the separation of powers and fulfill 
the role of checks and balances against public power.   
Public authorities cannot act as they please. Their actions must be lawful and legitimate and 
they may only exercise the powers given to them expressly or impliedly either by Parliament,
7
 
                                                     
3
 ‗In Britain, as in the principal countries of the Commonwealth…disputes between citizen and government are 
adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.‘ Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 9 ed (2004) 22. For the criticism 
and debate surrounding judicial review see s 2 3 6 on the Prominence of Review and s 2 3 7 on the Limit and 
Limitations of Review below.  
4
 These countries include South Africa and Australia, and this concept is discussed further in this chapter in s 2 
3, and in Ch 4 s 3 3, respectively.  
5
 Jowell ―Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review‖ 1999 PL 448 499 distinguishes 
between the constitutional competence, or the proper role of institutions within a democratic society, and 
institutional competence which involves practical considerations about the capacity of each institution to make 
certain decisions. 
6
 ‗The powers of all public authorities are subordinated to the law…they are all subject to legal limitations; there 
is no such thing as absolute or unfettered administrative power…The primary purpose of administrative law, 
therefore, is to keep the powers of government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen against their 
abuse.‘ Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 5.  
7
 This construction relies on a theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, such as exists in England. 
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or by the Constitution.
8
 The basis for judicial review is that the courts have the power to 
evaluate conduct of the executive which falls outside of their mandate.
9
 The reason for this is 
that all public power is subject to a form of judicial control.
10
 Judicial review involves a 
process whereby courts can identify and cure illegalities and irregularities committed by the 
administration. A clear, if somewhat dated, definition of the role of judicial review can be 
found in Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council
11
 where Innes CJ stated 
whenever a public body has a duty imposed on it by statute, and disregards 
important provisions of the statute, or is guilty of gross irregularity or clear 
illegality in the performance of the duty, this Court may be asked to review the 
proceedings complained of and set aside or correct them. This is no special 
machinery created by Legislature; it is a right inherent in the Court…12 
A more recent statement about the role of judicial review of administrative action can be 
found in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council
13
 where it was stated that  
it seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the 
Legislature and Executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that 
they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred 
upon them by law.
14
  
                                                     
8
 In South Africa, the functions and powers of public authorities have their basis in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―the Constitution) and ‗Parliament is no longer supreme. Its legislation, and the 
legislation of all organs of State, is now subject to constitutional control‘ in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and 
Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) 32.  
9
 ‗The British system of administrative law, which is followed throughout the English-speaking world, has some 
salient characteristics…the outstanding characteristic of the Anglo-American system is that the ordinary courts, 
and not special administrative courts, decide cases involving the validity of governmental action‘ Wade & 
Forsyth Administrative Law 10. In South Africa, S33(3) of the Constitution states that ‗national legislation must 
be enacted to give effect to these rights (of just administrative action) and must- a) provide for the review of 
administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal‘.  
10
 Cane Administrative Law 4 ed (2004) 28, ‗In a general sense, ‗judicial review‘ refers to judicial control of 
public decision-making in accordance with rules and principles of administrative law.‘ 
11
 1903 TS.  
12
 111 at 115. This definition is somewhat dated and there are several points raised in Boulle, Harris & Hoexter 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 246-251 which require clarity. Hoexter also considers the 
problems with the definition in Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 111-112.  
13
 This case was decided under the interim Constitution, but was confirmed in President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (SARFU 3) 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) 148.   
14
 58. Although the act is question did not constitute ‗administrative action‘, the court still had power to review 
under the principle of legality. For a further explanation of the principle of legality see s 2 2 2 Ultra Vires 
doctrine.  
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In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
15
 the court explains that although the 
historical origin of judicial review lies in common law, its continued existence and relevance 
is rooted in the Constitution.  
Judicial review served the purpose of enabling Courts, whilst recognising the 
supremacy of Parliament, to place constraints upon the exercise of public 
power. It was a power asserted by the English courts as part of their common-
law jurisdiction. Our Courts did the same and the development of 
administrative law in South Africa was much influenced by the developments 
in England.
16
 
And 
although the common law remains relevant to this process, judicial review of 
the exercise of public power is a constitutional matter that takes place under 
the Constitution and in accordance with its provisions.
17
     
Besides retaining primacy in terms of common law, judicial review has also been captured in 
legislation in certain commonwealth countries. These include the codification of the grounds 
of review and a right to reasons as contained in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 in Australia and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
18
 in South 
Africa.  
Due to the primacy that judicial review retains, this section aims to analyse its nature and 
functioning. A broad description of some of the most important elements of judicial review 
will be discussed, and the problems and limitations will be highlighted.  
2 2 2   Ultra Vires Doctrine 
The constitutions of Anglo-American legal systems, whether written
19
 or unwritten,
20
 are 
founded on the rule of law. According to Wade & Forsyth, the rule of law can be said to have 
                                                     
15
 2000 2 SA 674 (CC).  
16
 38.  
17
 51.  
18
 3 of 2000 (PAJA).  
19
 Such as the Constitution of the United States of America or the Constitution of South Africa s2 which states 
that ‗this constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the 
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled‘.  
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four meanings.
21
 The first is that everything must be done according to law and that the 
person affected by a law always has a right of recourse to the courts (the principle of legality). 
However, a standard higher than legality is required by the rule of law otherwise any law, 
even if it were arbitrary and unfair, would conform to the standard. The second meaning is 
therefore that government action should be conducted within a system of rules and regulations 
so that the rule of law is not replaced with the rule of arbitrary power. The third meaning 
relates to the first, and provides that disputes about the legality of acts of the administration 
are adjudicated by impartial and independent courts, or in other words, independent of the 
executive. The final meaning of the rule of law is that although government will necessarily 
have special powers in relation to citizens, its agents are neither exempt from the law nor does 
it benefit from gratuitous privileges under the law.  
When courts review administrative action, they will generally frame their enquiry on one of 
the grounds of review.
22
 These grounds then enable the court to decide whether or not there 
was illegality or irregularity in taking the action and then hand down an appropriate remedy. 
However, these grounds are merely indications of the more general concept which underlies 
the rationale of judicial review, namely legality.
23
 The basis behind the judiciary‘s power to 
control actions of the executive has historically been rooted in the doctrine of ultra vires. This 
means that the executive can only act legitimately where their conduct is lawful, which must 
be authorised by an empowering provision.  
The ultra vires doctrine is closely tied to the concept of the separation of powers and to 
parliamentary sovereignty. It implies that parliament confers certain powers or ‗vires‘ on 
public authorities, who must act within the boundaries of those powers. The function of the 
court is to apply the laws made by parliament, and to ensure that public authorities act within 
                                                                                                                                                                     
20
 Such as the British Constitution which ‗though largely unwritten, is firmly based upon the separation of 
powers‘ in Duport Steel v Sirs (1990) I WLR 142 at 157.  
21
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 21-22. 
22
 In South Africa these have been codified in S6 PAJA, but we share many of the common law grounds with the 
other commonwealth countries. Furthermore, the common law is still a relevant source in understanding and 
informing the grounds of judicial review. Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council para 38; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa para 45; O‘Regan ―Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in Our Administrative Law‖ 
(2004) 121 SALJ 430-431.  
23
 Boulle et al Constitutional and Administrative Law 256 state that ‗The notion of legality, then, is the source of 
all the various grounds of review.‘ 
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their vires. Judicial review is therefore legitimated on the idea that the court is applying the 
intention of parliament, which is in accordance with the idea of parliamentary sovereignty.  
There are, broadly speaking, two interpretations of the ultra vires doctrine; the narrow and the 
wide. In both South African and English law, the wide approach has historically dominated 
the case law.
24
 The distinction is that the narrow theory only requires fulfillment of the 
principle of legality, while the wide theory requires compliance with the rule of law. Baxter
25
 
identifies three fundamental characteristics of the wide theory. Firstly, it is a justificatory 
doctrine for the existence of judicial review. Secondly, it is a comprehensive doctrine which 
encompasses any administrative action falling short of any principle of legality being ultra 
vires. Thirdly, it is a negative statement of the positive requirements of legality. The grounds 
of review are therefore negative statements of the positive duties required by the principle of 
legality.   
Although ultra vires has historically been the underlying premise upon which judicial review 
is founded,
26
 that idea is slowly being eroded.
27
 Although there are some writers who cling to 
the orthodox view of ultra vires,
28
 there is rich debate and much criticism related to its 
continuance as the defining justification for judicial review.
29
 Craig argues that the concept of 
judicial intervention should not rely on its willingness to give effect to the will of parliament, 
but rather on whether there is ‗a reasoned justification which is acceptable in normative terms 
for the controls which are being imposed.‘30 
                                                     
24
 See the dictum of Milne AJ in Estate Geekie v Union Government 1948 SA 494 502 that ‗in considering 
whether the proceedings of any tribunal should be set aside on the ground of illegality or irregularity, the 
question appears always to resolve itself on whether the tribunal acted ultra vires or not.‘ 
25
 Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 307-312 and 301-305.  
26
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 41 state that the doctrine of ultra vires is ‗the central principle of 
administrative law‘.  
27
 Oliver ―Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis for Judicial Review?‖ in Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review & the 
Constitution (2000) 3-27; Craig  Administrative Law 6 ed (2005) 12.  
28
 Forsyth ―Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial 
Review‖ in Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review & the Constitution (2000) 29-46 answers criticisms and vigorously 
defends the argument that the ultra vires principle ‗remains vital to the developed law of judicial review‘.  
29
 Craig ―Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review‖ in Forsyth Judicial Review & the Constitution 
(2000)  47-71 collates and discusses the criticisms and argues that the doctrine is ‗indeterminate, unrealistic, 
beset by internal tension, and that it cannot explain all the instances where the judiciary has applied public law 
principles.‘ 
30
 Craig ―Ultra Vires‖ in Judicial Review 71.  
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Most importantly in this context is that the ultra vires doctrine has ultimately been abolished 
in South Africa.
31
 Forsyth
32
 discusses the judgments of both Rabie ACJ and Hefer JA in the 
UDF case.
33
 Rabie ACJ declares that the ultra vires approach was ‗unjustified. In my opinion 
it is artificial and false, and I think that vagueness must be seen as a self-standing 
ground…not as an example of ultra vires.‘34 Hefer JA stated that the concept of ultra vires 
was too closely related to ‗conceptualism‘, and that South African law ‗has no need of this 
kind of conceptualism or of an all embracing ground rule for the exercise by the courts of 
their review jurisdiction.‘35  
This being said, the underlying idea behind the doctrine remains true.
36
 Courts are able to 
intervene in executive action when it is unlawful or illegitimate. In the new Constitutional era, 
however, this reliance is not on the common law idea of ultra vires, but rather a direct 
application on s33 of the Constitution, as well as reliance on other constitutional provisions.
37
 
Henderson describes the new constitutional ultra vires doctrine as follows: 
By expressly empowering the courts to control administrative action the Constitution 
explains why the courts are entitled to control that action. The ultra vires doctrine 
lends a logical explanation of that empowerment by explaining how the courts control 
administrative action. A court is able to recognize a ground of judicial control where 
an administrative actor has not respected, protected, promoted or fulfilled a 
requirement of the constitutionality principle, whether reflected in the Administrative 
Justice Act or not. Such recognition occurs only where the administrative actor has 
operated outside the law and the Constitution and the administrative action is ultra 
                                                     
31
 Staatspresident en andere v United Democratic Front en ‗n Ander 1988 4 SA 830 (A) hereinafter referred to 
as UDF. Boulle et al Constitutional and Administrative Law 261-264 provide a detailed discussion of the 
following case and its impact on South African administrative law. Cf O‘Regan (2004) SALJ 427; Mureinik 
―Pursuing Principle: The Appellate Division and Review under the State of Emergency‖ (1989) 5 SAJHR 71 for 
a criticism of the case.  
32
 Forsyth ―Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales‖ in Judicial Review 35-38.  
33
 The case dealt with a challenge to emergency regulations made in terms of the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953, 
which sought to prevent media coverage of ‗unrest‘. The challenge was that the concept of ‗unrest‘ was too 
vague and that the regulations should be struck down on that ground.  
34
 UDF 855 H-F.  
35
 UDF 868.  
36
 ‗There is of course no doubt that the common-law principles of ultra vires remain under the new constitutional 
order. However, they are underpinned (and supplemented where necessary) by a constitutional principle of 
legality.‘ Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 59.  
37
 S8(1) states that the Bill of Rights binds all organs of state; s7 requires the state to ‗respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights‘ and s39(2) requires the courts to promote the spirit, purport 
and object of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation and when developing common or customary law. 
The courts therefore justify their intervention constitutionally.  
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vires. The doctrine is as comprehensive as the Constitution will allow, and although it 
is the Constitution itself which now provides the courts with political ‗license for 
judicial review‘, the doctrine still provides a logical explanation of how the courts 
control administrative action.‘38 
2 2 3 Difference between Appeal and Review 
The difference between appeal and review should briefly be stated here, because (at least on a 
theoretical level) the importance of maintaining the distinction is one of the fundamental 
pillars in South African administrative law generally and in judicial review specifically.
39
 
While both are means of reconsidering a decision made by an administrator or lower tribunal, 
they reconsider the decision in different ways and therefore serve different purposes.
40
 Appeal 
is concerned with the actual merits of the decision and whether the decision reached was the 
‗correct‘ one. Appeal judges can therefore declare whether the decision was right or wrong.41 
Review, on the other hand, is not concerned with the merits. When the courts review 
decisions they assess the manner in which the decision was reached to determine whether or 
not it was lawful.
42
 In essence this means that the enquiry which the courts follow is one of 
legality, or whether the decision was reached in a procedurally fair, lawful manner. 
Considerations which are taken into account are process-related, rather than ‗whether the 
record reveals relevant considerations that are capable of justifying the outcome.‘43  
The reasoning behind courts and judges in particular showing such judicial restraint and 
deference to the executive is that an enquiry into the merits and a decision that the initial 
conclusion reached was the ‗wrong‘ one involves an unconstitutional usurpation of the 
constitutional function of the executive. Provided courts only consider the method and the 
process, they are not questioning the inherent discretionary or decision-making powers of the 
                                                     
38
 Henderson ―The Curative Powers of the Constitution: Constitutionality and the New Ultra Vires Doctrine in 
the Justification and Explanation of the Judicial Review of Administrative Action‖ (1998) 115 SALJ 359 
(emphasis and spelling as in original).  
39
 Hoexter Administrative Law 105.  
40
 Hoexter Administrative Law 104-105.  
41
 Tikly v Johannes NO 1963 2 SA 588 (T) 590G-H. This may also put them in a position to substitute their own 
decision as a ‗correct‘ one.  
42
 Rustenberg Platinum Mine Ltd (Rustenberg Section) v Commission for Conciliatiion, Mediation and 
Arbitration 2007 SA 576 (SCA) para 31 Cameron JA states that ‗the focus is on the process, and on the way in 
which the decision-maker came to the challenged conclusion.‘ 
43
 Rustenberg Platinum Mines v CCMA para 30. Hoexter states that ‗that is the territory of appeal, when the 
question is whether the decision is correct.‘ Hoexter Administrative Law 105. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
executive, but are rather performing their own constitutionally-ordained function. Hoexter 
explains that ‗the distinction reflects the separation of powers, a fundamental pillar of our 
constitutional order.‘44 She considers that we have inherited a ‗watchdog theory‘ from English 
law, which places the courts as checks against the executive. This watchdog theory is also 
part of the ‗red-light theory‘ as used in the traffic-light metaphor.45 
That being said, this categorical distinction between appeal and review is not as apparent in 
practice as it may appear in theory. Hoexter illustrates that ‗in truth it may be impossible in 
some cases to separate the merits from the rest of the matter, since a court cannot effectively 
judge the legality of a decision without considering its merits as well.‘46 One of the most 
contentious points is a review for reasonableness, but this is not the only example. Hoexter 
lists several of the other grounds for review in PAJA
47
 and explains how an investigation into 
whether they were complied with will inevitably involve an enquiry into the merits.
48
  
However, the importance of the distinction is still relevant when considering what function 
judicial review should play. Due to the fact that it is concerned with the process of decision-
making, courts are able to limit their enquiry to the lawfulness of the decision and do not find 
themselves in an awkward position between judicial intervention and judicial restraint. This 
will allow the boundaries of judicial review to be respected and would not amount to an 
unconstitutional usurpation of functional competence on the part of the judiciary. At the same 
time, there may very often be a need for an enquiry into the merits, especially in the field of 
administrative law. For this reason, judicial review should generally not serve as the first 
forum for intervention. Rather, if a decision reached is a ‗wrong‘ one and does not require an 
                                                     
44
 Hoexter Administrative Law 107.  
45
 The metaphor is discussed below in s 2 2 5 regarding the Facilitation of Review. In Carephone v Marcus NO 
and Others 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) 37 Froneman DJP discusses the difference between appeal and review and 
states that ‗it seems to me that one will never be able to formulate a more specific test other than, in one way or 
another, asking the question: is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision maker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she 
eventually arrived at?‘ He sees no reason for the abolition of the difference between appeal and review. 
46
 Hoexter Administrative Law 106.  
47
 Listed in S6 PAJA.   
48
 Hoexter Administrative Law 107. These include whether sufficient weight was given to a relevant 
consideration, or whether an ulterior purpose or motive was pursued by the decision-maker, or whether the 
decision was dictated by an unauthorised person or body, or whether the decision-maker adhered rigidly to a 
policy or precedent. 
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enquiry into the process, but the correction of an incorrect decision, there should be a system 
of appeals to which applicants can turn.
49
  
2 2 4 Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty – Is Review Democratic?50 
One question which has been raised about the legitimacy of judicial review, and a factor 
which puts pressure on judges to show more judicial deference, is the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. The counter-majoritarian difficulty exists because courts, in effect judges, are able 
to hand down binding judgments over-and-above the actions of the executive. Judges are not 
elected officials and therefore do not necessarily represent the will of the people. This is a 
broader constitutional concept, but applies specifically in the tension between judicial 
intervention and judicial restraint.
 51
 
Hoexter states that ‗judicial review is characterised by a continuous tension between two 
opposing ideals: the ideal of governmental freedom of action, and the ideal of judicial 
control.‘52 The reason for the tension is ultimately a political decision; the courts attempt not 
to overstep their institutional role and to infringe on the sphere of the executive or the 
legislature. The reasoning is that  
the actions of administrative bodies and officials, established by a 
democratically elected legislature to perform certain functions (involving 
questions of law, fact and policy) stand opposed to a judiciary with the 
(constitutional, common-law or derived legislative) function of controlling,  
reviewing or supervising such action.
53
 
Courts have tried to lessen the potentially undemocratic consequences of their decisions by 
retreating into a mechanistic role, focusing on strict classifications of functions in order to the 
                                                     
49
 See Ch 3 for a discussion of appeal tribunals; their advantages and functioning.  
50
 See also s 2 2 6 Limits and Limitations of Judicial Review. However, a full discussion of the separation of 
powers implications of tribunals is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
51
 ‗The ―difficulty‖ of reconciling the judicial control of legislation with the fact that such legislation has been 
enacted by a democratically elected legislature…is in other words replicated in the administrative law context.‘ 
De Ville ―Deference as Respect and Deference as Sacrifice: A Reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs‖ (2004) 20 SAJHR 586. ‗The democratic objection to judicial review, which has dogged 
constitutionalism since the early nineteenth century, originates in the ‗countermajoritarian difficulty‘: the 
problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and unaccountable judges in a political 
democracy.‘ Lenta ―Democracy, Rights Disagreements and Judicial Review‖ (2004) 20 SAJHR 20 1-31 5.  
52
 Hoexter The New Constitutional and Administrative Law II: Administrative Law (2002) 68.  
53
 De Ville (2004) SAJHR 586. 
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limit their influence.
54
 However, in a constitutional state where the judiciary has an 
accountable, influential role on the achievement of socio-economic rights, such formalism 
and conceptualism cannot be reconciled with their purpose.
55
  
There are two important counter-arguments to this difficulty. Firstly, it is only ministerial 
heads who are directly elected to office. Many, if not most of the administrators who make the 
bulk of the decisions are far removed from the people who they serve. Judges, on the other 
hand, are appointed by officials who were democratically elected. Judges also have a far 
higher standard of accountability than low-level public servants and administrators.  
A second argument is that the democratic ‗cost‘ of judicial review is surely outweighed by its 
ability to hold the administration accountable for its actions and in the limitation of 
maladministration. In fact,  
most administrative lawyers surely see review itself as a desirable and essential 
component of modern democracy, and reject any crude majoritarian 
conception of democracy in which review would feature as the automatic 
enemy.
56
 
These arguments aside, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is still a real concern. The potential 
threat that judicial review poses of being undemocratic may be a powerful factor towards 
avoiding over-reliance on judicial review as a control mechanism.  
2 2 5 Facilitation of Review: The Traffic-Light Metaphor 
The purpose with which review is employed is an essentially important aspect of how it is 
used as a safeguard against the abuse of public power. The traffic-light metaphor, as 
employed by Harlow & Rawlings,
57
 is especially useful in determining the role that judicial 
review plays. The metaphor is a way of describing approaches to the control of public and 
                                                     
54
 In South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 4 SA 1 (A), the strict classification of 
functions approach was finally rejected by Milne J. He states at 13 that ‗a departure from formal classification as 
criterion not only would be in accordance with modern trends in administrative law, but also would provide a 
more rational function for the application of the rules of natural justice in this area.‘  
55
 There is a clear commitment in s1 of the South African Constitution to ‗accountability, responsiveness and 
openness‘ and courts must be able to conduct reasonableness review over governmental action, according to 
O‘Regan (2004) SALJ 336.  
56
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 493.  
57
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 2 ed (1997). The 2
nd 
 rather than the 3
rd
 edition has been used 
here as the concept is more fully discussed and explained than in the later edition. Taggart discusses reasons for 
the movement away from the traffic-light metaphor in Taggart ―Reinvented Government, Traffic Lights and the 
Convergence of Public and Private law‖ (1999) PL 124-138.  
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administrative power by the courts, and the intention with which the courts exert jurisdiction. 
The metaphor uses the example of the three stages of a traffic-light, the red-light theory, the 
green-light theory and the integrated ‗amber-light theory‘.  
The red-light theory indicates courts as watchdogs whose primary function is to curb the 
misuse
58
 of public power. In this way courts provide a controlling and limiting function over 
the power of the executive. This may often lead to judicial activism
59
 and may give weight to 
the objection that judicial review is not democratic.
60
 The red-light theory has at its centre the 
rule of law. This means that courts are the primary weapon of the citizen against the state and 
the control of the executive. Woolf et al state that 
in matters of public law, the role of the ordinary courts is of high constitutional 
importance. It is a function of the judiciary to determine the lawfulness of the 
acts and decisions and orders of the Executive, tribunals, and other officials 
exercising public functions, and to afford protection of the rights of the 
citizen.
61
  
Red-light theory further looks to a balanced constitution, the strict separation of powers and 
supports strong judicial control of the executive and legislature. Hoexter describes this theory 
as one in which ‗law is elevated above politics, and judges are independent and impartial 
arbiters protecting citizens‘ rights and guarding against tyranny and arbitrariness in 
government.‘62  
The green-light theory, on the other hand, views courts as facilitators to administrative justice. 
Rather than merely curbing executive power, they encourage good governance and facilitate 
better operations in the administrative sphere. In this way, green-light theory favours the 
‗administrative state‘ and identifies administrative law as a vehicle for positive social change. 
                                                     
58
 Misuse in this sense is more appropriate than ‗abuse‘ because according to Wade & Forsyth Administrative 
Law 5 ‗‖abuse‖, it should be made clear, carries no necessary innuendo of malice or bad faith. Government 
departments may misunderstand their legal position as easily as may other people, and the law they have to 
administer is frequently complex and uncertain. Abuse is therefore inevitable, and it is all the more necessary 
that the law should provide means to check it.‘  
59
 Hoexter refers to the dangers of this by saying ‗it is futile to deny the dangers of unbridled activism…a 
particular judicial willingness to intervene in administrative matters, or alacrity in setting aside administrative 
action, correcting it, or granting some other remedy.‘ Hoexter (2000) SALJ 494. 
60
 See s 2 2 4 Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty. The traffic-light metaphor is inextricably linked to the democratic 
debate and thus these two sections should be read in conjunction.  
61
 Woolf, Jowell & Le Seuer (eds) De Smith‘s Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 5.  
62
 Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law 69. 
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The focus of green-light theory must then also be the reform and change of the legal system 
itself and naturally the theory focuses on the alternatives to courts, especially the construction 
of so-called administrative courts. Green-light theory also places far less emphasis on judges 
and courts as having the primary responsibility for giving effect to social justice. Rather, 
green-light theorists view the whole of administrative law and all of the parties within it as 
equally responsible agents in the process of transformation. Green-light theorists aim to 
minimise the role of courts and although ‗lawyers still regard themselves as champions of the 
popular cause; there can be little doubt that the great departments of state…are not only 
essential to the well-being of the great mass of the people, but also the most significant 
expressions of democracy in our time.‘63 
While the red-light theory seems to prioritise judicial control over the executive, it is 
important to be aware of exactly what the word ‗control‘ means. Harlow & Rawlings pay 
specific attention to this concept by unpacking its meaning.
64
 Control is not merely a negative 
reinforcer, but can also be a positive impetus which provides structure and support. Once 
again, it appears that there is no settled answer to which of the theories provides a more 
democratic and just answer to administrative law questions.  
Harlow & Rawlings make an interesting point regarding the role of courts in administrative 
law. They state that their approach to the role of courts is ‗pragmatic‘, that they ‗do not 
demand consistency with some overarching theory of the administrative state‘ and are 
‗prepared to accept new ways of addressing problems, even though they may make a 
theoretical jumble of the legal culture.‘65 In this way, an either/or approach does not 
necessarily need to be followed. Rather, the valuable features of both theories should be 
combined in order to create the most efficient, most democratic solution to administrative law 
problems. Even Wade & Forsyth, who are typically regarded as advocating a ‗red light 
theory‘ which aims at curbing governmental power, also state that  
                                                     
63
 Robson Justice and Administrative Law 3 ed (1951) 421. This statement reinforces the idea that government 
departments should be as accountable as judges as agents of social change.  
64
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 39 ‗Control can be symbolic or real; it can mean to check, 
restrain or govern.‘ Also see Griffith & Street Principles of Administrative Law (1973) 24 ‗Banks control a river; 
a driver controls his car. The influence of a parent over his child may be greater than the power of a prison guard 
over a convict.‘  
65
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 48, and in this passage they are quoting Shapiro ‗Pragmatic 
Administrative Law‘ in Stewart (ed) Issues in Legal Scholarship: the Reformation of American Administrative 
Law (2005) 1. 
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it is a mistake to suppose that a developed system of administrative law is 
necessarily antagonistic to efficient government…Nor should it be supposed 
that the continuous intervention by the courts…means that the standard of 
administration is low…The contribution that the law can and should make is 
creative rather than destructive.
66
 
It has been argued that judicial review is an important and essential safeguard to 
misappropriation of public power. However, the important argument remains that courts 
cannot and should not be the only guardians of rights.
67
 Only an integrated system of 
responsible agents of administrative law who all work collectively and with a transformative 
agenda will give effect to positive social change. Boulle et al
68
 consider this as a third 
alternative where neither green-light nor red-light theories ultimately prevail, but rather where 
administrative law is a consistent balance between both sides. They term this the ‗amber-light 
theory‘.69 This differs from green light theory in that political institutions are not viewed as 
adequate to control state power alone and that new administrative principles, procedures and 
law should be developed ‗to supplement the democratic and political controls over those who 
exercise state power.‘70 The idea is to create a balance between internal administrative 
controls and external, judicial or political controls. This approach to control of administrative 
action acknowledges both a limited role for judicial review and the courts as a control 
mechanism, and an improved level of coherent administrative principles and procedures.  
2 2 6  Prominence of Review 
Woolf et al
71
 show that judicial review, as well as traditionally being the most important 
safeguard of public power, is not in any way diminishing. They explain that there is a danger 
in relegating judicial review to a minor role, firstly because there is evidence to suggest that 
the judicial review case load grows every year
72
 and secondly because there is evidence to 
                                                     
66
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 7. 
67
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration  48 state that ‗lawyers…suffer from a professional deformation; 
they are too easily inclined to assume a judicial answer to every problem.‘ 
68
 Boulle et al Constitutional and Administrative Law 80-83 
69
 Boulle et al Constitutional and Administrative Law 81. 
70
 Boulle et al Constitutional and Administrative Law 81.  For a summary and critique of the usefulness of the 
traffic-light metaphor in South African administrative law see Klaaren ―Redlight, Greenlight‖ (1999) 15 SAJHR 
209-216 and for a English perspective see Taggart (1999) PL 124-138.  
71
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 3.  
72
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 3. Hoexter (2000) SALJ 492. 
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suggest that there is a heightened awareness among administrative officials of the potential 
impact of judicial review.
73
 However, the practical impact and relevance of these judicial 
decisions are realised only when administrators translate and incorporate the judgments into 
their daily administration, which will only be achieved when judges show sensitivity to the 
complex and policy-laden decisions of the administrative officials. Failure to co-operate in 
this way may lead to ‗greater formalism and increased bureaucratisation.‘74 
They consider this point in light of the fact that while judicial review may be the ultimate and 
highest form of control, it cannot stand alone and must be seen in a broader context of all the 
checks and controls available in administrative law. Judicial review simply cannot perform all 
the control functions necessary in a complex, stratified administrative law system.  
Judicial review provides just one of a number of legal controls of 
administrative action and its role is inevitably sporadic and peripheral. The 
administrative process is not, and cannot be, a succession of justiciable 
controversies.
75
  
This means that judicial review must retain its authoritative role as the ultimate defense 
against administrative abuse and the protector of the rights and legitimate expectations of 
citizens. At the same time, there should be an integrated system of checks and controls at a 
lower, administrative level to provide efficient, effective and progressive realisation of 
administrative rights.
76
  
2 2 7 Criticism of Review: Limits and Limitations 
Hoexter
77
 summarises some of the major criticisms against judicial review. While many of 
these are especially prominent in South Africa, these criticisms relate to judicial review in 
general. The following section uses her synopsis as a starting point for the discussion.  
Hoexter categorises the types of criticisms against judicial review. Firstly, review is described 
as being ‗marginal or peripheral‘ in three different senses; the first of which is that it does not 
                                                     
73
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 19. Hoexter (2000) SALJ 492. 
74
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 23. 
75
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 3. 
76
 ‗Public authorities are set up to govern and administer, and if their every act or decision were to be reviewable 
on unrestricted grounds by an independent judicial body, the business of administration could be brought to a 
standstill.‘ Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 3. Cf Hoexter (2000) SALJ 494.  
77
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 489-490. Paraphrasing her summary I will outline the major problems.  
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consider matters which are not ‗justiciable‘ or not of a nature that is able to be decided by a 
court of law.
78
 Secondly, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the outcomes of 
adverse judicial review judgments cause administrators to change their decision-making 
methods in any way.
79
 Thirdly, review does not necessarily grant applicants the kind of relief 
they are seeking. As will be demonstrated with reference to the Eastern Cape social assistance 
cases,
80
 merely remitting the decision back to the administrator to re-make it is often 
insufficient. The applicants generally seek a favourable substantive decision, not merely the 
same adverse decision re-made in accordance with procedural requirements. This criticism 
links heavily with the intended institutional purpose of judicial review, which is not to 
question the merits of the decision, but rather its form and process.  
The second criticism is that review is negative and retrospective. This means that rather than 
aiming progressively at ensuring better future administrative decision-making, review focuses 
on past maladministration and seeks to cure defects that have already occurred.
81
  
The third criticism is that review is sporadic and random, and that decisions are corrected on 
an ad hoc basis.
82
  
Fourthly, review is criticised as being slow, expensive,
 83
 time-consuming and ‗deeply 
mysterious to the layperson.‘84 
                                                     
78
 Fuller ―The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‖ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard LR 353 details how we consider 
disputes to be ‗justiciable‘ and what precisely it means to have a dispute which can be adjudicated by a court of 
law.  
79
 In fact, it may even have negative consequences in that administrators employ defensive practices which will 
limit their exposure to liability rather than focusing on making the decision-making process better. Hoexter 
(2000) SALJ fn 18; Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration; Hutchinson ―The Rise and Ruse of 
Administrative Law and Scholarship‖ (1985) Modern LR 293.   
80
 S 2 3 2.  
81
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 1 and Cane Administrative Law 4 ed (2004) 378.  
82
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 1. Galligan ―Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers‖ (1982) 2 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 257.  
83
 This point is also one of the essential bases for considering alternative administrative adjudication 
mechanisms, such as a system of administrative appeals tribunals.  
84
 Hoexter illustrates that this is a particularly salient objection in South Africa where high levels of poverty and 
illiteracy abound. Cf Budlender ―The Accessibility of Administrative Justice‖ in Bennett, Cockrell, Jooste, 
Keightley & Murray (eds) Administrative Law Reform (1993) 128; Plasket ―Accessibility through Public Interest 
Litigation‖ in Corder & Maluwa (eds) Administrative Justice in South Africa (1997) 119.  
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The last criticism, one that has important consequences for the legitimacy of judicial review, 
is the accusation that it is undemocratic. Hoexter divides the ‗undemocratic‘ accusation into 
two categories; firstly that the process of review does not enhance participation of the public 
or the ‗problem of non-participation‘85 and secondly that judicial review involves usurpation 
by the judiciary of the function of the executive.
86
 The first ‗undemocratic‘ objection is that  
judicial review operates as a pale and perverse substitute for genuine and 
vigorous popular involvement and control. Indeed, the need for judicial review 
is premised on the failure of the institutional structure of British democracy to 
ensure meaningful citizen participation in government.
87
 
The noteworthy point about the criticisms above is that, although they are true of judicial 
review, they are only problematic when review is required to fulfill a different function then 
the one it was created to. For example, despite the fact that it is true that review is backward-
looking and a negative check, there should be other positive and progressive means of 
promoting good governance.
88
 That way, judicial review would remain a curative power of 
the courts and would only be employed as a final means to correct glaring legal errors. If 
judicial review is required to perform the function of an internal appeal mechanism, it can 
naturally be criticised for not fulfilling this task.   
Based on the more general concepts of judicial review as discussed above, the following 
section will consider the position of judicial review in South Africa, with a focus on the role 
that judicial review has been forced to play in the development of South African 
administrative law. The examination will also highlight the above criticisms of judicial review 
in South Africa in the case law. From that, arguments against the criticism will be evaluated, 
and potential alternatives will be considered.   
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 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 490.  
86
 This is dealt with more comprehensively in s 2 3 3 above.  
87
 Hutchinson (1985) Modern LR 323. In South African constitutional law, and especially administrative law, 
public participation is both a fundamental cornerstone of our constitutional order and an indispensable part of 
any administrative action.  
88
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 4 state that ‗English administrative law is becoming increasingly 
interested in different forms of regulation and in prophylactic rather than exclusively curative techniques of 
control‘.  
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2 3 Judicial Review in South Africa 
2 3 1 Introduction 
Judicial review in South Africa has enjoyed primacy as the courts‘ approach to the control of 
executive power.
89
 To some extent, judicial review has almost become synonymous with 
administrative law,
90
 despite the two being rather different. It is because of this that the first 
set of criticisms against judicial review, that it is ‗marginal and peripheral‘, do not necessarily 
apply the same way in South Africa.
91
 Rather than being relegated to a marginal role, ‗as a 
result of our oppressive history, it has been made to play a dominant and central role.‘92 
Hoexter points out that the Apartheid political and social structure made it necessary for 
judicial intervention to be the only bulwark against the misuse of power and that judicial 
review has been forced to ‗fill the vacuum created by the absence (or lack of efficacy) of non-
judicial safeguards.‘93 The case law reiterates the idea that courts face a daunting temptation 
not to intervene on behalf of an applicant who has been wronged by the system and who has 
no other remedy. 
94
 
Hoexter
95
 provides a detailed explanation of the shortcomings of judicial review in South 
African law, and particularly in the creation of an administrative justice act
96
 as envisaged by 
S33 of the Constitution. She identifies two main problems with South African administrative 
law of the 20
th
 century; firstly that it was in desperate need of completion, for an ‗integrated 
system of administrative law in which judicial review is regarded as merely supplementary to 
the business of making good primary decisions‘;97 and secondly that both courts and 
                                                     
89
 ‗The field (of administrative law) had always been dominated by judicial review, other controls and safeguards 
in the administrative process having been relegated to unimportant positions or neglected altogether.‘ Hoexter 
(2000) SALJ 484. 
90
 Hoexter explains that the reason for this is that in the pre-constitutional era, South African administrative law 
had little to offer in the way of remedies other than judicial review. Hoexter (2000) SALJ 485. 
91
 The sub-problems of a non-recognition of rights which are not justiciable; of administrators not necessarily 
changing their decision-making standards; and the potential unsuitability of judicial review in remedying 
administrative error still apply. 
92
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 492.  
93
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ fn 37.  
94
 Galligan (1982) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 269. See s 2 3 2.  
95
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 492. 
96
 PAJA.  
97
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ 484. 
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administrators required an appropriate theory of deference which would give guidance as to 
the role of judicial intervention into executive decision-making. This problematic position is 
still a reality. Despite the regulation of administrative action by PAJA; numerous definitive 
judgments from the highest courts;
98
 and academic opinion;
99
 judicial review continues to be 
forced to play an ‗anti-administration‘100 role; and a clear, consistent theory explaining the 
tension between judicial activism and judicial restraint has not been formulated.  
This section will not deal with the vast set of problems with the pre-constitutional position of 
judicial review, but rather consider its failings after the enactment and coming into effect of 
PAJA. Recent case law will demonstrate how the general objections above are particularly 
salient in South Africa today.  
2 3 2 Case Law 
The cases discussed in this section will show the situation in the country as it is today, and 
how the administrative law system is failing so many of the most desperate and needy citizens 
of South Africa. Although this is not directly attributable to the shortcomings of judicial 
review and is more often than not attributable to the failings of local government and 
administrators, the unsatisfactory remedies that judicial review can offer will be 
demonstrated. Reason will also be provided for an alternative form of dispute resolution 
because review simply does not result in the necessary administrative outcomes.  
In a leading case in the Eastern Cape High Court,
101
 Plasket J provides a succinct explanation 
of the situation surrounding social assistance in the province. He paints a bleak picture of the 
incompetence, unwillingness and sheer lack of responsibility of provincial government in the 
administration of social benefits. He begins with his greatest cause for concern which is the 
backlog of cases which appear on the motion court role. He states that 
                                                     
98
 Cameron JA in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) para 21; O‘Regan J 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
para 46-48; Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 4 SA 1 (CC).  
99
 Dyzenhaus ―The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy‖ in Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (1997) 303; De Ville (2004) SAJHR 586. 
100 Hoexter states that ‗when South African lawyers placed great reliance on judicial intervention in 
administrative matters to remedy the injustices of political and legal oppression…the fostered an attitude that 
was distinctly ‗pro-review‘ and ‗anti-administration‘. Their assumption – apparently justified by history – tended 
to be that the more review there was, the better things would be.‘ Hoexter (2000) SALJ 484. This is in contrast 
with the idea of an integrated administrative law system.  
101
 Vumazonke & Others v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape, and Three Similar Cases 2005 6 SA 229 
(SE) hereinafter referred to as Vumazonke.  
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during a week of motion court duty from 8 to 12 November 2004, I dealt with 
102 matters in which applicants claimed relief in essentially similar terms 
against the Member of the Executive Council for Social Development in the 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government…Unfortunately, it is a phenomenon that 
is now common: the judges of this division, as well as those in the other two 
divisions in the Eastern Cape, have grown accustomed to the depressing tales 
of misery and privation contained in an ever-increasing volume of cases that 
clog their motion court rolls in which applicants complain about administrative 
torpor in the processing of their applications for social assistance. To make 
matters worse, this situation is not new. Over the last four or five years, judges 
have commented, often in strident terms, about the unsatisfactory performance 
of the respondent‘s department in the administration of the social assistance 
system in the province.
102
  
Another problem is that because many of the residents of the province do not have access to 
legal aid and legal representation, ‗the matters that do come to court are probably but the tip 
of the iceberg‘.103 This means that there is a very distressing reality that even though the 
motion courts are full of people coming to review their cases, in all probability many more are 
suffering in the same way but are unable to rectify it. With reference to several other cases, he 
explains the problems facing the judiciary.
104
 
A recent Supreme Court of Appeal case, MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate
105
 also 
deals with the Department of Welfare in the Eastern Cape and the administrative failings 
thereof. The two judgments will be analysed in order to show the potential problems with 
judicial review in South Africa. Although Plasket J and Nugent JA deal with these in a 
different order respectively,
106
 the order of the discussion will reflect the criticisms 
highlighted by Hoexter above.  
                                                     
102
 Vumazonke 2. 
103
 Ndevu v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government SECLD 
undated judgment case no. 597/02 2.  
104
 Somyani v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another SECLD undated 
judgment case no 1144/01; Ndevu v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, EC; Jayiya v Member of the 
Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA); Mjeni v Minister of Health 
and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk); Ngxuza and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another 2001 2 SA 609 (E) and Kate v Member of the 
Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). 
 
105
 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) hereinafter referred to as Kate.  
106
 Plasket J delivered the judgment in Vumazonke, while Nugent JA delivered the judgment in Kate.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
 
2 3 2 1 Marginal and Peripheral 
As has been demonstrated above, judicial review plays a central role in the administration of 
justice in South Africa. The argument that can be made here is not that judicial review plays a 
marginal role, as it clearly occupies a central and dominant position, but rather that judicial 
review is a marginal remedy against maladministration because so few of these cases can ever 
reach court. While judicial review remains the primary possibility of redress, so few claimants 
have access to the levels of education or wealth needed to bring a case to court.  Furthermore, 
judicial review is a peripheral and marginal remedy against maladministration because it 
cannot assist with systematic improvements to the administrative system, but can only cure a 
small percentage of badly-made decisions.  
2 3 2 2 Negative and Retrospective 
The problem that negative remedying poses to a system determined to better its decision-
making is that decisions are often remedied months to years after they are made. For people 
who are reliant on social assistance not only for support but to actually live, this position is 
untenable. In the Kate case, it is apparent that Kate applied for a social grant just after the 
coming into of the Social Assistance Act
107
 in 1996 and her case only reached the Supreme 
Court in 2006. Ten years to wait during difficult, prolonged litigation resulting in exorbitant 
costs, both for the applicant and the public purse, cannot be the solution to the massive crisis 
facing social administration in the Eastern Cape.  
The long delays relate not only to slow court proceedings, but also to the time it takes the 
applicant to bring her case before the courts. The members of society that our Constitution is 
most committed to assisting and who must ‗animate our understanding of the Constitution‘s 
provisions‘108 are usually the ones without the necessary resources or the legal knowledge to 
enforce such rights. This was acknowledged in Kate where it was stated that  
rights that are now in issue are directed towards the very poorest in our society, 
who have little or nothing to sustain them, and who can be expected to have 
little or no knowledge of where their rights lie nor the resources readily to 
secure them.
109
 
                                                     
107
 59 of 1992.  
108
 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and another v Ngxuza 
and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 12. 
109
 Kate 31.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
Furthermore, the retrospective relief courts can provide to the individuals who are fortunate 
enough to approach courts cannot systematically improve the quality of administrative service 
they received. In Vumazonke Plasket J states that  
the courts are left with a problem that they cannot resolve: while they grant 
relief to the individuals who approach them for relief, they are forced to watch 
impotently while a dysfunctional and apparently unrepentant administration 
continues to abuse its power at the expense of large numbers of poor 
people...
110
 
The curative remedies available to courts processing an application for judicial review are 
simply not suited to the large-scale systemic problems facing the administrative system. This 
problem can also be related to the fact that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the 
administrators change their decisions after unfavourable judgments against them. In the 
Eastern Cape, the evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary and the case law reinforces this 
idea that the administration is in fact not responding whatsoever to court intervention.
111
  
2 3 2 3 Sporadic and Random 
This criticism relates to the criticism of a backward-looking remedy and can be found in the 
same paragraph. From the judgments it appears that administrators are willing, even in the 
best-case scenario, only to pay the costs and obey the orders that they are ordered to by court. 
Rather than envisaging new and innovative ways to improve and enhance good governance 
and better decision-making from the beginning, administrators opt to pay massive cost orders 
and to use the courts‘ adjudicatory function to decide who should be paid out.112  
Plasket states that  
notwithstanding that literally thousands of orders have been made against the 
respondent‘s department over the past number of years, it appears to be willing 
to pay the costs of those applications rather than remedy the problem of 
                                                     
110
 Vumazonke 10.  
111
 Vumazonke 10 fn 20 states that ‗The point must be made that the respondent‘s department hardly ever 
opposes the applications brought against it and, when it opposed, hardly ever does so successfully.‘ This 
statement seems to suggest that neither original process nor justified opposition are being altered in accordance 
with court orders or court pronouncements. 
112
 Rather than viewing the courts‘ intervention as an unconstitutional usurpation, the misuse of the role of the 
courts in administrative law should be a cause for concern. 
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maladministration and inefficiency that has been identified as the root cause of 
the problem.
113
 
As stated above by Woolf et al
114
 the administrative process cannot merely be a ‗succession 
of justiciable controversies.‘ Plasket J alludes to this when he describes that it is not only the 
relevant governmental authorities
115
 that are responsible for the dire situation, but also two 
other public bodies which are empowered by the Constitution to investigate, monitor and 
evaluate the organisation and implementation of the administration.  
He refers firstly to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) which is a Chapter 9 institution 
created to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic.
116
 The duties of the HRC are 
outlined in s184
117
 and it is required to promote respect for human rights; promote the 
protection, development and attainment of human rights and monitor and assess the 
observance of human rights in the Republic. This is to be achieved by investigating and 
reporting on the observance of human rights; taking steps to secure appropriate redress where 
human rights have been violated; carrying out research; and educating administrators. Finally, 
the HRC must require relevant organs of state to provide information regarding the measures 
that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning 
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment.
118
 S15 of 
the Human Rights Commission Act
119
 empowers the HRC to conduct these investigations and 
sets guidelines for how they are to be carried out.
120
    
                                                     
113
 Vumazonke 10 (footnotes omitted).  
114
 Woolf et al De Smith‘s Judicial Review 1.  
115
 Such as the MEC for Social Welfare and Development, the Premier of the province, the Social Development 
Standing Committee of the provincial legislature and the Minister of Social Development in the national sphere 
of government all of whom are responsible according to their Constitutional obligations.   
 
116
 Vumazonke 15.  
117
 Constitution of South Africa, 1996.  
118
 S184(2) of the Constitution. 
119
 54 of 1994.  
120
 Danaline Fransman, Head of Legal Services of the HRC advised via e-mail (28-04-2011) that there was a 
thorough investigation conducted by the EC office regarding this judgment. A series of meetings with the then 
Premier of the Eastern Cape, the Minister of the Eastern Cape Social Development and senior officials of the 
Department of Social Development were convened. There were walkabouts to some selected offices of Social 
Development to verify information received from the Department and thereafter a letter was sent to the Judge 
informing him of their investigation. 
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Plasket ordered that a copy of the judgment should be served on the HRC in order that the 
Commissioner could make a reasoned decision whether  
to institute an investigation into the conduct of the respondent‘s department, 
with a view to proposing concrete steps to ensure that it begins to comply with 
its constitutional and legal obligations and ceases to infringe fundamental 
rights on the present grand scale.
121
 
The second institution to which he refers is the Public Service Commission (PSC). This in an 
independent body created to maintain ‗effective and efficient public administration‘ and to 
promote ‗a high standard of professional ethics in the public service‘.122 The functions of the 
PSC are contained in s196(4) and include the promotion of the values and principles in s195 
of the Constitution;
123
 the investigation, monitoring and evaluation of the organisation and 
administration of the public service; the proposing of measures to ensure effective and 
efficient performance within the public service; the reporting of activities and performance of 
functions and the general investigation and evaluation of personnel and public administration 
practices. The PSC is empowered to conduct such enquiries and investigations in terms of the 
Public Service Commission Act.
124
 
The reason for his choosing to serve the judgments on the HRC and PSC is that they can then 
consider whether to institute an investigation into the relevant department. Rather than relying 
solely on a route which can only solve one case at a time, Plasket highlights the responsibility 
of the independent institutions to investigate and systematically improve the disorganisation 
and ineptitude of the department in the administration of social assistance. 
In Kate, the problem is highlighted with regard to how applications for review are 
approached. Rather than being sensible reasoned applications which relate specifically to 
judicial review, they are desperate attempts to illicit any response from an unresponsive and 
impotent government department. Nugent JA explains that  
                                                     
121
 Vumazonke 18. 
122
 S196(2) of the Constitution. 
123
 Namely s195(1)(a), which requires that a ‗high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained‘; s195(1)(b), which requires that ‗[e]fficient, economic and effective use of resources must be 
promoted‘; s195(1)(e), which requires that the needs of people ‗must be responded to‘; s195(1)(f), which 
requires that public administration ‗must be accountable‘; and s195(1)(g), which requires that ‗[t]ransparency 
must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information‘. Vumazonke 12. 
124
 46 of 1997 ss 9 & 10.  
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typically what seems to be occurring is that when a demand upon the 
administration is ignored an application to court spews from a word processor, 
with adaptations to meet the particular case…125 
and later that 
another consequence of litigation on that scale…is that cases are often 
commenced without adequate thought being given to the formulation of the 
claim. Instead a burst of shrapnel is fired in the general direction of the 
government in the hope that somewhere something will strike home.
126
 
2 3 2 4 Expensive, slow, time-consuming and daunting 
This four-part criticism relating to courts generally is perhaps one of the most important in 
our context. However, it is more thoroughly dealt with in the section relating to the Chapters 
3, 6 and 7.  
What should be noted here is that it is not only the costs to the applicant which should be 
considered, because even if they are successful there is often a costs order against the 
administration. This is even more alarming because it is the public purse which is being 
plundered. Instead of making correct decisions and administering allocated funds from the 
beginning, each case now has an additional and unfavourable cost order attached to it.  
In Ndevu v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government and another,
127
 Erasmus J states  
I have obtained from the Registrar a copy of a bill taxed in a similar matter. On 
that basis these matters tax out at about R4 000.00 per case. It would mean 
therefore that in today‘s cases alone about R100 000.00 will be paid in legal 
costs in respect of the fees and disbursements of the legal representatives of the 
applicants. Clearly, millions of rand in taxpayers‘ money have been wasted in 
unnecessary legal costs occasioned by indolence and/or incompetence on the 
part of public servants.
128
 
                                                     
125
 Kate 6.  
126
 Kate 6. Here he refers to the case of Makalima v Member of the Executive Council: Welfare SECLD 27-01-
2005 case no 1601/03 hereinafter referred to as Makalima. 
127
 This case was one of 27 related cases in which all of the applicants had applied for grants but had either 
received no responses or inadequate responses. 
128
 Ndevu v MEC for Welfare, EC 5 – 6.  
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Plasket J comments on this statement by stating that R4 000.00 per case is an optimistic 
estimate and that ‗going rate‘ of cost orders per case are more likely in the region of R5 
000.00.
129
 In the 2004 judgment of the same court,
130
 Leach J introduces his judgment with a 
statement about ‗the worrying inability of the Department to properly perform its functions 
continues, seemingly unabated, with hundreds of these applications being heard in our courts 
every month, at huge financial costs to the fiscus.‘131 Nugent JA132 also highlights the 
problematic element that public funds are being used to finance damages claims against the 
administration and that ‗it is indeed troubling…that the public purse, upon which there are 
many calls, should be depleted by claims for damages.‘133 He states that hopefully legislative 
accountability will resolve the matter, but the fact that it is not a justifiable situation is not a 
reason to withhold such damages. In the absence of legislation to combat such claims, there is 
authority to award them.  
2 3 2 5 Unconstitutional  
The theory behind judicial deference to the executive is demonstrated in the Vumazonke case. 
Plasket J uses the concept of institutional competence and demonstrates how this limits the 
scope of interference of the court. At the same time, he explains why the review of 
administrative failings of government is in fact a judicial function and that the protection of 
human rights that have been so grossly infringed is ‗within the heartland of the judicial 
function‘. He states that  
when rights are infringed or threatened, the impugned conduct becomes very 
much the business of the judiciary: s38, s165 and s172 of the Constitution 
make that abundantly clear, placing as they do a duty on the judiciary to 
remedy such infractions.
134
 
However, he is quick to point out that there is no unconstitutional infringement of the spheres 
of government and that courts only intervene when there has been a gross violation of rights. 
                                                     
129
 Vumazonke fn 9. 
130
 Makalima. 
131
 Makalima 1.  
132
 Kate.  
133
 Kate 32. 
134
 Vumazonke 9. 
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Despite the fact that he attempts a justification for his actions, there is still evidence of a 
highly deferential attitude towards the executive.  
Although the case law has been limited to problems occurring in the Eastern Cape, these 
difficulties extend to all of the provinces in South Africa and are symptomatic of 
unresponsive and unwilling government departments. Our focus, however, is rather on the 
fact that judicial review as a primary dispute resolution forum is unsuitable to adequately 
address the dilemma. The limitations of judicial review as to its operation, its ability to cure 
systematic defects, its coherent remedying, its potential unconstitutionality and its costliness 
have been identified and explained in case law, and must be weighed against its ability to 
provide administrative justice across the board.  
In a country fraught with such monumental challenges against the effective administration of 
justice, judicial review cannot and should not be made to perform the myriad of roles which 
should be dispersed over an integrated and comprehensive system of administrative dispute 
resolution.  
2 4   Conclusion 
South African judicial review reflects many of the common-law characteristics inherited from 
its English parent-law. Judicial review occupies a central and primary role in the control of 
executive and legislative power and continues to be viewed as the most prominent avenue of 
administrative justice. That said, our system of administrative law requires compliance with a 
written and comprehensive Constitution. Administrative law in South Africa must also then 
comply with the standards and provisions of the Constitution, and should perform a function 
which advances openness, transparency and good governance.  
What is clear from the above discussion is that judicial review in its current role is highly 
unsuitable for the advancement of administrative justice in South Africa. It suffers from 
various limitations and is inappropriate in many instances to cure large-scale 
maladministration. On the other hand, judicial review remains an essential element of what 
should become an integrated and complex system of administrative justice. The important 
argument that has been advanced in this chapter in not the abolition of judicial review nor a 
slander on its effectiveness and importance. Rather, the argument centralises around the point 
that judicial review cannot provide all forms of relief in a system of administrative law which 
spans every sphere of government and almost every aspect of the lives of our citizens.  
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Should judicial review no longer be the primary avenue for justice, it is necessary to consider 
alternative forums of the adjudication of administrative disputes. The following chapter will 
provide a detailed discussion of the nature of administrative appeal tribunals and their 
potential suitability for the adjudication of large-scale systematic administrative action.  
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CHAPTER 3: DEFINING FEATURES OF TRIBUNALS 
3 1 Introduction 
One of the key elements of this study is the fact that tribunals offer an alternative form to the 
traditional method of judicial review as control of the executive. As a result it is necessary to 
investigate theoretical elements of how tribunals operate and are composed. While not every 
element can be covered as there are many different forms and types of tribunals, an attempt 
has been made to highlight some of the most general and important features.  
A brief historical explanation of the origin of tribunals will set out their position and the need 
for them in an administrative law system. The discussion that follows will consider the 
characteristics of tribunals and how these are to be understood. Thirdly, certain hallmarks of 
tribunals have been generally identified and these elements will be discussed. Supervision of 
tribunals remains an important safeguard as to the regulation and circumscription of their 
functioning. A discussion of the relevant features that any supervisory body should embody 
will be shown. Lastly, a short outline of the debate relating to the scope of tribunal 
jurisdiction, and some of the issues, will be demonstrated. These elements should then 
provide an over-arching blueprint for a tribunal structure.  
3 2 Historical Origins of Tribunals 
According to Schwartz and Wade, ‗the welfare state could not work without an elaborate 
judicial system of its own.‘1 The reason for this is that when governments are involved in the 
administration of tangible rights to its citizens, they do so with total control. In order to ensure 
that the administration is fair and just, state action should be controlled and sufficient 
mechanisms should be in place so that disputes which spring up can be adjudicated and 
dispensed with both quickly and effectively.  
The historical story of tribunals is a long one,
2
 and can be traced back as far as 1066. This 
thesis will focus only on their development in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century,
3
 as only this is 
                                                     
1
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States (1972) 
143. However, ‗the proliferation of tribunals is a phenomenon of the present century. Many, but by no means all, 
tribunals from part of the apparatus of the welfare state‘ in Report of the Committee of the JUSTICE – All Souls 
Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms (1988) 
212.  
2
 The full history can be found in Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Pearson, Harlow & 
Taggart (eds)  Administrative Law in a Changing State (2004) 275-283.  
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pertinent to tribunals as we know them. In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, the rise of the welfare 
state allowed for tribunal development in a similar manner to the tribunals of today. 
Developments in tribunals could also be attributed to the growth of the apparatus of the 
welfare state in the 20
th
 century. Commonwealth countries have their origin in the 
administrative law of England, and so the following discussion deals with the most important 
developments of tribunals which occurred in England.
4
  
During the period of the Industrial Revolution in the first half of the 19
th
 century, statutory 
schemes of social relief were implemented by combining functions of the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary into central, multi-functional agencies.
5
 This combination was 
thought to be the most efficient problem-solving mechanism, and indeed more appropriate 
than the ill-equipped courts to remedy major social and economic problems.
6
 However, these 
multi-functional agencies went into decline in the 20
th
 century due to a growth in power of the 
executive and a preference for exclusive ministerial responsibility in policy-making. The 
agencies were replaced, in part due to a different conception of separation of powers, and the 
tribunals that remained were charged only with an adjudicative function. The issue which then 
arose was that although tribunals served essentially the same core function as courts, they 
were not courts and not therefore part of the superior judiciary as envisaged by Montesquieu.
7
 
Had there been a proper understanding of the reasons behind the separation of powers, 
namely the restriction of concentrated power and a desire to avoid conflicts of interests caused 
by governmental departments overstepping their competencies, the creation of tribunals 
which were not courts would not have been problematic. However, as Cane states; 
the problem of tribunals had emerged, a product of the institutional aspect of 
separation of powers and the idea that government is composed of three 
branches…The idea that the judicial function should be allocated to judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3
 For this account, Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 280-283 is the 
informing text and a shortened, paraphrased version of his explanation follows.  
4
 Boulle, Harris & Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law (1989) 107.This is also due to Britain‘s 
colonisation of the United States, Australia, part of India and many African countries.  
5
 Multi-functional agencies were vehicles of administration of regulatory schemes, such a poverty relief or health 
and safety benefits. An example of this is the non-departmental ‗board‘ which had the duty of implementing a 
statutory scheme by exercising a mixture of legislative, judicial and executive functions. The combination of 
functions was thought to be the most efficient way to deal with large-scale socio-economic problems.  
6
 Stebbings Legal Foundations in Nineteenth Century England (2006) 37-72. The courts were considered ill-
equipped because they were slow, costly and could not provide the highly specialised relief required in these 
matters.  
7
 Montesquieu L‘Esprit des Lois (1748).  
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institutions, coupled with the narrow understanding of judicial institutions in terms of 
the superior central courts, generated the problem of tribunals.
8
 
The concept of non-departmental agencies, such as had developed in England, followed a 
similar line of growth in Australia but, due to different conditions,
9
 Australian law reflected 
centralism and federalism rather than parliamentary sovereignty. While also not favouring 
multi-functional agencies, the Australian system aligned their adjudicatory bodies with the 
executive rather than the judiciary. Their particular model of separation of powers is such that 
it accommodates tribunals and entrenches them as necessary adjudicatory bodies within any 
welfare state.  
South Africa falls decidedly under the model of judicial supervision of administrative action 
found in English Law. This means that the decisions of administrators are subject to control of 
the ordinary courts.
10
 This model, as well as our Apartheid past,
11
 meant that judicial review 
was essentially the courts‘ only way of regulating administrative action, and merits review or 
errors of fact were remedied by the executive or the legislature. Although tribunals do exist in 
South Africa, they are fragmented and not coherent, centralised structures like the ones that 
can be found in Australia and England.
12
 However, since the new constitutional dispensation, 
s33(3)
13
 and PAJA,
14
 the door has been opened for the creation of a central tribunal 
structure.
15
 A weakness that may be identified is that the legislation provides for ‗judicial 
review‘ and not merits review, but at the very least it ‗lays the foundations for what in time 
                                                     
8
 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 281.  
9
 The political climate was very different as Australia was initially a British colony, had a far smaller population 
and had unaccommodating climatic conditions.  
10
 Boulle et al Administrative Law 92.  
11
 Ch 2 explains this history and existence of judicial review, as well as its weaknesses.  
12
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across the 
Commonwealth (2007) 83 notes that South Africa had a ‗disparate collection of appeal bodies with vastly 
differing modes of operation, and consequently different levels of effectiveness‘. Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa (2007) 68 confirms that ‗little or nothing has changed. There is still no coherent system of 
administrative appeals in this country‘. This topic is dealt with in more detail in Ch 6.  
13
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 allows for the review of administrative decisions by a court 
‗or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal‘.  
14
 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) ss 6 – 10, and a tribunal is defined in s1 as ‗any 
independent and impartial tribunal established by national legislation for the purpose of judicially reviewing an 
administrative action in terms of this act‘.  
15
 Hoexter Administrative Law 60-62 describes that the suggested tribunal structure would be similar to that of 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) found in Australia. The description of the AAT can be found in Ch 
4, while Hoexter‘s suggestions will be discussed in Ch 6.  
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may become a system of special administrative courts or a type of ‗non-judicial‘ review.‘16 A 
centralised system of tribunals has been suggested in South Africa, and the possible 
advantages of such a system have been acknowledged.
17
 At this stage, however, the 
advantages of tribunals have only been suggested and accepted theoretically.
18
  
Cane then articulates the 20
th
 century ‗problem‘ of tribunals 
how to explain and justify the existence of institutions performing adjudicatory 
functions similar to those of courts which are not part of the judicial branch of 
government and are staffed by officials who are not guaranteed the tenure and salary 
protections enjoyed by judges?
19
 
The remaining chapter will therefore outline the important elements and characteristics of 
tribunals in an attempt to illustrate and to justify their continued existence in administrative 
law systems.  
3 3 Characteristics of Tribunals 
Tribunals are informal investigative or quasi-judicial bodies which deal almost exclusively 
with administrative law, and usually on a highly specialised level. According to Farmer,
20
 
tribunals per definition should consist of the following characteristics.  Firstly, they should 
have the ability to make final, legally enforceable decisions. Secondly, they should be 
independent from any departmental branch of government. Thirdly, the nature of the hearings 
conducted in tribunals should be both public and of a judicial nature, while not necessarily 
subject to the stringent formalities of a court of law. Fourthly, tribunal members should be in 
possession of specific expertise, in the field of operation of the tribunal as well as judicial 
expertise. Fifthly, there should be a duty on tribunals to give clear reasons for their decisions, 
and lastly that there should be a right of appeal to a higher court on disputes regarding points 
of law.  
                                                     
16
 Hoexter Administrative Law 61.  
17
 South African Law Reform Commission Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice (1999). See Ch 6 s 2 2 
1. 
18
 A more detailed discussion about the history of tribunals and position in South African administrative law will 
follow in Ch 6.   
19
 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 283.  
20
 Farmer Tribunals and Government (1974) 184. 
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According to Govender,
21
  
the usefulness of this definition lies not in its description of existing tribunals but 
rather as a list of prerequisites which would ensure the optimum effectiveness of 
tribunals in any administration. 
If, as a point of departure, the above six characteristics are prerequisites for effective 
tribunals, then a careful study and unpacking of what each entails would create a general 
measure against which tribunals can be evaluated. 
3 3 1 Finality and Enforceability 
The first important consideration is the finality and legal enforceability of the decisions. The 
finality requirement does not require that there is no leave to appeal to a higher court, but that 
the decisions reached by tribunals are not mere suggestions, but rather judgments with 
enforceability. The requirement of finality distinguishes tribunals from bodies without this 
power, such as commissions of inquiry and mediation committees.
22
 Tribunals need to have 
sufficient power to enforce their decisions; for fear that they become nothing more than a 
committee empowered only to make suggestions to the parties.  
Another reason why tribunals need to be empowered with final decision-making abilities lies 
in the nature of the disputes they are called to resolve. Specifically in the resolution of 
disputes regarding civil-political and socio-economic rights, the government acts under a duty 
as a responsible agent.
23
 Govender quotes the Bland Committee of Australia‘s24 unpacking of 
the responsibilities of government with regard to the individual, 
there are powers to admit or accept and to refuse or reject claims; powers to grant less 
than the maximum of a prescribed benefit; powers to determine degrees of 
disablement; powers to select beneficiaries for benefits; powers to seize and forfeit 
goods; powers to exempt persons from statutory obligations; powers to remit and 
make rebates; powers to authorise what is otherwise explicitly prohibited by 
legislation; powers whose exercise can advance or prejudice a career, a livelihood or a 
                                                     
21
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 77.   
22
 Schwartz & Wade explain the theoretical distinction in England that ‗tribunals in principle lie outside the area 
of ministerial power. Inquiries are essentially part of it.‘ in Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 148. 
23
 One problematic issue with South African administrative law that has been raised in Boulle et al 
Administrative Law 95 is that it treats administrative disputes from a private law perspective and thus all actors 
as equals. This issue is more fully explained in the problems with judicial review in Ch 2.  
24
 Committee on Administrative Discretion Parliamentary Interim Report (1998) 5-6 as reproduced in Sharpe 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Policy Poles (1986).  
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cherished ambition; and powers whose exercise may impinge deeply on property right, 
with sometimes no redress for the person affected.
 25
 
Bearing in mind the far-reaching consequences that state action has on the life of the 
individual, the checks that judicial or quasi-judicial institutions have against the executive 
must have more official effect than a mere proposition. Tribunals need to be empowered to 
grant judgments with sufficient finality to bring administrative officials to check when there 
has been an abuse of power or a mismanagement of administrative action.    
The second element of the first requirement is that tribunals should be empowered to make 
legally enforceable decisions. Enforceability is a big concern because the legal enforcement of 
a judgment is related to the function of the judiciary. Whether tribunals fall under the control 
of the executive or under the control of the judiciary, their decisions must result in 
enforceable consequences. As with any judgment, unless its outcome is fully and legally 
enforceable it is not effective, and in order to retain public confidence in the power and 
authority of the tribunal, their decisions must have enforceability.   
3 3 2 Independence 
The second characteristic is that of independence.
26
 The independence of the judiciary in 
South Africa is enshrined in the Constitution,
27
 and case law has unequivocally confirmed that 
independence.
28
 If tribunals are to be seen as ‗quasi-courts‘ as in the English model, then their 
independence is probably guaranteed underneath that blanket protection.
29
 Cane states that 
‗independence is thought essential to the effective operation of courts as an external check on 
government decision-making.‘30  
                                                     
25
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 76.  
26
 This characteristic is also mentioned in, among others, Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 145; 
Justice All Souls Review 213; Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 9 ed (2004) 911-912; Cane Administrative 
Law 4 ed (2004) 389-391 and is generally accepted to be one of the most important elements of a tribunal. 
However, almost all of the writers acknowledge that this is a theoretical independence and that in practice it does 
not always occur.  
27
 S165 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―the Constitution‖). 
28
 Van Rooyen v The State 2002 5 SA 246 (CC); De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC).  
29
 It should be noted that in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 this independence is guaranteed. 
The Lord Chancellor is required to uphold the independence of the judiciary, and even when the bill was 
promoted in the House of Commons, the Minister stated that ―The purpose of the (first) clause is manifest. It 
puts beyond doubt the fact that the tribunal judiciary are independent of the Executive.‖ 
30
 Cane Administrative Law 390.  
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However, tribunals generally operate differently to courts and are not bound by the same rules 
of evidence or strict court procedures.
31
 Tribunals do not necessarily follow the adversarial 
procedure, nor are bound to adhere to the rules of court. By their very nature tribunals require 
constant communication with the government branch whose decisions they review, in order to 
promote more effective governance and to remedy errors committed by officials.
32
 Cane 
raises the argument that it is merely a matter of political choice that tribunals are separate 
from the government departments whose actions they review, and that there is no intrinsic 
reason why internal review is any less preferable to external merits review.
33
 This said, he 
agrees that public perception may play an important role in the decision to keep tribunals and 
governmental departments separate. Schwartz & Wade also confirm the characteristic of 
independence as seminal to the operation of tribunals, and state that ‗tribunals are wholly 
independent of the government departments which dispense benefits and exercise controls.‘34 
 The resultant effect is that the operation of tribunals may fall under a grey category whereby, 
even in a strict system of separation of powers, the functions of the branches of government 
are not as defined. Depending under which branch of government tribunals function, 
adjudication may be a case of the executive acting in a judicial capacity, or alternatively the 
judiciary administering executive justice. In either instance, it is important that although there 
is communication, co-operation and collaboration between the tribunals and the government 
departments, there is still a measure of independence and decisions reached by tribunals are 
not influenced by governmental bias. Cane
35
 illustrates the difference between courts‘ and 
tribunals‘ functions with this distinction between ‗adjudication as an instrument of 
governance and adjudication as an accountability mechanism‘.36   
                                                     
31
 Tribunals should still be bound by the objectives of consistent treatment, fairness and the rules of natural 
justice.  
32
 They may even depend heavily on the departments whose actions they review for staff. This is problematic 
because even if the membership of the tribunals committee remains independent, clerks or other civil servants 
working in the tribunals system may give the impression that there is no independence. This was noted in Wade  
& Forsyth Administrative Law 911-912.  
33
 Cane Administrative Law 390.  
34
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 145. 
35
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Forsyth, Elliott, Jhaveri, Ramsden & Hill (eds) Effective 
Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 493. 
36
 In this way courts are responsible for dispensing with a constitutional function of a governmental system, 
namely the resolution and adjudication of crimes and disputes, while tribunals are responsible for calling 
administrators to be accountable for their actions, and indeed remedying them should there be error.  
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3 3 3 Public Hearings 
The point of departure is that tribunal hearings should be public and open. Although public 
hearings of a judicial nature appear to be a surefire way to promote accountability and 
transparency of proceedings and of tribunal lack of bias,
37
 in some cases this may be totally 
undesirable. One of the reasons for the existence of tribunals is that certain disputes may 
concern an area which requires high expertise, such as tax disputes or disability benefits 
where the assessment of the disability requires medical expertise, and very often such areas of 
the dispute are of a highly personal and sensitive nature.
38
 While court hearings on the same 
subject matter are of public record and open to the public, courts can still maintain control and 
impartiality as judicial proceedings are heavily policed by rules of witness appearance and 
testimony, evidence and conduct. In order to fulfill the requirements of effectiveness and 
efficiency, tribunals are not necessarily subject to the same restrictions. Members of tribunals 
may engage on fact-finding missions, call for submissions mero moto on issues of the dispute 
on which they require clarity, question persons who appear before them of their own accord, 
request written submissions on issues and not have regard to information which they consider 
irrelevant.
39
 Making these kinds of proceedings open to public record may actually infringe 
on their effectiveness and indeed their accessibility as the public may be deterred from 
approaching a tribunal due to the notion that the proceedings would be tantamount to privacy 
infringement.
40
 Rather, the ‗public nature‘ of the hearings could be attained by requiring all 
members of tribunals to publish clear, coherent and comprehensive reasons for their findings. 
This would protect the dignity and personal integrity of the claimant,
41
 but would also 
maintain a system wherein members must be accountable and transparent in the course of 
                                                     
37
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 786.  
38
 Disability claims may require in-depth medical information, tax claims would divulge personal wealth and 
means information, water and housing claims may require information relating to personal hygiene and living 
conditions which may be highly confidential to the claimant.  
39
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 785.  
40
 In England, several tribunals already sit in private, such as the Betting Levy Appeal Tribunal, Mental Health 
Review Tribunal, General and Special Commissioners of Income Tax. Other hearings can be held in private 
where the claimant so requests, where there are intimate personal circumstances involved or where there is an 
issue of public security. This privacy is lost in an appeal to the high court. Further explanations of the privacy of 
English tribunals can be found in Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 786.  
41
 Art 6(1) of the of the European Convention on Human Rights, by which all European and UK tribunals must 
abide, does not insist on public hearings where ―the interests of morals, public order or national security,..the 
interests of juveniles…the protection of the private lives of the parties or the interests of justice‖ require 
otherwise.   
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their deliberations. In principle, however, hearings should always be public and a case made 
out for instances when such a deviation from normal proceedings is required.
42
   
3 3 4 Expertise 
Farmer‘s fourth characteristic is that tribunal members must be in possession of expertise. The 
purpose of tribunals is to provide quicker and more cost-effective resolution of administrative 
disputes, and thus the requirement that members must be in possession of detailed and 
intricate knowledge of the issues at stake is very important to that efficiency. While this may 
seem like a fairly obvious requirement, it is the level, rather than the existence, of expertise 
which is important. In some jurisdictions, India being an example, the structure of the 
tribunals is such that it engages members not due to expertise, but due to station in life. Datar 
states that ‗tribunals are structured in such a way that only civil servants who are on the verge 
of retirement would be interested in applying for the vacancies.‘43 He illustrates this with 
reference to India‘s National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Any member of the Bar or 
Chartered Accountants with fifteen years of expertise is eligible to become a member of the 
tribunal, but the term of office is only five years, without the guarantee of any extension. It 
would be absurd for experienced advocates or accountants to leave practice at the height of 
their careers, serve on the tribunal for a five-year term, and then return to practice with a five-
year loss of experience. The Indian experience is that most of the members recruited for 
tribunals are retired or near-retired civil servants. This is not desirable, as the tribunals 
become a gateway into retirement for the members. Rather, tribunals should attract highly 
experienced members and thus would need to offer competitive benefits and incentives to 
those it wishes to attract.  
Just as expertise in the relevant field of operation is especially important, particularly with 
regard to revenue disputes, housing policies and all other technical and intricate policies, 
judicial expertise is as much of an imperative. Tribunals administer a judicial function and 
have legally enforceable decisions. If this is the case, then those decisions must be legally 
sound and uphold the underlying values with which all judicial decisions must comply. The 
informing values of the Constitution,
44
 such as the principle of legality and the rule of law, 
                                                     
42
 Justice All Souls Review 221.  
43
 Datar ―The Tribunalisation of Justice in India‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across the 
Commonwealth (2007) 296.   
44
 S1 of the Constitution. 
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equality, human dignity and fairness, as well as accountable and transparent governance must 
be upheld in the functioning of the tribunals. Judicial expertise is necessary to ensure the legal 
accuracy of the decisions. 
3 3 5 Reasons 
The fifth requirement that Farmer identifies, that of giving reasons, is hardly a new concept in 
South African administrative action.
45
 Reason-giving is a basic feature of judicial decision-
making in South Africa.
46
 Based on this, the giving of reasons is an important justificatory 
measure in all administrative adjudication. More specifically, S5 of PAJA
47
 requires that 
administrators give reasons for their decisions, and indeed grants a ground of judicial review 
if there is a failure to give ‗adequate‘ reasons.48 If that is the case, decisions made by tribunals 
should comply with the same, if not a higher, standard.
49
 The requirement of providing 
reasons for decisions has several positive effects. Firstly, reasons promote transparency and 
accountability from the members of the tribunals. Secondly, reasons offer to both the 
administrative official and the claimant a satisfactory understanding of why the decision was 
given, which contributes to the perception of fairness and justice. Thirdly, reasons provide a 
blueprint to the administrators as to how to improve the original administration to avoid a 
similar claim. Good governance can then be promoted from primary administrative action 
rather than only at the later remedial stage.  
                                                     
45
 S33(2) of the Constitution provides a right to written reasons to those whose rights have been adversely 
affected by administrative action.  
46
 The court makes this point expressly in Mphahlele v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1999 2 SA 667 (CC) 12 by 
saying that giving reasons in a judgement ‗explains to the parties, and to the public at large which has an interest 
in courts being open and transparent, why a case is decided as it is. It is a discipline which curbs arbitrary 
judicial decisions.‘ This point is re-iterated in Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 2 SA 92 
(CC) 17. In Stuttafords Stores (Pty) Ltd and Others v Salt of the Earth Creations (Pty) Ltd 2010 14 SA (CC) 59 
the court quotes Corbett ―Writing a Judgment‖ (1998) 115 SALJ 118 in saying that ‗the true test of a correct 
decision is when one is able to formulate convincing reasons (and reasons which convince oneself) justifying it.‘ 
 
47
 S5 gives effect to S33(2) of the Constitution and is in keeping with the goals of the preamble of PAJA which 
aim to ―create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the 
exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function‖. 
48
 A number of cases find their pivotal issue as to what constitutes ‗adequate‘ reasons, notably Minister of Health 
and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as 
Amici Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC); Commissioner for the South African Police Services and Others v Maimela 
and Another 2003 5 SA (T) 481. In Koyabe and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others 2010 (4) SA 327 
CC the court discussed the considerations for reasons and their constitutional basis.  
49
 'The statement of bare conclusions without the statement of reasons will always expose the tribunal to the 
suggestion that it has not given the matter close enough attention or that it has allowed extraneous matters to 
cloud its consideration.‘  Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 538.  
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3 3 6 Appeal 
The last requirement is that there should be a right to appeal to a court on points of law.
50
 
Appeal is the not the same as judicial review.
51
 While they both allow for reconsideration of 
administrative decisions, judicial review relates to errors of law, while appeal allows a 
challenge of the merits of a decision.
52
 In common law jurisdictions where tribunals are an 
accepted part of the administrative adjudication machinery, the courts continue to play an 
important supervisory role as a court of appeal.
53
 The decisions of administrative bodies and 
tribunals should be subject to this right of appeal to the courts in order to ensure that the legal 
system remains essentially unitary.
54
 These considerations are discussed more fully in s 3 3 5.  
Although these characteristics of tribunals have been identified and generally accepted over a 
period of time, these arise out of the effective functioning of tribunals. The next section will 
deal with more theoretical underpinnings of tribunals in order to establish their nature.  
3 4 Informing Principles of Tribunals 
As was illustrated above,
55
 tribunals are necessary elements in any welfare-state machinery. 
However, it is important to understand how they operate and what differentiates them from 
courts. The following discussion aims to consider what principles define and inform the 
structure and procedure of tribunals, and why despite these principles, courts continue to exist 
side-by-side with, or as a higher standard of, tribunals.  
 
 
                                                     
50
 On questions of fact, the general rule is that there is no appeal at all: Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of 
Government 158.  
51
 A full explanation of judicial review in South Africa can be found in Ch 2.  
52
 ‗Unlike judicial review, such appeals are established specifically to challenge the merits of a particular 
decision. Judicial review, on the other hand, focuses on the way in which the decision was reached, and not on 
the justice or correctness of the decision itself. At least in the theory, review tests the legality and not the merits 
of the decision‘ Hoexter Administrative Law 63.  
53
 In England there is a specific and automatic statutory right to appeal to courts against administrative decisions. 
This should be distinguished from judicial review which arises from the inherent jurisdiction of the courts at 
common law.  
54
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 157. 
55
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 143.  
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3 4 1 Franks Report 
A report which fundamentally defined the principles of tribunals was the report of the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Franks Committee)
56
 in the United 
Kingdom. The committee firmly established the position of tribunals within the government 
of the United Kingdom, stating that ‗tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery 
provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of 
administration.‘57 Furthermore, the Franks Committee is most notable for laying out the three 
essential values of tribunals, namely ‗openness, impartiality and fairness‘.58 The report then 
defined these values as follows: 
In the field of tribunals openness appears to us to require the publicity of proceedings 
and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision; fairness to require 
the adoption of a clear procedure which enables parties to know their rights, to present 
their case fully and to know the case which they have to meet; and impartiality to 
require the freedom of tribunals from the influence, real or apparent of departments 
concerned with the subject-matter of their decisions.
59
 
As was illustrated above in the second characteristic according to Farmer, impartiality in 
decision-making is not always the same thing as independence. Harlow and Rawlings see 
‗independence as institutional and related to the structural framework of the adjudicative 
machinery; impartiality, on the other hand, is functional and refers to the adjudicator‘s 
approach to his task‘.60 This means that although tribunals may not have strict institutional 
independence from the departments with which they work, impartiality can still be achieved 
through the way in which decision-making is approached. This being said, there is still room 
                                                     
56
 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Equiries Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals 
and Enquiries Cmnd 218 (1957). The Franks Committee was commissioned in order to evaluate the position 
regarding tribunals and enquiries in the UK. It became a watershed for tribunals and spurned much development 
for tribunals. Hereafter referred to as ‗Franks report‘.  
57
 Franks report 5. This position is entrenched into English administrative law, and should be contrasted with the 
Kerr Committee Report, which cemented the Australian position of tribunals within the executive. See Ch 4 s 3 
1.  
58
 Franks report 4. The Franks report‘s recommendations allowed for gradual change to be implemented with 
regard to the nature of tribunals. The Committee identified the three core values of openness, fairness and 
impartiality. These became informing values of all tribunals and are still relevant in the re-structuring of 
tribunals today. These, along with the recommended changes with regard to the Council of Tribunals, allowed 
for a measure of judicialisation and tribunals began to be regarded as quasi-courts, or court substitutes. Tribunals 
also began to be regarded without deep suspicion and rather as an effective means of adjudication of 
administrative law. 
59
 Franks report 42. 
60
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 3 ed (2009) 489 fn 8.  
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for the argument that institutional independence may help ‗to maintain a distance between the 
decision-maker and both the subject-matter of the dispute and the personalities involved, and 
in that sense can be seen as instrumental to achieving impartiality and hence good 
outcomes.‘61  
3 4 2 Unique Features of Tribunals  
Courts continue to have an important place in the administrative law system and should not be 
seen to be replaced by tribunals. Harlow & Rawlings explain that although tribunals may have 
the legal force and the competence of a quasi-court, the functional nature of tribunals is very 
different from courts and they are rather ‗prized for qualities that differentiate a tribunal from 
a court hearing‘.62 Cane confirms this by saying that although the functions of both courts and 
tribunals are the adjudication of disputes, tribunals are far more important as agents who 
dispense administrative justice.
63
 He explains that courts are considered less suitable than 
tribunals because of their formal procedures; costly and slow operations; their individualist 
approach to policy-based problems and their lack of expertise in complex welfare 
programmes. It follows then that the hallmarks of tribunals would be the contrast to these 
problems. While the hallmarks of tribunals are each individually important, it is the 
combination of them which give tribunals their distinctive advantage. If measured 
individually, each would possibly indicate an alternative route to tribunals and thus it is 
necessary for them to be packaged together.
64
  
3 4 2 1 Cost and Speed 
One of the most pressing reasons for the creation of tribunals is cost.
65
 Tribunals are cheaper 
for the government to run than courts for a number of reasons, but among them that tribunal 
members are paid less than judges and that the government is not usually under a duty to 
provide legal aid. From a claimant point of view, tribunals are more accessible because it is 
cheaper to apply to them, and usually a speedier process. The characteristics of speed and cost 
                                                     
61
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 489. 
62
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 491. 
63
 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 274.  
64
 This means that if speed were the only consideration, then an internal review would seem more appropriate. If 
participation the only concern, then mediation is more fitting. Each element must be considered in conjunction 
with the others to provide a balanced tribunal.  
65
 The cost element will be more fully explained in Ch 7.  
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are consequently interlinked, and contribute to each other. Harlow & Rawlings also identify 
these positive qualities, namely cheapness, speed and accessibility, and how they interact.
66
 
They say that these values are not merely positive in regard to the managerial aspect of a 
tribunal, but rather that the underlying values are in conformity with effective dispute 
resolution, and that tribunal processes are in a better position to give effect to proportional 
resolution of disputes than courts.
67
 It should be borne in mind that there will be 
implementation costs involved when establishing a new tribunal system, but these costs 
should be weighed against the future benefit that tribunals can provide.
68
 
3 4 2 2 Participation  
Participation in the tribunal process remains an important aspect of their effectiveness. The 
proceedings of tribunals may be either adversary or inquisitorial, depending on the nature of 
the right and the nature of dispute, but either way the claimant‘s role and participation in the 
decision is fundamental to a feeling of justice and fairness. Harlow & Rawlings quote 
Professor Bell in saying that the level of participation within tribunals helps to ‗foster civic 
competence, personal responsibility and active involvement rather than over-dependency on 
professionals and a belief that people are not able to cope.‘69 Factors that contribute to the 
participatory nature of tribunals include the oral nature of the proceedings as well as the 
presence of lay members on the tribunal.
70
  
3 4 2 3 Informality 
The formality, or lack thereof, of tribunals gives them an advantage over courts as primary 
administrative adjudicators. Not only does the license of the proceedings contribute to the 
speed and the efficiency of the adjudication, but the informality in itself may be a key 
attribute. Claimants, especially of welfare benefits, are usually poorly-educated and may be 
intimidated by formal court proceedings.
71
 The informality of tribunal proceedings makes 
approaching them more accessible to the neediest members of society. Furthermore, 
                                                     
66
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 491.  
67
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 491.  
68
 See Ch 7 s 5 1 2 fn 37 for an indication of the implementation and subsequent cost savings of the Victorian 
Council of Administrative Tribunals.  
69
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 491 fn 20.  
70
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 147. 
71
 Cane Administrative Law 396 
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informality of proceedings is an essential element in any fact-finding mission and can 
contribute greatly to tribunals being able to provide the ‗correct‘ decision. However, criticism 
remains that the informality of tribunals may result in the sacrifice of a certain amount of 
legal accuracy.
72
  
3 4 2 4 Specialisation  
Specialised tribunals are in a more appropriate position than courts to give effect to individual 
administrative law claims within a broader policy-based framework. Despite the fact that, like 
courts, highly specialised tribunals such as tax tribunals or welfare grant tribunals must take 
into consideration the consequence their decisions have on the effective administration of the 
executive, an advantage of tribunals is that they are not bound by the rules of precedent and 
thus can decide each case on its facts. Specialised tribunals can then also contribute to the 
development of improved initial decision-making by identifying common problems or errors 
within a specific area of administrative law. In addition, while courts may have to adjudicate a 
wide range of both civil and criminal disputes, tribunals are specifically responsible for an 
individual aspect of social administration. This specialisation contributes then to accuracy and 
speedier adjudication.  
While these traits of tribunals are largely undisputed, criticism has been raised regarding the 
effectiveness that tribunals provide. Cane goes on to explain that although the goals of 
cheapness, speed and efficiency are all desirable, they must be balanced with the other 
important goals such as procedural fairness and legal accuracy.
73
 An administrative law 
system, in considering how to construct tribunals, should pay attention to all sides of the 
spectrum of concerns in order to give weight to all the considerations necessary in 
adjudicatory bodies.  
3 5 Supervision of Tribunals 
While tribunals may offer useful assistance to the enormous field of administrative 
adjudication, it is important that they do not merely spring up unassisted or in a haphazard 
way. In South Africa especially, one of the biggest challenges facing tribunals is their 
                                                     
72
 Cane Administrative Law 396. He further points out that the nature of the dispute and the issues of legality 
involved will naturally push proceedings to either be more informal and flexible, or more formal and rigid.  
73
 Cane Administrative Law 394.  
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fragmentation and disorganisation.
74
 Schwartz and Wade identify one of the main problems 
with tribunals as being ‗proliferation‘.75 The reason for this is that tribunals have an inherent 
tendency to multiply.
76
 Cane raises the question as to why judicial systems would prefer to 
create alternative institutions for adjudication rather than reform the court system itself.
77
 The 
following section will discuss the need for supervision of tribunals, and further how courts are 
still necessary to lend important institutional and supervisory guidance to the development of 
a coherent tribunal system.   
3 5 1  Central Supervisory Body 
An essential element of tribunal justice, especially with regard to its effective functioning, is a 
centralised supervisory body. A study of other common law jurisdictions‘ supervisory bodies 
and their development may supply a useful basis to illustrate which characteristics are most 
important.
78
 Australian tribunals are monitored by a central supervisory body, the ARC.
79
 The 
Franks Committee also identified the essential need for such a body to maintain and regulate 
the functioning of the tribunals in England, namely the Council of Tribunals or a similar 
permanent supervisory body which would provide ‗a focal point from which knowledgeable 
advice and guidance could be maintained.‘80 Any envisaged body will be most effective if it 
has a sufficient budget to function according to its mandate and performs three major roles; a 
consultative role, a supervisory role and an advisory role.  
                                                     
74
 This will be further discussed in Ch 6.  
75
 Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government 149.  
76
 Notably it is not their proliferation alone which is problematic, but their unchecked proliferation.  
77
 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 284. He presents two possible 
explanations. The first is that ‗creation is seen as being politically and technically simpler and more efficient 
than re-creation‘, and therefore more appealing to policy-makers. Cf Schwartz & Wade Legal Control of 
Government 150. The second explanation is a resistance from government to the expansion of a ‗judicial elite‘ 
and to a ‗proliferation of tenured public offices‘.  See s 3 6 1 for a further discussion of this question.   
78
 However a full discussion of the structure and functioning of the supervisory bodies of Australia and England 
will follow in Chs 4 and 5 respectively.  
79
 Australian Review Council (ARC) which was created in terms of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 
1975.  
80
 Franks report. This description can be seen as a blueprint for how a supervisory body should generally be 
understood. The Council of Tribunals has since been replaced with the Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
Council (AJTC) 
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Although there is not a set specific structure to which the supervisory body should conform, 
certain accepted traits have developed.
81
 Firstly, the body should be independent. Secondly 
the council should have the necessary resources
82
 to conduct individualised visits to tribunals 
and to compile reports about their functioning. These resources should extend both to 
personnel as well as to expertise. Unless tribunal growth and procedures can be closely 
monitored and the results carefully documented and analysed, it will be difficult to assess 
problems and areas for development and improvement. This assessment and reformulation 
will be especially necessary in the initial implementation stages of a new tribunal system. 
Thirdly, the supervisory body needs to be able to make recommendations generally to the 
administrative sector.
83
 If their recommendations and advice are limited to tribunals, then the 
result may be the fragmentation of hierarchies and structures.
84
 Fourthly, the supervisory body 
should have dual role of watchdog and of mentor. As well as reviewing the functioning and 
effectiveness of the tribunal, the body should facilitate better decision-making and provide 
support and training for tribunal members.  This role of encouragement and guidance should 
include the formulating of ‗best practice‘ rules, performance standards for tribunals and 
guidelines for more efficient administration, based on a collective experience.
85
  
If a council on tribunals is to be effective, it must have both an adequate research budget and 
sufficient regularity authority over the whole of the administrative justice sphere. The need 
for a supervisory body to constantly regulate and re-formulate the structure of the tribunals is 
necessary for good governance. Tribunals, if they are to offer the kind of flexible and efficient 
dispute resolution which is required of them, must be adaptable to the changing nature of the 
                                                     
81
 The most successful supervisory body is the Australian ARC. It was the basis of the new English AJTC, and 
was also suggested as a model in South African administrative reform in clause 15(a) of the draft bill appended 
to the South African Law Reform Commission Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice (1999). See Ch 6 s 
2 3 1 for a discussion on the role of an ARC in South Africa.  
82
 Despite having noble intentions, any council without the necessary budgetary resources will be nothing more 
than an empty shell and unable to perform its appointed role.  
83
 Two examples of legal systems whose institutions take on this extensive oversight role are Australia‘s ARC 
and England‘s AJTC.  
84
 This was a core concern in the development of the AJTC. Craig points out that it would be ‗beneficial to 
extend the ambit of the Council‘s power to the whole area of administrative adjudication‘ which should 
‗embrace regulatory agencies, as well as more traditional court-substitute tribunals.‘ in Craig Administrative Law 
6 ed (2005) 268.   
85
 These objects are all supported both by the Australian ARC and  the Council of Australasian Tribunals 
(COAT). Furthermore these Councils provide and promote research seminars, conferences, the publishing of 
papers and the proliferation of adequate literature on the topic of tribunal supervision. Administrative Review 
Council Report on the Council of Australasian Tribunals (2002) 14.  
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society and the needs of citizens. The informality of tribunals is one of its most essential 
qualities and thus tribunals should be under constant scrutiny to ensure that there is no 
stagnation of procedures and that functionality is a more dominant requirement than 
constancy. Furthermore, the supervisory body should be empowered to perform a supervisory, 
consultative and advisory role with regard to the administrative justice system as a whole.   
3 5 2  Administrative Appeals to a Higher Body 
All tribunals and similar bodies should be subject to some form of control by a higher body or 
court. This higher appeal process contributes to a unitary and coherent structure of dispute 
resolution, as well as lending judicial certainty to the decision of tribunals. As described 
above,
86
 appeal is not the same as judicial review. Although both consist of a judicial-type 
remedy, they differ in several major ways. The power of review is inherent in the jurisdiction 
of the courts, while the power of appeal must be expressly provided for by statute. Appeal 
focuses on the merits of a decision, while review is concerned with the way in which the 
decision was taken. Judicial review is considered to be an external remedy, while appeal is a 
form of control which is internal to the administrative action.
87
  Lastly, in appeal proceedings, 
the original decision may be altered by the appeal tribunal or court. This allows the court to 
‗stand in the shoes‘ of the original decision-maker and replace his decision.88 In review, the 
court must refer the decision back to the original decision-maker for reconsideration.
89
 While 
these important differences between the two remedies exist, there is inevitable overlap 
between them. Decisions made by tribunals often give rise to a remedy both by way of a 
statutory right of appeal (if such a right exists), and an automatic right to judicial review.   
3 5 3 Judicial Review by Courts 
Tribunals cannot and should not be used to completely replace courts. Cane describes the 
reasons for this, explaining that not only is there a functional differentiation between courts 
                                                     
86
 S 3 6.  
87
 Boulle et al Administrative Law 253.  
88
 Hoexter Administrative Law 63. 
89
 There is the possibility that in exceptional cases the court itself may be able to take the decision, and this 
possibility is recognised in several common law countries. An example is S8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA recognises 
that the court may make any order ‗in exceptional cases – substituting or varying the administrative action or 
correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action‘.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
 
and tribunals, but there are specific institutional reasons for the continued existence of both.
90
 
While tribunals have certain advantages to add to the system, they should be placed in their 
correct role.
91
 Courts should retain their superiority as courts of final instance. While judicial 
review as the primary form of control of administrative action has been criticised,
92
 much of 
the criticism relates to the role it has been forced to play in South African administrative law 
historically. When used correctly and as an instance of last resort,
93
 judicial review continues 
to play a necessary, constitutionally-ordained role in administrative adjudication. This 
position and the challenges facing courts have been discussed in Chapter 2.   
3 6  Scope of Tribunals 
As is apparent from the above descriptions of tribunals, tribunals can offer many advantages 
to a system of adjudication of administrative disputes, at least at a theoretical level. What then 
becomes a point of contention is over which exact elements of the dispute tribunals are 
competent to adjudicate.
94
 The question arises whether tribunals should only preside over 
questions of fact or ‗merits review‘, and leave questions or errors of law which are concerned 
with legality and scrutinised by ‗judicial review‘ up to competent courts, or whether tribunals 
should be able to fully preside over all elements of the dispute.
95
 The contrast between the 
                                                     
90
 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law 283-299. These institutional 
reasons are further discussed in s 3 6 2 ‗Judicial and Non-Judicial Review‘.  
91
 Tribunals should be subject to control by the superior courts in order to ensure that they have observed the 
limits of their statutory power to make enforceable decisions. The dictum ―That supervision goes to two points: 
one is the area of the inferior judgment and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the 
observance of the law in the course of its exercise‖ can be found in the English case of R v Nat Bell Liquor 
(1922) 2 AC 128 156.  
92
 See Ch 2 for a full discussion of the problems related to judicial review.  
93
 The availability of review should not, however, be accepted as a substitute for appeal proceedings, and 
‗wherever…it can be shown that the absence of an appeal procedure is leading to the widespread use of judicial 
review as a substitute, there must be a strong presumption that some form of appeal should be provided.‘ Turpin 
& Tomkins British Government and the Constitution 6 ed (2007) 720.  
94
 ‗Tribunals have both a positive duty to decide the questions that the legislature intended them to decide and a 
negative duty to refrain from exceeding their jurisdiction.‘ Wade & Bradley Constitutional and Administrative 
Law 11 ed (1993) 886.  
95
 In Cane A Research Agenda for the Age of Tribunals 
<http://www.ajtc.gov.uk/adjust/articles/feature_peter_cane.pdf> (accessed 21-02-2010), he writes that ‗in 
Australian federal law, tribunals and courts are categorically different institutions, and merits review is a 
function categorically different from judicial review. In English law, by contrast, courts and administrative 
tribunals are understood as species of the same genus. It remains to be seen whether a generic concept of tribunal 
review will develop in English law; and if it does, in what respects will it resemble and differ from judicial 
review.‘ 
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Australian position and the position in England provides a backdrop for the position tribunals 
occupy within government; in the executive and the judiciary respectively.
96
  
3 6 1  Judicial and Non-Judicial Review 
Cane
97
 draws a distinction between ‗judicial review‘, that is review by judges in courts, 
notably superior courts, and ‗non-judicial review‘ which is review by other entities. He 
further distinguishes between internal non-judicial review and external non-judicial review, 
the former being the implementation of rules and the latter the adjudication of disputes arising 
out of the implementation of rules. His article then relates to the relationship between external 
non-judicial review and judicial review, more specifically that ‗the merits of decisions do not 
negatively define the limits of judicial review but positively characterise a mode of 
administrative adjudication distinct from judicial review.‘98 He uses the example of the AAT 
and points out that because it has more intrusive and investigative powers than a court, merits 
review is something of an ‗enhanced judicial review‘99 and  
merits review by tribunals is considered to be categorically different from judicial 
review by courts, as least in procedural and remedial terms. Whereas the characteristic 
merits review remedy is to vary a decision or make a substitute decision, the 
characteristic judicial review remedy is to set the decision aside and remit it for 
reconsideration.
100
 
He then raises the question as to why judicial review has not then been rendered obsolete by 
merits review. He contends that judicial review still occupies a constitutionally ordained 
superiority with regard to judicial review jurisdiction. Although tribunals can decide on errors 
of law, the finality of this decision remains a judicial function that only courts can 
conclusively perform and ‗tribunals may be the biggest show in town but they are not the 
                                                     
96
 However, this discussion merely highlights some of the problematic elements and does not seek to offer any 
solution or suggestion. This thesis does not have the scope to discuss the wealth of literature on the subject. 
Interesting  sources on the issue can be found in Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in 
Administrative Law 273-299 and Pearson ―Fact-Finding in Administrative Tribunals‖ in Pearson, Harlow & 
Taggart (eds) Administrative Law in a Changing State (2008) 301-323.  
97
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 490. 
98
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 494.  
99
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 495. He later points out that if a 
claimant has a choice between merits review and judicial review, it would seem strange for anyone to prefer the 
latter, especially considering the more intrusive nature of the former.   
100
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 501. 
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brightest.‘101 The jurisdictional argument is that tribunals are only as competent as far as they 
are empowered by statute, whereas the high courts are empowered with inherent jurisdiction. 
In this way, judicial review and merits review should not merely be seen as alternatives to 
each other as modes of primary review, but rather as each having important functional and 
institutional relevance within the system. Courts discourage judicial review if merits review is 
also available and has not already been pursued, and although ‗tribunals are commonly 
considered to be preferable to courts in certain respects (such as higher speed and lower cost); 
… such supposed advantages have not raised their status relative to courts…‘102  
Cane points out that 
courts and tribunals are both understood to be external to the agencies whose decisions 
they have the power to review. Moreover, courts strongly discourage applicants who 
have a choice between review by a tribunal and review by a court from opting for the 
latter. Judicial review is a last resort.
103
 
Similar arguments and conclusions may be reached within a South African context as well. 
Judicial review in PAJA can already be suspended if all internal remedies have not been 
pursued prior to review proceedings.
104
 If tribunals occupy a specific institutional role, then 
high courts may retain their jurisdictional superiority on the conclusive determination of 
questions of law. A warning from Chief Justice Warren comes at a time when the rise of 
tribunal power is increasing in Australia and he points out that  
on the one hand, it may be that tribunals continue to grow. On the other hand, long 
standing judicial institutions are capable of change, and may respond. Whatever the 
outcome, maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the superior courts and 
recognising their fundamental difference, in particular, their role in judicial 
independence, should remain the first priority.
105
 
 
 
 
                                                     
101
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 504. 
102
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 505. 
103
 Cane A Research Agenda for the Age of Tribunals 3.  
104
 S7(2).  
105
 Warren The Growth in Tribunal Power (2004) speech delivered to The Council of Australasian Tribunals 
Victoria, 07-06-2004 10.  
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3 6 2 Errors of Fact and Errors of Law  
The distinction between tribunals and courts in England differs to that in Australia because 
tribunals in England fall into the same institutional branch of government as courts. There is 
not a constitutional or institutional argument that would prevent the tribunals from exercising 
a judicial function and thus not a conclusive argument against their making decisions on 
errors of law. While the Australian tribunals are members of the executive and thus perform 
functions that are categorically different to courts, the English tribunals are seen as ‗quasi-
courts‘ and perform a similar function to the courts. Tribunals offer an institutionally-alike 
service, but they provide practically preferable means to do so, such as being more efficient, 
more effective, cheaper, more accessible and more informal.
106
 This institutional similarity 
then raises the question of whether tribunals are empowered only to decide on the merits of 
the case, or whether, like courts, they can decide on issues of law as well.  
The argument that courts should not be empowered to decide on errors of fact, and practically 
are not empowered to substitute decisions of the executive with decisions of their own, has 
traditionally been based on the separation of powers. The courts act deferentially towards the 
executive when they will not decide on the error of fact of the administrator, and the argument 
is institutional as to why they will only decide on decisions of law. Using the English system 
as a basic example, lower tribunals,
107
 however, are able to ‗stand in the shoes‘ of the 
decision-maker. Unlike a court with judicial-review powers, a tribunal is not limited to 
questions of lawfulness. Appellate tribunals
108
 can decide issues of fact, of law and of policy, 
and even substitute their decision for that of the decision-maker based on it being the ‗wrong‘ 
decision.
109
 Cane illustrates that the duty of tribunals is essentially to decide whether the 
decision-maker exercised correct discretion in the case.
110
 Practically, this means that lower 
tribunals decide fact, upper tribunals decide law, fact and policy (both through merits review) 
and it remains the duty of the courts to scrutinise pure law by means of judicial review. This 
places appellate tribunals into some sort of ‗twilight zone‘111 because while tribunals are part 
                                                     
106
 These characteristics are explained in more detail Cane Administrative Law 392-397. 
107
 First-tier tribunals. The structure of the English system of tribunals will be fully explained in Ch 5.  
108
 Upper tribunals.  
109
 Wrong in the sense that it is not the decision that the tribunal members would have made, based on the 
evidence before them.  
110
 Cane Administrative Law 389.  
111
 Cane Administrative Law 389. 
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of the judiciary, lower tribunals perform similar functions to the administration in order to 
reach their decisions. How this will operate in practice remains to be seen.  
3 7 Conclusion 
Through a study of what constitutes some of the most important issues around tribunals, it 
becomes clear that there are several important points. For our purposes, it is relevant that in 
South Africa space has been created within legislation for the creation of tribunals. Tribunals 
form such a large part of the administrative justice machinery of other commonwealth 
jurisdictions with whom we share many legal structures and understanding, and their 
continued existence is becoming ever more important. Tribunals, while not necessarily 
identical in structure or operation, share many general characteristics and are prized for the 
specific hallmarks which make them unique creatures of administrative law adjudication. 
Those characteristics subsequently show that while tribunals are valuable parts of 
administrative law adjudication, they also need to be controlled and supervised, and as a result 
a supervisory body is essential to their effective functioning. In order for the supervisory body 
to retain effective control of the tribunals, it should maintain a powerful role in the review and 
regulation of administrative justice as a whole. The control of tribunals by the courts should 
also form an important feature of the supervision of their development. Lastly, it is by no 
means certain nor generally established as to exactly how a tribunal should exercise its 
jurisdiction and just how wide its scope of adjudication should be. However, it is necessary 
that whatsoever that scope is determined to be, courts should retain their superior jurisdiction 
and exclusive function of judicial review in order that tribunals do not overtake their 
institutional role. After establishing these theoretical frameworks, a yardstick has been created 
which can be used to measure and analyse the functioning and operation of tribunals in the 
Australian and English administrative law systems.  
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CHAPTER 4: AUSTRALIAN TRIBUNALS AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
4 1  Introduction 
Tribunals have a long history of existence in Australia. The broader Australian administrative 
system boasts a unique and coherent model of administrative justice, with a unique system of 
tribunals. Since a watershed development in the 1970‘s,1 reforms have been introduced 
systematically which have been instrumental in the development of the Australian 
administrative model. Tribunals, while individually responsible for a vast portion of 
administrative dispute resolution, work alongside various other governmental institutions and 
structures which occupy distinct roles in the administration of Australia. Consequently, 
Australian administrative law is administered by a comprehensive, integrated and accessible 
system.  
This chapter aims to briefly outline the structure of Australia‘s model of administrative 
justice, with a specific focus on the role and functioning of tribunals. The scope of operation, 
the effectiveness of merits review and tribunal justice, and the supervision of tribunals will 
also be discussed. The purpose of the discussion in this chapter is to facilitate a comparison 
with the English system in the next chapter, and eventually within the broader context of the 
thesis to facilitate a comparison with the South African system. 
4 2  Federal Government 
What should be noted before discussing the administrative structure is that Australia has a 
federal system of government made up of a commonwealth government and separate 
governments in Australia‘s states and territories.2 Government at the federal level employs a 
strict separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, which is 
imposed by the Constitution.
3
 For this reason, the references in this chapter to tribunals will 
be to federal tribunals, unless otherwise indicated. The individual states within Australia do 
                                                     
1
 This is discussed in s 4 3 1 below.  
2
 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 Part 1 established the Australian Federal Government.   
3
 The first three chapters of the Australian Constitution are headed respectively ‗The Parliament‘, ‗The Executive 
Government‘, and ‗The Judicature‘. Each chapter begins with a provision vesting the relevant ‗power of the 
Commonwealth‘ in the appropriate branch of government. The individual states are not bound by the 
Constitution.  
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not necessarily share all the same legal provisions as at federal level, and so this discussion 
will be limited to describing the position of the federal tribunals.
4
  
4 3  General Administrative Structure 
4 3 1 Kerr Committee Report 
Australia‘s current system of administrative dispute resolution mechanisms is the result of 
administrative reforms of the 1970‘s. The Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee 
Report
5
 of 1971 was an investigative committee report that introduced a drastic overhaul of 
the structure of the administrative justice system and suggested an ambitious range of 
apparatus designed to provide control of government action. The objective was to ‗establish 
machinery which provided for a more comprehensive review of administrative decisions.‘6 
These reforms included development of judicial review jurisdiction and codification of the 
grounds of judicial review; a central tribunal empowered to provide merits review across the 
whole of government; a supervisory body to oversee the administrative law framework and 
operation; a system of disclosure of government documents; and a human rights protectorate.
7
  
The implementation of the suggestions made by the Kerr Committee resulted in the structures 
that exist today. The following discussion will briefly outline the organisation of the various 
bodies empowered to control and facilitate government action.  
4 3 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) 
Due to the fact that the Kerr Committee was originally assembled to advise the Government 
about a proposal for a commonwealth superior court to review administrative decisions, their 
major focus was on the necessity of a ‗court‘ to provide merits review. A large part of the 
report is focused on the role of such a court. A primary recommendation of the report was the 
                                                     
4
 Murray ―Legislative and Executive Governance in South Africa‖ in LeRoy & Saunders (eds) Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 462 explains that South Africa is also federal in 
form, and therefore it is useful to examine the federal tribunals as models for national tribunals.  
5
 Administrative Review Committee Report Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report (1971) 
(―Kerr Committee Report‖).  
6
 Kerr Committee Report 12.  
7
 Kerr Committee Report 12. 
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establishment of a general and central tribunal with wide jurisdiction to review government 
decisions of all kinds affecting individual rights (AAT).
8
 
4 3 3 Federal Courts of Australia 
 
The Federal Court of Australia was designated by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act
9
 to be the principal national court for administrative law matters. However, this 
court has been fairly unsuccessful in the administration of these matters and the Federal 
Magistrate‘s Court has had a better record of case administration.10 The Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act also codified the grounds of judicial review
11
 and imposed a 
statutory obligation upon decision-makers to provide written reasons for their decisions.
12
 
Both of these reforms provided a legislative requirement of openness and the disclosure of 
reasons for decisions which did not exist in the common law and were important safeguards 
against the abuse of power.  
 
4 3 4 Ombudsman 
 
While Ombudsmen were among the first administrative law mechanisms established in 
Australia, the office of the Ombudsman was only officially established by statute in terms of 
the Ombudsman Act.
13
 These offices act on both a state and a federal level and work hand-in-
hand with each other, providing a two-tier structure to which affected parties can apply. The 
role of the offices of the Ombudsman is to ‗consider and investigate complaints from people 
who believe they have been treated unfairly or unreasonably by an Australian Government 
department or agency.‘14 They are not empowered to override the decisions of the agencies 
                                                     
8
 A more comprehensive description of this tribunal and the reasons why a tribunal was more suitable than a 
court can be found in s 4 4 3 1 below.  
9
 1977.  
10
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice: Beyond the Courtroom Door‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative 
Justice Across the Commonwealth (2007) 262 outlines the caseload of the two courts. See Ch 7 s 5 1 3 and 
McMillan ―Re-thinking the Separation of Powers‖ (2010) 38 Federal LR 12.  
11
 Ss 5-7 
12
 S 13. Prior to this common law did not always require administrators to provide reasons for all decisions.  
13
 1976.  
14
 Ombudsman ―About Us‖ (12-04-2011) Commonwealth Ombudsman 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/about-us/our-office/what-we-do.php> (accessed on 08-11-2010).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
 
complained about, nor do they issue directions to the administrators. Rather, they resolve 
disputes through consultation and negotiation, and if necessary, by making formal 
recommendations to the most senior levels of government. They have been described as ‗one 
of the main instruments of administrative review at the federal level‘.15 An added advantage 
of the Ombudsman over and above their primary dispute-resolution function is the production 
of whole-of-government reports, such as the ‗best practice‘ standards for public service.16 
Creyke states that these reports ‗demonstrate admirably the dual focus of administrative law – 
providing appropriate avenues for individual complaints, while encouraging systemic reform 
within public administration.‘17 
 
4 3 5 Freedom of Information and Privacy Legislation 
 
The Freedom of Information Act
18
 provides the public with a right of access to the official 
documents of the commonwealth government and its agencies. One of the motivating factors 
behind the establishment of the Kerr Committee was concern from citizens regarding the 
secretive nature of Westminster-style government agencies and the closed-door policy 
regarding the decisions of administrators.
19
 The Freedom of Information Act
20
 aimed to 
provide a right of access to government documents to the public in order to advance the goals 
of openness and the transparency of government decision-making. These reforms were later 
complemented with national privacy legislation, namely the Privacy Act
21
 which legislated 
the acquisition, storage, use and disclosure of personal information by government agencies.
22
  
 
 
                                                     
15
 Administrative Review Council Annual Report (1983) 24. Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing 
Administrative Justice 261.  
16
 These reports can be accessed on Ombudsman ―Publications and Media‖ (12-04-2011) Commonwealth 
Ombudsman <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/publications-and-media/better-practice-guides/> (accessed 
02-03-2011).  
17
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 279.  
18
 1982.  
19
 Downes Australian Tribunal Reforms (2009) speech delivered at the Commonwealth Law Conference Hong 
Kong, 08-04-009.  
20
 1982.  
21
 1988.  
22
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 258.  
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4 3 6 Australian Human Rights Commission 
 
The Australian Human Rights Commission, previously called the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC), acts on a national level and was established in 1986. The 
Australian Human Rights Commission
23
 is an independent statutory organisation that works 
to protect and promote the human rights of all people in Australia. The Commission was 
established by the Australian Human Rights Commission Act,
24
 formerly called the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, and has as its main objectives to inquire into, 
and attempt to conciliate, complaints of unlawful discrimination in terms of the Age 
Discrimination Act,
25
 the Disability Discrimination Act,
26
 the Racial Discrimination Act,
27
 the 
Sex Discrimination Act
28
 or any other enactment.
29
  
 
4 3 7 Administrative Review Council
30
 
 
The Administrative Review Council (ARC) is primarily an independent law reform and 
advisory committee and fulfills an important and coherent supervisory role over Australian 
administrative law.
 31
 The ARC was established in 1976, on recommendation of the Kerr 
Committee Report and under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act.
32
 The major functions 
of the ARC are ‗to keep the commonwealth administrative law system under review, monitor 
                                                     
23
 This name was not shortened to an acronym because according to the information released on their website, 
‗We will not use an acronym for the Australian Human Rights Commission. ‗AHRC‘ is just as hard to remember 
as ‗HREOC‘ so we will not use it.‘ The only acceptable shortened form is ‗The Commission‘.  AHRC ―About 
Us‖ (04-12-2010) Australian Human Rights Commission 
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/faqs/FAQ_name_2008.html> (accessed 08-11-2010).  
24
 1986.  
25
 2004.  
26
 1992.  
27
 1975.  
28
 1984.  
29
 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 ss1(a) and 1(aa).  
30
 A more specific and comprehensive description of the ARC and its relationship to tribunal supervision can be 
found in the s 4 5 below.  
31
 This basis for this concise description of the ARC can be found in Buck ―Administrative Justice and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: the Australian Experience‖ (2005) <http://www.dca.gov.uk/ 
research/2005/8_2005_full.pdf> (accessed 12-08-2010) .  
32
 1975 (AATA) Part V.  
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developments in administrative law and recommend to the Minister improvements that might 
be made to the system.‘33 The ARC is further involved in several investigative reports which 
aim to identify problems and challenges, and to make recommendations to streamline and 
update the functions of tribunals. These include the Better Decisions report,
34
 reports 
regarding computerisation of the administrative decision-making
35
 and current investigations 
such as the one into the scope of judicial review.
 36
 The most important characteristic of the 
ARC is its effectiveness. In its roles of monitoring, facilitation, and recommendation, the 
ARC has been able to actually influence the structures and systems within the Australian 
administrative law system.
37
 It has recently been described as ‗an effective body, providing 
useful and timely advice on administrative review matters.‘38  
4 3 8 Judicial Review by Courts 
 
Judicial review by the courts retains a primary role in the administrative law system. Creyke 
illustrates that ‗the principal Australian administrative law text [Aronson, Dyer & Groves 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4 ed (2009)] is unashamedly single-minded about 
review by the courts‘39 and that ‗the longevity and pre-eminence of the Aronson et al 
publication indicates that judicial review… (has) a pivotal role in administrative law.‘40  
Comparable to the position in South Africa, the courts‘ judicial review function was at one 
stage seen as central to administrative law, but Creyke illustrates how that centrality is 
diminishing and other elements of the system are in ascendency.  The courts‘ power of 
judicial review is largely curtailed and confined only to jurisdictional error. More important is 
                                                     
33
 S51(1)(aa) AATA. The remainder of the statutory functions can be found in s51. They include making 
recommendations to the Minister, make inquiries as to the adequacy of law and procedures, facilitating the 
training of members and promoting knowledge of the commonwealth administrative law system.  
34
 Administrative Review Council Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals (1995).  
35
 Administrative Review Council Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision Making: Report to The 
Attorney-General (2004).  
36
 Administrative Review Council Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals (1994).  
37
 Administrative Review Council Annual Report (2008/2009) 5-8 has most recently documented the 
achievements and effective functioning of the ARC. Prior to this, there are annual reports stretching back to the 
establishment of the council which also are testament to its efficacy.  
38
 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on the Role and Functions of the 
Administrative Review Council (1997).  
39
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 264.  
40
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 264. 
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the realisation that the curtailment of judicial review is no strange phenomenon, but is both 
requisite for good governance and manifests itself frequently in different legislative ways. 
The ARC has identified nine legislative methods which exclude judicial review.
41
 
Similar criticisms to those illustrated by Hoexter in Chapter 2 have arisen in the Australian 
context as well.
42
 The Australian model made use of alternative structures of dispute 
resolution to courts before the emerging criticisms to judicial review, and the evidence now 
shows that the prominence of judicial review may be declining,
43
 while the alternative 
measures are becoming more widely and effectively employed. Morris J, President of the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)
44
 stated that the VCAT is ‗gradually 
replacing judicial review as the principal method of resolving issues between citizens and 
government‘45 because ‗judicial review is poorly positioned to provide an accountability 
mechanism over executive decision-making.‘46 
 
The advantages of tribunals which were outlined in Chapter 3 show why they may be 
preferable forums for adjudication to courts. Warren points out that tribunals provide 
administrative law with ‗speed, efficacy, economy and expertise‘47 and that their proliferation 
is a result of ‗dissatisfaction with the courts in resolving particular types of disputes.‘48  
Nevertheless, whether judicial review is as effective or as important as it has historically been, 
it remains the highest form of review. It is under the sole jurisdiction of the High Court and 
the grounds for review remain codified in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. 
                                                     
41
 These are listed in Creyke ―Administrative Justice‖ in Comparing Administrative Justice 267.  
42
 For a thorough discussion of the comparison between South African and Australian judicial review see 
Saunders ―Constitutions, codes and administrative law: the Australian Experience‖ in Forsyth, Elliott, Jhaveri, 
Ramsden, & Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010).  
43
 See Ch 7 s 5 1 3.  
44
 The VCAT is a similar institution to the AAT.  
45
 Morris ―The Emergence of Administrative Tribunals in Victoria‖ (2004) AIAL Forum 21.  
46
 Morris (2004) AIAL Forum 22.  
47
 Warren ―The Growth in Tribunal Power‖ 2004.  
48
 Warren ―The Growth in Tribunal Power‖ 2004. 
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4 4 Tribunals  
4 4 1  History 
Tribunals occupy a space in Australian administrative law which has been carved out 
specifically for them. They function as the primary adjudicators of administrative disputes,
49
 
despite having no constitutionally guaranteed status.
50
 Tribunals give effect to the bulk of 
administrative justice in Australia by way of merits review of administrative decisions. The 
model of the tribunal system in Australia is one of the most coherent and over-arching. While 
there are highly specialised tribunals who deal specifically with certain disputes, the defining 
feature of the tribunal system is the Australian Appeals Tribunal which has extensive 
jurisdiction over administrative disputes.  
 
4 4 1 1 Kerr Committee Report and Tribunals 
 
Tribunals have been a part of the Australian system for many years, but this chapter will only 
describe their development from 1971. As described above at 3 1, the result of the findings of 
the Kerr Committee
51
 caused the tribunal structure to undergo a dramatic change and the 
wheels were set in motion to create the system that we see today.  
 
Despite the fact that the Committee‘s principal requirement was ‗to consider the jurisdiction 
to be given to the proposed Commonwealth Superior Court to review administrative 
decisions‘,52 they decided that they were not constrained by the use of the word ‗court‘ and 
were therefore able to examine administrative law more comprehensively. They stated that 
administrative review ‗requires to be considered in its entirety‘ because judicial review 
‗cannot provide for an adequate review of administrative decisions‘ on its own.53 The 
Committee‘s remarkable initiative meant that instead of merely examining judicial review of 
administrative decisions undertaken by courts, they embarked on a study which has been 
                                                     
49
 Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2009) 21 states that ‗in aggregate, administrative tribunals 
deal with many more disputes between citizen and government than do courts…‘. 
50
 Mullan ―Where do Tribunals Fit into the System of Administration and Adjudication? – A Canadian 
Perspective‖ in Creyke (ed) Administrative Tribunals: Taking Stock (1992) 18.  
51
 The full report of the Committee is a detailed and comprehensive document, the details of which are too wide-
ranging for the scope of this study. This section contains only a brief summary of the recommendations relating 
to tribunals specifically.  
52
 Kerr Committee Report 1.  
53
 Kerr Committee Report 4. 
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described as ‗the most extensive examination of merits review by tribunals which had ever 
been undertaken.‘54 The Committee‘s recommendation was as follows: 
 
Stated broadly, our view is that the work of the Court should be complementary to a 
system of administrative review on the merits. As we have already indicated, we are 
disposed to the view that, as part of any comprehensive system of administrative law 
in Australia, there should be a general Administrative Review Tribunal.
55
 
 
Rather than establishing a superior ‗court‘ for the review of administrative decisions, the Kerr 
Committee came to the conclusion that judicial review was an inadequate remedy for 
administrative disputes. The Kerr Committee then examined three potential forums for 
expanding the framework for merits review; a court; specialised tribunals; or a general 
administrative review tribunal. Dismissing the first option, the Committee favoured the 
general administrative review tribunal over specialised tribunals. Two advantages of a general 
tribunal in particular were that many areas of decision-making would not justify the creation 
of a specialist tribunal;
56
 and that the creation of a general tribunal was preferable to the 
proliferation of specialist tribunals.
57
 The Committee did nonetheless acknowledge that the 
creation of specialist tribunals in some circumstances would be warranted where expertise 
was required that did not exist in a general tribunal.
58
 The Kerr Committee further highlighted 
the need for more comprehensive research on Australian review before its proposed new 
system was established
59
 and as a result two further inquiries were commissioned.  
 
                                                     
54
 Downes The Tribunal Dilemma: Rigorous Informality (2008) unpublished paper presented as the Second 
Professor Harry Whitmore Lecture at the Annual General Meeting of the Council of Australasian Tribunals 
Sydney, 17-09-2008 
55
 Kerr Committee Report 291. 
56
 Kerr Committee Report 233 
57
 Kerr Committee Report 282.  
58
 Kerr Committee Report 280.  
59
 Kerr Committee Report ch 18.  
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4 4 1 2 Bland Committee
60
 and Ellicott Report
61
 
 
These two inquiries were concerned with other aspects of the administrative review system, 
but which were considered integral to the implementation of the suggestions made by the Kerr 
Committee. The Committee on Administrative Discretions (―Bland Committee‖) issued two 
reports; an interim report examining the Kerr Committee proposal for an Ombudsman; and a 
final report examining the proposals for administrative review. The Committee of Review of 
Prerogative Writ Procedures (―Ellicott Report‖) examined the Kerr Committee‘s proposals for 
a reformed system of judicial review. Both committees produced reports in 1973. These two 
reports highlighted the need for comprehensive administrative law reform and not merely the 
reform of individualised areas. 
 
4 4 2 Constitutionality 
 
In order to fully understand the results of these commissions, there is an important 
constitutional consideration to be mentioned. The Australian Constitution obeys a strict 
doctrine of the separation of powers,
62
 and contains provisions to ensure its adherence.
63
 For 
that reason, courts are prohibited from fulfilling functions other than judicial ones and no 
other sphere of government may fulfil the judicial function.
64
 Tribunals in Australia are not 
considered to be ‗quasi-courts‘ or court replacements, but rather a fully-fledged and 
functioning part of the executive.
65
 Tribunals are not empowered to adjudicate any other 
                                                     
60
 Committee on Administrative Discretions Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions 
Parliamentary Paper No 53 of 1973 (Bland) (1973). 
61
 Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedure Report of the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ 
Procedure Parliamentary Paper No 56 of 1973 (Ellicott) (1973). 
62
 Creyke illustrates that ‗the Australian Constitution has shaped the jurisdiction of tribunals. Chapter III of the 
Constitution restricts the exercise of judicial power of the commonwealth to courts covered by Chapter III. A 
concomitant restriction is that such courts are not permitted to exercise non-judicial power.‖ Creyke ―Tribunals 
and the Australian System‖ in Huscroft & Taggart (eds) Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law: 
Essays in Honour of David Mullan (2006) 85. This was confirmed in R v Kirby Ex parte Boilermakers‘ Society 
of Australia (1956) HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 273 
63
 Spigelman ―The Integrity Branch of Government‖ (2004) 78 ALJ 730.   
64
 Australian Constitution Chapter III.  
65
 Downes Overview of Tribunals Scene Australia (2006) speech presented at the International Tribunals 
Workshop Canberra, 05-04-2006 states that ‗in Australia, reviewing administrative decisions on the merits is not 
an exercise of judicial power, any more than the making of original administrative decisions is an exercise of 
judicial power. Both are exercises of executive or administrative power.‘ However, this position has been 
questioned in the debate about the ‗fourth‘ or ‗integrity‘ branch of government. Creyke ―Tribunals and the 
Australian System‖ in Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law 110 writes that ‗Tribunals are neither 
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disputes than administrative ones, and they do not have the power of judicial review. Rather, 
tribunals have the power of ‗merits review‘ and they are able to reconsider the decisions 
originally made by administrators on the merits of the specific instance. In the same way, 
courts are not empowered to make enquiries into the merits, but are restricted to judicially 
review decisions of administrators under the doctrine of legality.
66
  
 
4 4 3 Tribunal Structure 
 
The five major merits review tribunals providing external review of government decisions are 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Migration Review Tribunal, the Refugee Review 
Tribunal, the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Veterans' Review Board. The AAT 
has a wider jurisdiction than the other specialised tribunals and may also be approached to 
review decisions made by the other tribunals.  
 
4 4 3 1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal
67
 
 
The AAT was explicitly set up to perform merits review by the AATA. Recommendations of 
both the Kerr Committee Report and the Bland Committee were implemented in order to 
create the structure of the AAT.
68
 The main objective of the AATA was to establish a single 
independent tribunal with the purpose of dealing with appeals against administrative decisions 
on as wide a basis as possible. 
 
Although the AAT has widespread jurisdiction, it does not have an inherent general 
jurisdiction.
69
 The AAT derives its authority statutorily and consequently,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
part of the judicial arm, nor, since they are exempted from requirements which apply to officials such as 
compliance with policy, are they part of the executive. Tribunals, since they do not fit easily into the traditional 
three arms of government, but are, at the same time, a key accountability mechanism, deserve a place in the 
integrity or fourth branch of government‘. This view is also endorsed by Spigelman (2004) ALJ 734 and 
McMillan ‗The Ombudsman and the Rule of Law‘ (2005) 44 AIAL Forum 11.  
66
 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.  
67
 There are two other similar tribunals in Australia; in New South Wales the equivalent is the Administrative 
Decisions Tribunal (the ADT) and in Victoria it is known as the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(VCAT). All three are essentially similar and therefore only the characteristics of the AAT will be discussed. 
68
 Pearce ―The Australian Government Administrative Appeals Tribunal‖ (1976) 1 NSWLJ 193. 
69
 Part VI S25(1) & (4) AATA.  
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the Tribunal can only review a decision if an Act, regulation or other legislative 
instrument provides specifically that the decision is subject to review by the Tribunal. 
Jurisdiction is generally conferred by the enactment under which the original decision 
was made.
70
  
 
Nevertheless, the AAT has jurisdiction to review decisions made under more than four 
hundred acts and legislative instruments. The Tribunal's jurisdiction includes areas such as 
commonwealth employees' compensation, social security, taxation, veterans' entitlements, 
bankruptcy, civil aviation, corporations‘ law, customs, freedom of information, immigration 
and citizenship, industry assistance and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 
Cane explains that  
 
in the areas of taxation and worker‘s compensation the AAT provides a first-tier of 
review, whereas in the areas of social security and veterans‘ benefits it undertakes 
second-tier review (of decisions of the Social Security Appeal Tribunal and the 
Veterans‘ Review Board respectively). There are two first-tier ‗specialist tribunals‘ – 
the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Migration Review Tribunal, from which there is 
no ‗appeal‘ to the AAT.71  
 
4 4 3 1 1 Structure of the AAT 
 
The AAT has four levels of members. The AAT consists of a president, presidential members 
including judges and deputy presidents, senior members and members.
72
 The president must 
be a judge of the Federal Court of Australia
73
 and all deputy presidents must be qualified 
lawyers.
74
 Senior members may be lawyers or have special knowledge or skills relevant to the 
duties of a senior member.
75
 Members other than the president may also be judges, but this in 
no way means that the AAT is in any sense a court, nor does it in any way affect the tenure of 
the judge.
76
 The judicial members of the AAT exercise administrative or executive power.
77
 
                                                     
70
 AAT ―Introduction to the AAT‖ <http://www.aat.gov.au/AboutTheAAT/IntroductionToTheAAT.htm> 
(accessed 02-02-2011).  
71
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Forsyth, Elliott, Jhaveri, Ramsden, & Hill (eds) Effective 
Judicial Review 485.   
72
 S6 AATA.  
73
 S7(1).  
74
 S7(1AA).  
75
 S7(1B).  
76
 S7A.  
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The Tribunal can sit in panels of one, two or three members. Members have expertise in over 
ninety different areas of expertise such as accountancy, actuarial work, administration, 
aviation, engineering, environment, insurance, law, medicine, military affairs, social welfare, 
taxation and valuation. This diverse range of expertise is part of what facilitates the AAT‘s 
wide scope and functionality.
78
  
 
The AAT is also divided into internal specialised divisions. They are the General 
Administrative Division; Medical Appeals Division; Security Appeals Division; Taxation 
Appeals Division; and the Valuation and Compensation Division. Each division has specific 
requirements which relate to its composition and functioning.  
 
4 4 3 1 2 Procedures of the AAT 
 
While the structure of the AAT is unique in itself, it also employs unique procedures relating 
to the administration of justice. An important goal of the AAT is aimed at assisting early 
settlement between the parties, where that is possible. Where it is not, the AAT aims to 
resolve the disputes set before it. Contributing factors to the overwhelming success and 
acceptance by government agencies of the AAT are its ability to be flexible in procedure 
according to the dispute at hand, as well as the way in which those procedures are carried 
out.
79
  
 
4 4 3 1 2 1 Formality of the AAT 
 
Although the Tribunal is informal in its procedures, it performs its adjudicatory function in a 
court-like manner. There is an essential requirement of procedural fairness in tribunal 
proceedings. That being said, an important aspect of the Tribunal‘s procedure is its flexibility 
                                                                                                                                                                     
77
 Downes Why does Australia have a General Review Tribunal? (2005) Address to the New Zealand Chapter of 
the Council of Australasian Tribunals, Wellington 07-10-2005 5.  
78
 Information regarding the structure of the AAT can be found on their website AAT ―Introduction to the AAT‖ 
<http://www.aat.gov.au/AboutTheAAT/IntroductionToTheAAT.htm> (accessed 02-02-2011). 
 
79
 ‗Merit review, as two decades of legal development have shown, is as much about the way in which disputes 
with the state are settled, and about who is to settle them, as it is about the criterion that is applied in settling 
those disputes.‘ McMillan ―Merit Review and the AAT: A Concept Develops‖ in AIAL (ed) The AAT—Twenty 
Years Forward (1998) 54.  
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and subsequently its ability to adapt its procedures to the dispute which is laid before it. 
Downes points out that  
 
a small social security case with a self represented applicant is conducted informally 
around a table, while a multi-million dollar tax case with Queens Counsel bears more 
relation to a hearing in a superior court. Even when the Tribunal acts more like a court 
it is obliged by its empowering Act to provide ‗a mechanism of review that is fair, 
just, economical, informal and quick‘. It must also conduct proceedings ‗with as little 
formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as [possible]‘.80 
 
4 4 3 1 2 2 Fact-finding in the AAT 
 
Firstly, the AAT conducts merits review, as opposed to judicial review, like a court.
81
 Cane
82
 
illustrates that the categorical difference in procedure between the AAT and a court is the 
process of fact-finding. Courts conduct review based on the situation which existed at the 
time of the dispute, and allow extrinsic or new evidence only as an exception. In 
contradistinction, the AAT conducts review on the facts that exist at the time of the hearing.
83
 
He points out both the positive and negative aspects of this; the former being that the tribunal 
can add value to the decision-making process because they are able, and indeed encouraged, 
to spend more time and energy investigating the facts than the original decision-maker and 
can usually come to a more ‗correct‘ decision. The latter negative aspects are two-fold and 
flow from each other. Firstly, the additional powers of the tribunal may give rise to 
resentment from administrators who have their decisions reversed because while they must 
make decisions under pressurised situations and within the available resources, the AAT has 
the benefit of time and resources in their decision-making. The criticism that flows from this 
relates to fairness. Because only a small percentage of decisions are reviewed, the decision-
making process is considered unfair to citizens who do not have their administrative decisions 
taken under review.
84
 Cane points out that this is the 
                                                     
80
 Downes Australian Tribunal Reforms 7 (fns omitted).  
81
 See s 4 4 4.  
82
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 490.  
83
 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31.  
84
 ‗Given that only a tiny proportion of administrative decisions are ever reviewed, how can we justify giving a 
very small proportion of affected citizens the benefit of a Lexus decision-making process when the vast majority 
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central dilemma of merits review: constructing a convincing rationale for merits 
review depends on identifying a distinctive contribution that the reviewer can make to 
the decision-making process and the primary decision-maker cannot...
85
 
 
But he subsequently says that 
 
having identified significant value added by the reviewer, it may be difficult to justify 
the very limited incidence of review.
86
  
 
This dilemma is resolved to a certain extent if the roles of administrators and administrative 
review tribunals are properly considered. Cane describes that the review of decisions is a 
mode of adjudication while administrative decision-making is a mode of implementation. 
This means that the AAT‘s main function is to focus on the individual‘s circumstances and to 
resolve their individual disputes in a more specialised and adjudicatory forum than the 
original decision-maker. On the other hand, the administrator‘s basic responsibility is to 
‗promote the social purposes of general rules‘ than to resolve every individual‘s specific 
situation.
87
 
 
4 4 3 1 3 Success of the AAT 
 
The AAT has been a well instituted and implemented administrative reform and has gone a 
long way to improving the delivery of administrative justice. During a conference reviewing 
the AAT after twenty years of functioning, Skehill
88
 stated that  
 
(my) assessment is that within Commonwealth administration our policy and 
legislative development processes and our decision-making processes are now far 
better than they were pre-AAT. The bureaucracy has, I think, responded well overall 
to external review. Training of decision-makers and awareness of concepts of natural 
justice are much heightened. Our systems of external review outside the AAT are now 
                                                                                                                                                                     
have to be satisfied with the Lada version?‘ Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial 
Review 487. 
85
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 487. 
86
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 487. 
87
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 487. 
88
 Skehill provides insight from the perspective of government as he served as an advisor to many administrative 
bodies.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
far better than they were pre-AAT. A great deal of this is directly attributable to the 
AAT itself; other improvements are attributable to the sea-change of which the AAT 
has been a part.
89
  
 
What appears to be the greatest factor in favour of the effective functioning of the Tribunal is 
that it is a general tribunal. Creyke
90
 illustrates some of the advantages of the general tribunal, 
stating that it offers a more coherent system to the citizen; offers a single, overarching 
structure through which all appeals can be lodged; provides greater clarity and simplicity to 
the applicants; enables a greater level of participation from the citizen; offers a non-
threatening, easily approachable single source of information regarding the functioning and 
procedures of all administrative appeal forums; and provides standardised and consistent 
tribunal merits review procedures.
91
 Another advantage of the general tribunal is that it can be 
adapted to undertake merits review in any new field, provided legislation makes provision 
therefore. This reduces long delays in the legislative process because 
 
if the Parliament is considering legislation on a new topic and the question arises 
whether a decision should be subject to merits review there is a readily available a 
tribunal to undertake the review. In other jurisdictions it will usually be necessary to 
create a new tribunal attended by cost, both initial and recurring, and delay, associated 
with increasing bureaucracy.
92
 
 
A secondary factor towards the success of the AAT is its ability to both ‗deliver justice in the 
individual case but also see beyond it to the departmental decision-makers and intermediate 
review tribunals‘.93 Dwyer94 explains that the task of the AAT is both challenging and 
important, and must be seen to both provide justice in individual cases and to enhance and 
improve original decision-making.  
                                                     
89
 Skehill ―The Impact of the AAT on Commonwealth Administration - A View from the Administration‖ in 
AIAL (ed) The AAT—Twenty Years Forward (1998) 59. 
90
 In this discussion, she relies Leggatt Tribunals for Users One System, One Service (2001). This report was 
conducted in England and consequently will be discussed in detail in Ch 5 s 3 1 2.  
91
 Creyke ‗Tribunals and Access to Justice‘ (2002) 2 QUT Law and Justice Journal 69-70.  
92
 Downes Australian Tribunal Reforms 6. This is important feature of the AAT and will be considered further in 
Ch 7 s 5 1. .  
93
 Dwyer ―The Impact of The AAT: A View from the Tribunal‖ in AIAL (ed) The AAT—Twenty Years Forward 
(1998) 97.  
94
 Dwyer provides perspective from the view of the tribunal, as she served on the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, Social Security Appeals Tribunal and Equal Opportunity Board of Victoria.  
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The AAT has many unique and desirable characteristics which apply universally to a merits 
review tribunal, and can be held up as a distinct model for how a general merits review 
tribunal should operate.
95
 The Leggatt Report stated in 2001 that  
 
[they] found general agreement that the AAT had had a thoroughly beneficial effect on 
the development of administrative law, establishing a valuable tradition of individual 
treatment of cases, and of test cases. That had enabled the development of a distinctive 
process of merits review which all tribunals used in their separate jurisdictions.
96
 
 
4 4 3 2 Specific Tribunals  
 
As mentioned above, the AATA allows for the creation of specific tribunals when necessary. 
The Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal review decisions made under 
the Migration Act,
97
 particularly decisions to refuse or cancel visas or refuse applications for 
refugee status. The Social Security Appeals Tribunal reviews decisions made by officers of 
Centrelink
98
 under social security and similar laws. The Veterans‘ Review Board reviews 
certain decisions made by the Repatriation Commission under veterans‘ entitlements 
legislation.
99
 The Social Security Appeals Tribunal has the power to review decisions made 
by the Child Support Agency.
100
 Decisions of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal in child 
support matters will generally not be able to be reviewed by the AAT.  
 
                                                     
95
 Ch 7 s 5 1.  
96
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users (2001) 6. 
97
 1958.  
98 ‗
Centrelink is an Australian Government statutory agency, delivering a range of Commonwealth services to the 
Australian community.‘ Centrelink ―About Us‖ 
<http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/about_us/index.htm> (accessed 10-02-2011).  
99
 Such as the Veterans‘ Entitlements Act 1986 and the Veterans' Entitlements Amendment (Income Support 
Measures) Bill 2010.  
100
 ‗CSA is responsible for administering Australia‘s Child Support Scheme and supporting separated parents to 
transfer payments for the benefit of their children.‘ Child Support Agency ―About Us‖ <http://www.csa.gov.au/> 
(accessed 10-02-2011).  
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4 4 4  Merits Review or Judicial Review?
101
 
4 4 4 1 The Distinction 
As discussed above at s 4 2, the distinction between merits review and judicial review is an 
indispensable pillar of Australian administrative law. The distinction between the concepts 
generally has been discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2. The important point here is how 
merits review and judicial review relate to each other in Australian administrative law.  
 
Merits review is the sole responsibility of the tribunals, acting in their capacity as members of 
the executive and ‗standing in the shoes‘102 of the original decision-maker.103 Review on the 
merits is concerned with whether a legally sound decision was the ‗correct and preferable‘ 
one.
104
 Judicial review remains the sole responsibility of the court, performing their judicial 
function. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing decisions against the standard of 
legality and for this reason judicial review does not prevent wrong decisions; it instead 
prevents them from being made unjustly.  
 
Based on this distinction, tribunals are generally the logical first step in administrative 
adjudication. Tribunals are empowered to change the decision if it was not the correct one. 
Once all of the aspects of the case at hand have been examined and the tribunal comes to the 
conclusion that it would have made a different decision, then that decision will be substituted 
for the original administrator‘s decision. For most administrative disputes, this direct 
approach will provide the most appealing and satisfactory results, both from an efficiency and 
a finality perspective. In addition, because the tribunals are able to both review the decision 
and then make a ‗correct‘ one, Cane describes merits review as ‗enhanced judicial review‘.105  
                                                     
101
 See Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Pearson, Harlow & Taggart (eds) Administrative 
Law in a Changing State (2008) 273-299; Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2009); Cane 
―Judicial Review and Merits Review: Comparing Administrative Adjudication by Courts and Tribunals‖ in 
Rose-Ackerman & Lindeth (eds) Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 426 – 448 for a comprehensive 
explanation of the value of the distinction.   
102
 S43(6), S43(1) AATA; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139 143 per 
Smithers J.   
103
 Administrative Review Council What Decisions should be Subject to Merits Review? (1999) 1. 
  
104
 Spigelman (2004) ALJ 730.   
105
 Cane ―Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals‖ in Effective Judicial Review 489.  
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In many instances courts will not entertain judicial review if it can be shown that merits 
review would have been preferable and was not attempted.
106
 Resort to the law should only be 
necessary when the administrative decision-making process has failed in some way and 
judicial review of administrative decisions should be regarded as an ‗option of last resort‘.107 
Furthermore, judges have decided that the distinction must be strictly upheld and that merits 
review must be approached before resorting to the law.  
The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go 
beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and 
governs the exercise of the repository‘s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids 
administrative error or injustice, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to 
cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent 
that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant 
power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.
108
  
However, judicial review is still an important control mechanism and the executive must 
make decisions that are in accordance with the principle of legality. If the administrative 
dispute relates to the legality of the decision or any of the grounds of review, then the relevant 
court must be approached and judicial review by the courts must be permitted. The power of 
the court is restricted to declaring the invalidity of the decision and remitting the matter back 
to the original decision-maker for re-determination in accordance with the law. The courts‘ 
power to review the legality of administrative decisions is found in the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act and the Australian Constitution.
109
 
Finally, tribunals are not courts. Tribunals must also act in accordance with the principle of 
legality and may also err in law when they make decisions. For this reason, the court may also 
be approached to perform judicial review of the decisions made by tribunals.  
 
                                                     
106
 Allars ―Federal Courts and Federal Tribunals: Pluralism and Democratic Values‖ in Opeskin and Wheeler 
(eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 214.  
107
  Douglas & Jones‘s Administrative Law 4 ed (2002) 1.  
108
 Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 35-36 per Brennan J. 
109
 Chapter III.  
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4 4 4 2 Is Merits Review Working? 
  
Although the full extent of this question cannot be fully discussed within the scope of this 
thesis, it remains an important point of consideration. An interesting research paper by Linda 
Pearson
110
 provides a basis for the issues in question, and I will briefly summarise her 
opinions here.
111
 Firstly, Pearson points out that merits review cannot provide ‗administrative 
justice‘ on its own, but must be allowed to work within a comprehensive framework of 
administrative redress.
112
 She then explains that merits review has become entrenched in 
Australian administrative law to such an extent that more is expected of it than to merely 
remedy individual complaints. Rather,  
 
there is an expectation that tribunal decisions and decision-making have a role to play 
in ensuring that there is fairness and consistency in the treatment of individuals by 
government; that there is an improvement in the quality and consistency of agency 
decision-making beyond the individual case; and that there is an improvement in 
administration generally through the adoption of the values inherent in administrative 
review.
113
 
 
The second part of the research paper considers ‗the impact of what and the impact on 
what‘.114 She states that the relationship between a tribunal and the agency whose decisions it 
reviews is far more complex than that between the agency and a court, and any evaluation of 
merits review must reflect that complexity.
115
 Tribunals engage in a process of making correct 
decisions and are far more intrusive in their activities than courts when engaging in judicial 
review,
116
 so an impact analysis of merits review must take this into consideration.  
                                                     
110
 Pearson The Impact of External Administrative Law Review: Tribunals (2007) UNSW Law Research Paper 
No. 2007-53.  
111
 Notably, Pearson calls for more empirical and complete research about the impact of merits review and the 
measuring of the current system, in order to be more conclusive about whether merits review and the tribunal 
system offer a more complete and coherent model of administrative justice.  
112
 Pearson The Impact of External Administrative Law Review 3.  
113
 5. Cf Fleming ―Administrative Review and the ‗Normative‘ Goal: Is Anybody Out There?‖ (2000) 28 
Federal LR 63. 
114
 Pearson The Impact of External Administrative Law Review 5.   
115
 Pearson The Impact of External Administrative Law Review 5: ‗Any evaluation of impact, whether it be of 
judicial review or tribunal review, must acknowledge that external review is only one influence on 
administrative decision-making‘.  
116
 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 at 70 ‗Judicial review is neither more nor less than 
the enforcement of the rule of law over executive action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented 
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The third part of the research paper considers the statistics
117
 and how merits review is being 
measured.  What Pearson is keen to emphasise is that individual statistics and the possibility 
of having an unfair decision overturned can only be a part of the greater administrative aim, 
and she quotes Spigelman J‘s warning against the ‗dangers of ―pantometry‖, or the belief that 
everything can be counted: ―…not everything that counts can be counted. Some matters can 
only be judged – that is to say, they can only be assessed in a qualitative way‖.‘118 She refers 
to examples of qualitative factors such as the role of active participation of the citizen and 
fairness of decision-making.
119
  
 
However, the positive effects of merits review can be measured by the extensive use of the 
AAT and the decrease in the judicial review caseload. Chapter 7 discussed this success in 
more detail.  
 
4 5 Supervision of Tribunals 
4 5 1 Administrative Review Council 
4 5 1 1  Composition of the ARC 
 
Like any structure, especially one with wide jurisdiction and far-reaching influence, the 
tribunal system requires supervision and management. For this purpose, the ARC was 
established under the AATA Sec V. Although the focus in this discussion will be on the 
ARC‘s supervision of tribunals specifically, its field of influence is not limited to that. The 
ARC is empowered and indeed statutorily required to supervise and manage the whole field 
of administrative justice and to make recommendations about the improvement of the 
administrative justice system in its entirety.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
from exceeding the powers and functions assigned to the executive by law and the interests of the individual are 
protected accordingly.‘  
117
 Some statistics relating to the success of the AAT will be discussed in Ch 7 s 5 1 3.   
118
 Spigelman ―Measuring Court Performance‖ (2006) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 70. 
119
 Pearson The Impact of External Administrative Law Review 9.  
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The Council consists of three ex officio members, six appointed members and a president.
120
 
The ex officio officers are the commonwealth ombudsman holding office under the 
Ombudsman Act;
121
 the resident of the Australian Law Reform Commission established by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission Act;
122
 and the Australian Information Commissioner 
holding office under the Australian Information Commissioner Act.
123
 The appointed 
members are able to serve on the ARC for a term of up to three years, and are eligible for 
reappointment. Appointed members need to be highly qualified and are judged by criteria 
which include inter alia; extensive practice at a high level in industry, commerce, public 
administration or industrial relations; the practice of a profession or service in government or 
an authority of a government; an extensive knowledge of administrative law or public 
administration; or direct experience and direct knowledge of the needs of people significantly 
affected by government decisions.
124
  
 
4 5 1 2 ARC Supervision of Tribunals 
 
The general statutory functions of the ARC are contained in the AATA
125
 and have been 
described above at 3 7. They have general advisory functions as to the whole of 
administrative law but they also have functions which relates specifically to the context of 
tribunals. The ARC is required to ascertain and keep under review the classes of 
administrative decisions that are not the subject of review by tribunals;
126
 to make 
recommendations to the Attorney-General about the categories or types of decisions that 
should be subject to merits review;
127
 and to make recommendations to the Minister with 
regard to the constitution of tribunals engaged in the review of administrative decisions.
128
  
 
                                                     
120
 S49 AATA. 
121
 1976. S49(1)(b) AATA. 
122
 1996. S49(1)(c) AATA. 
123
 2010. S49(1)(ca) AATA. 
124
 S50 AATA. 
125
 S51 AATA.  
126
 S51(1)(a) AATA. 
127
 S51(1)(b) AATA. 
128
 S51(1)(e) AATA. 
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The ARC‘s role in the efficient functioning of tribunal justice is not limited to its influence 
over tribunal processes and members. They also communicate to and advise government 
agencies in order to improve their original decision-making competence,
129
 facilitate the 
training of administrators,
130
 and advise the legislature when they develop legislative 
proposals that involve the creation of administrative powers of decision.  The Council has 
released several publications with guidelines regarding good decision-making and merits 
review in order to make them more accessible and user-friendly to administrators.  
 
4 5 1 3 Success of the ARC‘s Supervisory Role 
 
A recent and comprehensive assessment of the success of the Council in exercising its powers 
and fulfilling its supervisory role can be found in the Report on the Role and Function of the 
Administrative Review Council.
131
 The conclusions of the Committee were that the ARC ‗has 
been an effective body, providing useful and timely advice on administrative review matters‘; 
that ‗there is a continuing need for the Commonwealth Government to receive advice and 
recommendations on administrative review and decision-making, and to promote a 
comprehensive, affordable and cost-effective administrative law system‘ and that the ARC 
‗should remain as a separate and permanent body, provided that it is making a significant 
contribution towards an affordable and cost-effective system of administrative decision-
making and review.‘132 It is clear from the Committee‘s report, and indeed from the many and 
varied submissions made to it during its deliberations, that the ARC provides an invaluable 
and positive contribution to the maintenance of the administrative justice system as a whole, 
and its continued independent existence is a necessary safeguard in the protection of the 
integrity and coherent functioning of the system.  
                                                     
129
 S51(1)(ab) AATA. 
130
 S51(1)(g) AATA. 
131
 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on the Role and Functions of the 
Administrative Review Council (1997).  
132
 Rather than the suggestion that the ARC should be abolished and its functions transferred to the Attorney-
General's Department or merged with those of the Australian Law Reform Commission.  
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4 5 2 Other Forms of Tribunal Supervision
133
 
4 5 2 1 Legislative Supervision 
 
Parliament and the legislature exercise control over tribunals by requesting that they present 
annual reports about their activities, and by requesting that tribunal executive officers appear 
in front of parliamentary committees which investigate issues surrounding the functioning and 
existence of tribunals. Furthermore, because they are creatures of statute, Parliament exercises 
control over tribunals from their very existence. This applies to a lesser extent to the AAT 
since jurisdiction can merely be extended by Parliament and a new tribunal does not 
necessarily have to be created, but the legislature can maintain a level of control through 
legislative provisions.  
 
4 5 2 2 Supervision by the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General 
 
Ombudsman and the Auditor-General exercise a control function over tribunals because 
tribunals are accountable to them by virtue of their status as independent statutory agencies. 
The office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Ombudsman Act
134
 to investigate acts 
which relate to 'a matter of administration' taken by a department or a 'prescribed authority',
135
 
either by virtue of a citizen making of a complaint or mero moto. Although courts are 
excluded from the provision, tribunals remain under their supervision.
136
 The Ombudsman 
exercises control by ensuring that tribunal decisions are made fairly, rationally and efficiently. 
The Ombudsman also presents an avenue whereby interested parties can partake in 
government decision-making, and it allows tribunal decisions to be scrutinised. 
 
4 5 2 3 Judicial Supervision  
 
Australian courts have inherent judicial review jurisdiction and are able to monitor and 
regulate tribunal decisions. Courts require stricter standards over tribunal decisions than they 
                                                     
133
 The following discussion of the supervision of tribunals relies on the chapter Creyke ―Tribunals and the 
Australian System‖ in Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law 92-107.  
134
 1976 s5.  
135
 S5.  
136
 S5(2).  
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do over inferior courts, and require a higher standard of reasoned decisions. This review 
power of the courts is one of the most important control mechanisms over the actions of 
tribunals, but should come with a warning to courts not to overzealously interfere in tribunal 
decisions. This results in an unconstitutional infringement by courts of the merit review 
function and infringes the well-developed doctrine of the separation of powers in Australia.
137
 
Creyke also describes the undesirable situation that arises when courts express negative 
opinions and ‗a lack of confidence in tribunal adjudication‘.138 This adversely affects opinions 
of the public regarding tribunal effectiveness and importance and consequently results in the 
relegation of the impact of their jurisprudence.  
 
4 6 Conclusion 
 
Through the above discussion, the importance and centrality of Australian tribunals within a 
comprehensive administrative review and dispute resolution system have been described. All 
the same, it is precisely that coherent and comprehensive range of administrative relief 
mechanisms that allows for an effective and properly-functioning system. Within tribunals 
themselves, there is overwhelming support for the consistency and homogeneity which can be 
achieved through a tribunal of general jurisdiction, like the AAT. Furthermore, the ARC 
provides the essential supervisory and regulatory role which is critical to the success of 
tribunals and their proficiency. The following chapter will describe the recently revamped 
tribunal system in England.  The Australian model, with its successful implementation of the 
recommendations of the Kerr, Bland and Ellicot Committee reports, was an important 
blueprint for the establishment of the English Tribunal system.  
                                                     
137
 Creyke & McMillan Control of Government (2005) Ch 3.  
138
 Creyke ―Tribunals and the Australian System‖ in Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law 103. 
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CHAPTER 5: ENGLISH TRIBUNALS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEM 
5 1 Introduction 
From an historical perspective, England has been the guiding light in commonwealth 
administrative law and many of the concepts and legal principles were imported from there to 
other commonwealth countries.
1
 However, England has not been the forerunner with regard to 
the modern system of tribunal justice. Due to an overwhelming need in the English law for a 
comprehensive system of tribunal justice,
2
 the English system only recently undertook an 
overhaul of their administrative review mechanisms and a reform of the tribunal system. The 
new scheme came into effect on 3 November 2008 and the structure and composition of this 
reformed system will be the focus of this chapter. Nevertheless, the reasons leading up to the 
refining of the system will assist the reader in understanding the importance of the modern 
tribunal in English administrative law, and an historical overview of the necessity for the 
reforms will be provided accordingly. The supervisory Council on Tribunals was also 
reconstructed, and the new Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council‘s oversight role will 
be described, along with other forms of tribunal supervision.  
Many of the concepts and reasons behind tribunal reforms in England can be compared to 
those in the Australian system, and the discussion in this chapter will follow a similar formal 
structure to that of the previous chapter. This chapter will also use the conceptual distinction 
between merits review and judicial review discussed in Chapter 4 as a basis for comparison of 
the differences and similarities of the functioning of tribunals.
3
 Furthermore, this chapter 
provides a basis of analysis and comparison with the South African system for the 
implementation and effective execution of systematic reform of a tribunal system. 
                                                     
1
 See Ch 3 s 2.  
2
 This will be discussed in s 5 3.  
3
 For a comprehensive, authoritative and constitutional comparison of tribunal adjudication across Australia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France, see Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2009).  
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5 2 General Administrative Structure 
5 2 1 System of Government 
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy,
4
 wherein parliament is sovereign. This 
implies that the legislature has absolute sovereignty
5
 and it is supreme to all other government 
institutions, including any executive or judicial bodies.
6
 The UK has a Westminster system of 
government and endorses to a lesser degree the separation of powers.
7
 Unlike the Australian 
system, tribunals in England do not fall under the executive branch of government, but rather 
under the judicial branch.
8
 Tribunals fall strictly under the supervision of the courts and are 
considered to be a form of ‗quasi-court‘. This eliminates the idea of the institutional 
distinction of merits review and judicial review as in the Australian model, but raises different 
issues regarding the doctrine of the separation of powers.
9
   
5 2 2 Constitutional Reform 
Three major changes in the constitutional structure of the UK are relevant for discussing the 
nature of the relationship of the judiciary, and by extension tribunals, and the executive. They 
                                                     
4
 The government of England is also in the form of a Constitutional Monarchy, in which the monarch is head of 
state and the prime minister is the head of government. Executive power is exercised by Her Majesty's 
Government on behalf of the sovereign. However, this distinction does not affect the discussion of the tribunals 
in any material way and therefore will not be discussed in any detail.  
5
 This sovereignty is however subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) entered into on 3 
September 1953, which the UK ratified in 1951. See fn 10 below.  
6
 This contrasts directly with the South African system of government. Our Constitution is supreme and every 
government institution, including parliament, is subject to it. S2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (―the Constitution‖). England does not have a written Constitution like the South African or Australian 
systems.  
7
 Although the doctrine of separation of power plays a role in England‘s constitutional doctrine, England is often 
described as having ‗a weak separation of powers‘. This is due to the fact that the executive and legislative 
branches are intermingled to a certain extent. Up until very recently, even judicial power and executive power 
were assigned to the same person, namely the Lord Chancellor (see fn 13). Even now, all governmental power is 
exercised in the name of the Monarch, even if only notionally. Although the South African government and the 
Constitution also follow the doctrine of the separation of powers, in practice the executive and legislative 
functions often overlap. Cf Hoexter Administrative Law 71.    
8
 This constitutional classification was confirmed in Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Equiries Report 
of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries Cmnd 218 (1957) (Franks Report) 40.  
9
 The English seem to be less concerned with the issues surrounding the separation of powers than South African 
lawyers. There are issues that arise such as the counter-majoritarian difficulty and the encroachment of the 
judiciary into the realm of the executive, but the literature available on the subject does not seem overly 
concerned with these issues of legitimacy. As is evident from the discussion of the Leggatt report in s 53 1 2 
below, the most important aspect of English tribunals are their independence and their impartiality. 
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are the Human Rights Act (HRA),
10
 the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA)
 11
 and the creation of 
the new Ministry of Justice.
12
 The most important of the three was the reform initiated within 
the broader constitutional framework by the CRA. The CRA came into effect in April 2006 
and was enacted and intended to provide modernised statutory clarity to the relationship 
between the executive and the courts.
13
 The first part of the CRA is about the rule of law; the 
rest of the CRA is divided into three parts. The first and most important part reforms the office 
of Lord Chancellor, removing his functions of Speaker of the House of Lords and Head of the 
Judiciary of England and Wales. The second part of the act creates the new Supreme Court,
14
 
and the third regulates the appointment of judges. The major effect of the act is that ‗the CRA 
confers on the court judiciary a new statutory guarantee of judicial independence.‘15  
5 2 3 Relationship between the Executive and the Judiciary 
As a result of the doctrine of the separation of powers, and more recently the influence of the 
constitutional reforms, there is a strong degree of separation between the executive and the 
judiciary. The relationship between these branches of government requires a careful balance 
                                                     
10
 1998. The HRA gives citizens a practical right to use the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 
litigation in English courts. Although the HRA attempts to preserve the principal of parliamentary sovereignty, 
S3 places a duty on courts in relation to the way in which they carry out their function of interpreting legislation: 
‗So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in 
a way which is compatible with the Convention rights‘. 
11
 2005.  
12
 The Ministry of Justice came into being on 9 May 2007 and brought under one head the courts and tribunals, 
the prisons, and policy for civil, family and criminal law. ‗The new ministry replaced the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs and started life from a simple premise – that the justice system exists to serve the public.‘ 
Tribunals Service Transforming Tribunals: Implementing Part 1 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
2007 – The Government‘s Response CP 30/07 (19-03-2008) (―Transforming Tribunals‖).  
13
 The motivation behind these reforms may have been that the existing division of institutional functions ran 
contrary to the idea of separation of powers. The reform was prompted by concerns that the historical 
combination of legislative, judicial, and executive power might not conform to the requirements of the right to a 
fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in terms of Article 6 (paragraph 1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
14
 The Supreme Court is now the court of last resort and highest appellate court in the United Kingdom. It 
assumed the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which were previously exercised by the Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary. Lord Phillips, president of the Supreme Court, stated that ‗For the first time, we have a clear 
separation of powers between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive in the United Kingdom. This is 
important. It emphasises the independence of the judiciary, clearly separating those who make the law from 
those who administer it.‘ Anonymous ―New Supreme Court opens with Media Barred‖ The Telegraph (11-10-
2009) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/6251272/New-Supreme-Court-opens-with-
media-barred.html> (accessed 23-02-2011).  
15
 Carnwarth Tribunal Reform in the UK: a Quiet Revolution speech delivered at The Future of Administrative 
Justice Symposium Toronto, 17-01-2008 <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/visitors_content.asp? 
itemPath=5/5/0/0/0&contentId=1694#Material> (accessed 10-06-2010). Note the distinction between court and 
tribunal judiciary, namely judges in courts not judges sitting on tribunals.  
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of the separation of powers and the important constitutional system of checks and balances.
16
 
The judiciary is empowered to examine acts of the executive, and by extension its 
administrative agents, by virtue of its role as an important safeguard to the abuse of executive 
power.  
In England there is a rich debate as to the source of the courts‘ power of judicial review.17 
Historically, the proposition has been based on the principle of ultra vires, namely that 
judicial review is legitimated on the ground that the courts are applying the intention of the 
legislature.
18
 Parliament has found it necessary to confers powers (vires) onto the various 
agents of the executive, subject to certain restrictions, and they must act within these 
boundaries. Should they act outside the boundaries of the powers bestowed on them; courts 
are empowered to intervene to police the boundaries of Parliament.
19
  
However, critics of the theory of ultra vires contend that when judges review administrative 
action, they do so to fulfill the ‗duties of their constitutional position, acting in their own right 
independently of Parliament, adjusting the balance of forces in the constitution, and asserting 
their title to promote fairness and justice in government under the rule of law.‘20 By this, 
critics find the foundations of judicial review in the common law, rather than in the concept of 
ultra vires. Regardless of whether the ultra vires or the common law basis is correct,  
                                                     
16
 Tension between these two branches is inevitable, but this tension is viewed as a positive driving force in the 
relationship between the two branches. Sir Igor Judge, President of the Queen‘s Bench Division, thought that ‗a 
degree of tension is healthy‘. The former Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay, agreed with this, saying that ‗a certain 
degree of tension between the judiciary and the executive is inevitable and healthy because from time to time the 
judiciary are called upon to adjudicate under the judicial review procedure and in other ways on actions of the 
executive.‘ Lord Bingham, the senior Law Lord, took a similar approach, stating that ‗there is an inevitable, and 
in my view entirely proper, tension between the two.‘ All of these comments are extracts from the House of 
Lords Select Committee of the Constitution Minutes of Evidence taken before the Constitution Committee on 
Wednesday 22 November 2006 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 6th Report of Session 
2006–07 ―Relations between the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament‖ (2006).  
17
 See generally Forsyth ―Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and Judicial Review‖ in Forsyth (ed)  Judicial Review & the Constitution (2000) 29-46 where 
Forsyth sets out and defends the doctrine of ultra vires; Craig ―Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial 
Review‖ in Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review & the Constitution (2000)  47-71 for an alternative argument in favour 
of the common law or ‗conceptual‘ doctrine; and Oliver (ed) ―Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis for Judicial 
Review?‖ in Forsyth Judicial Review & the Constitution (2000) 3-27; and for a summary of the various opinions 
and critiques of the two topics.  
18
 This is a highly simplified construction of the ultra vires doctrine, as an examination of the articles in the fn 
above will indicate. See Ch 2 s 2 2.  
19
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 9 ed (2004) 30 state that ‗it is assumed that Parliament, when conferring 
power, intends that power to be used fairly and with due consideration of rights and interested adversely 
affected. In effect, Parliament legislates against a background of judge-made rules of interpretation. The judges 
have constructed a kind of code of good administrative practice, taking Parliament‘s authority for granted.‘ 
20
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 33.  
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there is, nevertheless, an inescapable tension between, on one hand, the traditional 
doctrine of ultra vires and its foundations in legislative supremacy and, on the other 
hand, the contemporary recognition of a range of common law rights conceived as 
basic components of a liberal, democratic legal order.
21
  
Tribunals, as members of the independent judiciary, present something of an anomaly to the 
rigid classification of the distinct branches and to the strict basis for judicial review. The 
reason behind this is by their very function tribunals engage in a very different activity when 
they review administrative action. As is evident from the discussion below,
22
 first-tier 
tribunals especially engage in merits review when approached to resolve disputes.  
5 2 4 Relationship between the Courts and Tribunals 
As stated above, the administration of tribunals falls under the Ministry of Justice, while the 
operation and decision-making of tribunals under the supervision of the normal courts.
23
 The 
responsibilities of the Senior President of Tribunals
24
 were closely fashioned according to 
those of the Lord Chief Justice under the CRA. There is a right of appeal
25
 from tribunals 
generally to the Court of Appeal by virtue of its inherent common law jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, there is now also a statutory right of appeal from the Upper-Tier tribunals to the 
Court of Appeal on issues of law.
26
 The supervisory relationship between the courts and the 
tribunals service will be discussed further below in s 5 3 3 2. 
 
 
 
                                                     
21
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 34. Cf Craig ―Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review‖ in 
Judicial Review & the Constitution 90: ‗we should recognise also that the ambit of review can only be 
legitimated in the same way as other common law powers, by asking whether there is a reasoned justification 
which is acceptable in normative terms for the controls which are being imposed.‘ 
22
 S 5 3 2 1 1.  
23
 Although the tribunals are members of the judiciary, much of the administrative oversight falls to the Ministry 
of Justice. While this relationship is beneficial and contributes to co-operation between the two spheres, it is 
important that tribunals maintain their independence.  
24
 S 5 3 2 1 4. 
25
 However, in reality this is more like a right of review.  
26
 S13 TCEA.  
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5 2 5 Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman 
Akin to the situation in Australia, ombudsmen and other independent complaint handlers are 
generally recognised as an essential part of the administrative justice landscape. It has been 
noted that ombudsmen ‗constitute a genus rather than a species‘.27 According to the AJTC,  
at one end of the spectrum there are the classic public sector ombudsmen now 
represented by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, the Scottish Public 
Services Ombudsman, the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales, the Northern 
Ireland Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman (England). These are 
established under statute and are typically concerned with complaints of 
maladministration giving rise to injustice. Their decisions are not binding but their 
recommendations are almost always complied with. At the other end of the spectrum 
are non-statutory ombudsmen set up by particular sectors such as the removals 
industry to resolve disputes between firms and customers.
28
 
The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsmen is a statutory office created in terms of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. The role of the ombudsman
29
 is to provide a 
service to the public by undertaking independent investigations into complaints of 
maladministration by government departments and other public bodies who have not acted 
properly or fairly or have provided a poor service.
30
 
5 3 Tribunals 
5 3 1 History 
5 3 1 1 Franks Report
31
 
Although tribunals have been very important historically in the English administrative justice 
regime,
32
 the first intensive investigation into the modern tribunal was only commissioned in 
the 1950‘s. The Franks Commission, named after its chair Sir Oliver Franks, was a 
commission of inquiry commissioned to investigate tribunals due to concerns regarding their 
haphazard and diverse system, diversity in their proceedings, and the lack of cohesion and 
                                                     
27
 AJTC The Developing Administrative Justice Landscape: Executive Summary 
<http://www.ajtc.gov.uk/adjust/articles/landscape_paper.pdf> (accessed 23-02-2011).  
28
 AJTC The Developing Administrative Justice Landscape 4. 
29
 For a more complete description of the role of the Ombudsman see Department of Constitutional Affairs 
Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals White Paper Cmnd 6243 (2004) (―the White 
Paper‖) 16-19.  
30
 Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman ―About Us‖ (12-11-2010) 
<http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/our-role> (accessed 23-02-2011).  
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supervision over their functioning.
33
 Among other things, the committee firmly established 
the position of tribunals within the government of the United Kingdom, stating that ‗tribunals 
should properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than 
as part of the machinery of administration.‘34 The most important statement about tribunals 
were the Franks principles of ‗openness, fairness and impartiality‘, which became the 
watchwords for how tribunals ought to operate.  
5 3 1 2 Leggatt Report
35
 
While the Franks Report defined important characteristics of tribunals and gave directions as 
to what their essential role should be, the Leggatt report provided the modern catalyst for the 
reforms in England. The Leggatt Report stated that tribunals were of such significance 
because  
together they form the largest part of the civil justice system in England and Wales, 
hearing about a million cases each year. That number of cases alone makes their work 
of great importance to our society, since more of us bring a case before a tribunal than 
go to any other part of the justice system. Their collective impact is immense.
36
 
However, Leggatt noted that the tribunal system was dissatisfactory because ‗the present 
collection of tribunals [had] grown up in an almost entirely haphazard way.‘37 The Leggatt 
report‘s main concern was that tribunals were created as and when they were required, 
resulting in a collective fragmented and unsystematic tribunals which made use of diverse 
procedures, degrees of formality, and approaches to dispute resolution. This meant that the 
tribunal system was reflecting the convenience of the departments whose decisions it 
reviewed, rather than the needs of the user.
38
   
                                                                                                                                                                     
31
 Franks Report Ch 3 fn 56 above. Also see Ch 3 s 4 1.  
32
 See the discussion in Ch 3 s 2. Cf Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Pearson, Harlow & 
Taggart (eds) Administrative Law in a Changing State (2004) 275-283 for the full history. 
33
 This is also an important concern in the South African system of tribunals. See Ch 6; Ch 2 and Govender 
―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‖ in Corder (ed) Comparing Administrative Justice Across the 
Commonwealth (2007) 73.  
34
 Franks Report 40.  
35
 Leggatt A Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (2001).  
36
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users  1. 
37
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users  3. Cf Ch 6 fn 23 as these challenges are similar to those in South Africa.  
38
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users 3. 
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The following extract from the report describes the main problems: 
In the 44 years since tribunals were last reviewed, their number has increased 
considerably and their work has become more complex. Together they constitute a 
substantial part of the system of justice in England and Wales. But too often their 
methods are old-fashioned and they are daunting to users. Their training and IT are 
under-resourced. Because they are many and disparate, there is a considerable waste 
of resources in managing them, and they achieve no economies of scale. Most 
importantly, they are not independent o the departments that sponsor them. The object 
of this review is to recommend a system that is independent, coherent, professional 
cost-effective and user-friendly. Together tribunals must form a system and provide a 
service fit for the user for whom they were intended.
39
  
The Leggatt report focused on the role of the tribunal user.
40
 All the requirements of 
accessibility, independence, speed, efficiency and cost were considered important as from the 
view of the user.
41
 This viewpoint is significant because it has shaped the vision of the 
tribunal reforms. Leggatt stated that  
 
it should never be forgotten that tribunals exist for users, and not the other way round. 
No matter how good tribunals may be, they do not fulfil their function unless they are 
accessible by the people who want to use them, and unless the users receive the help 
they need to prepare and present their cases.
42
  
 
The Leggatt report evaluated many of the problems with the tribunal system and made far-
reaching recommendations for its reform. Two central recommendations of the report were 
that firstly, tribunals should be brought together in a new, independent, single tribunal 
system
43
 and secondly that the new tribunal structure should be two-tier, under the 
supervision of a senior judge. The report stated that it hoped that the new structure would 
                                                     
39
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users 1.  
40
 Since the report, there has been other academic research into the user and the tribunal. See Adler & Gulland 
Tribunal Users‘ Experiences, Perceptions and Expectations: A Literature Review (2003); Partington, Kirton-
Darling & McClenaghan ―Empirical Research on Tribunals: An Annotated Review of Research Published 
between 2002-07‖ AJCT (10-08-2007) <www.ajtc.gov.uk> (accessed 23-02-2011).  
41
 This means that without perceived independence, the tribunal loses its important feature of independence. 
Unless users found tribunals to be quicker, easier and more efficient than court procedures, they were failing in 
their task to provide a better avenue of administrative justice. 
42
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users  6. 
43
 The advantages of a single system of tribunals were described by Creyke in Ch 4 s 4 3 1 3, and can be re-
iterated here. The streamlining of the system enhances the efficient distribution of resources, negates the need for 
duplication, and allows for a coherent and homogenous set of practices and procedures to be followed. 
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enhance the independence of the tribunal system, enhance its status relative to courts, and that 
tribunals would acquire  
a collective standing to match that of the Court System and a collective power to 
fulfill the needs of users in the way that was originally intended.
44
  
5 3 1 3 White Paper: Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals 
The general considerations of the Leggatt report were accepted in the governmental White 
Paper Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals. The White Paper 
did not only envision tribunal reform, but also made further recommendations as to the 
‗quality and responsiveness of the system as a whole‘,45 including the establishment of a new 
tribunal council to replace the existing Council on Tribunals
46
 and a new form of statutory 
Ombudsmen. The White Paper stated that their ‗vision for that system is therefore different 
from, but, [we] believe, compatible with [Leggatt‘s].‘47  
In the section focusing on Tribunals, the White Paper made use of a MORI survey
48
 to 
provide concrete statistical data about the state of tribunals and their effectiveness at the time. 
The White Paper coherently lays out reasons for why it deemed it necessary to institute a new 
tribunal system.
49
 It also details the envisaged phased implementation of the necessary 
reforms as per the Reform Bill.
50
 The White Paper stated that  
the case for change is strong. And it is a case for collective action to deliver better 
services to users.
51
 
And 
                                                     
44
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users 8. 
45
 The White Paper 1.12.  
46
 See s 5 3 3 1.  
47
 The White Paper 1.12. 
48
 Ipsos Mori is the second largest independent survey research organisation in the UK.  
49
 The White Paper Ch 5 20-24. The White Paper states in para 5.29 that ‗the total cost of the tribunal ‗system‘ is 
in the region of £280m per year. This money is not being spent effectively. We believe that for the same 
resources a much better system can be created.‘   
50
 The White Paper Ch 6 Resolving Disputes: A New Approach 25-38.   
51
 The White Paper Ch 5.30.  
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the procedures and processes of the new tribunal system need to be viewed 
systematically to ensure that they are all genuinely focused on achieving justice for the 
user.
52
 
Accordingly, the implementation of the reforms was achieved in stages,
53
 systematically 
updating and building on the current system. In his First Implementation Review, the Senior 
President of Tribunals stated that  
[he] believes that the key to realising the benefits of the new arrangements, while 
maintaining the quality of decision-making and the confidence of users, is to proceed 
gradually, adapting and building on the strengths of the system as it is, rather than by 
dramatic change. The legal and administrative changes required to establish the new 
tribunal structure are necessarily complex. However, our aim should be to achieve 
these changes with as little disruption as possible to the experience of ordinary users.
54
 
 
5 3 2 Tribunal Reforms
55
 
5 3 2 1 Tribunals Service
56
 
The first of the tribunal reforms was the establishment of the Tribunals Service in 2006. The 
Tribunals Service was established as an executive agency of the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA).
57
 The Tribunals Service combined tribunals that were at the 
time administered by the DCA. The major function of the Tribunals Service was to separate 
tribunals from their sponsoring departments and establish procedures for the streamlining of 
the new two-tiered tribunal structure. The Tribunals Service aimed to 
                                                     
52
 The White Paper Ch 7.10. 
53
 This took place in two phases. The first phase was termed ―T1 day‖ and the second ―T2‖. T1 day was 3 
November 2008 and involved the establishment of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) and 
the First tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber 1; Health, Education and Social Care Chamber). T2 day 
occurred in April 2009 and consisted of establishing other Upper Tribunal chambers (Finance and Tax, and 
Lands) and other First-tier chambers (Tax and Duties; Lands; General Regulatory). 
54
 Carnwath Senior President of Tribunals First Implementation Review (2008) 
<http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/Tribunals/ Documents/News/[30june]SPImplementationClean7b.pdf> (accessed 
12-07-2010) (First Implementation Review).  
55
 The following section is a summary of the White Paper‘s recommendations about the implementation of the 
new tribunals service.  
56
 A more comprehensive discussion of the functioning and operation of the Tribunals Service can be found in 
Transforming Tribunals 16-20.  
57
 The Department of Constitutional Affairs has now been amalgamated into the broader Ministry of Justice. Fn 
12 above.   
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ensure that tribunals were visibly independent of original decision makers; make it 
easier for users to understand the process of seeking redress; bring improved quality 
and efficiencies of scale to the provision of administrative and management support 
and allow the implementation of a national organisation, with a regional structure.
58
  
In the Tribunals Service Annual Report
59
 published after its first year of operation, the 
Tribunals Service had given common independent sponsorship to over twenty seven 
fragmented tribunals. Furthermore, they reached their key objectives
60
 of initiating the 
structural
61
 and statutory reform
62
 necessary for the new tribunal system.
63
  
The Tribunals Service continues to provide a high level of service delivery in their 
maintaining and monitoring of the tribunals system. An especially laudable characteristic of 
the Tribunals Service is their commitment to transparency and to accountability, through the 
publishing of high quality, easily accessible, intelligible annual reports.
64
  
5 3 2 2 Transforming Tribunals 
The next step in the process was the publishing by the Tribunals Service of the consultation 
paper Transforming Tribunals: Consultation on implementation of Part 1 of TCEA 2007. The 
paper laid out the proposals for the how the TCEA would approach the new structure of the 
two-tier system; the division of chambers, the assignment of judges and the role of non-legal 
members in order to obtain comment about the envisaged changes from everyone involved in 
the tribunal structure. This document served as the basis for a twelve month public 
consultation with all the key tribunal role-players.   
                                                     
58
 Transforming Tribunals17.  
59
 Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2006/2007 (2007) <http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0607/hc09/0905/0905.pdf> (accessed 03-03-2011). 
60
 These key objectives and how the Tribunals Service has performed are comprehensively described in the 
Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2006/2007. 
61
 These changes included developing a regional management structure and business model consisting of multi-
jurisdictional Administrative Support Centres supporting a network of Hearing Centres; changing the procedural 
requirements to simplify appeals; and investigating the potential success of alternative dispute resolution in 
tribunal adjudication.  
62
 The creation of the TCEA.  
63
 ‗All of this has been achieved while reducing expenditure by £15m, which represents 5% of the Tribunals 
Service budget.‘ Transforming Tribunals17. Cf Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2006/2007 16-17 
for the statistical breakdown of the costs. 
 
64
 The most recent report is the Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2009/2010 (2010) 
<http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/Tribunals/Documents/Publications/TS-AR-09-10-WEB-final.pdf> (accessed 25-
02-2011).  
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After receiving one hundred and forty replying submissions, the Tribunals Service published 
its response on 19 May 2008.
65
 The conclusions reached after the consultation paved the way 
for the implementation of the TCEA.  
5 3 2 3 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA) 
The first fundamental purpose of the Act is to establish a two tier tribunal structure, consisting 
of a First-tier Tribunal and an Upper Tribunal. Each tier would be sub-divided into distinct 
chambers of jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the existing tribunals were subsumed by either 
one of the new tribunals.
66
 Part of the new tribunal structure is the appointment of a Senior 
President of Tribunals. The second purpose is to abolish the Council on Tribunals and replace 
it with the newer, more inclusive Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council. The following 
section will explain the reformed structure as implemented by the Act, with reference to the 
various supporting apparatus enacted to give structure and support to it.  
5 3 2 3 1 First-Tier Tribunals 
The First-tier Tribunal is established in terms of S3(1) of the TCEA. The First-tier Tribunal is 
the tribunal of first instance in most cases. The First–tier Tribunal is currently divided into six 
chambers, namely the General Regulatory Chamber; Social Entitlement Chamber; Health, 
Education and Social Care Chamber; War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation 
Chamber; Tax Chamber; and the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. The creation of 
chambers is an important structural initiative, because the chambers allow the Tribunal to 
remain as a single judicial unit, without losing the expertise and jurisdictional knowledge that 
is so necessary in the effective adjudication of administrative disputes. Each chamber is led 
by a chamber president,
67
 who is also a judge of the Upper Tribunal.
68
  
The First-tier Tribunal is more diverse in its range of functions than the Upper Tribunal, as 
the intention was to expand and improve on the systems and approaches of the existing 
tribunals which were united by the Tribunals Service in 2006. Due to the fact that the First-
tier Tribunal is the foremost and most widely-used forum for dispute resolution, the primary 
                                                     
65
 Transforming Tribunals contains a detailed description of the submissions and opinions received.  
66
 The exceptions to this are the employment tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal which will continue as 
distinct pillars within the new system. Initially the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal was also to stand apart, but 
that has now been integrated into the Upper Tribunal. Transforming Tribunals 28.  
67
 S7 TCEA. Cf Schedule 2 of the TCEA. 
68
 S5 TCEA.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
 
objective of its dispute resolution function must be to make the principles of expeditious, 
accessible and specialist administrative justice a reality through tribunal flexibility, procedural 
innovation, and the increased skills development of tribunal judges. 
The adjudicators of the First-tier Tribunal consist of judges
69
 and other members. Legally 
qualified members of the former tribunals became judges of the First-tier Tribunal when their 
jurisdiction was transferred, whereas the non-legal members, such as tribunal experts, became 
other members. New judges and members are appointed by the Judicial Appointments 
Commission.
70
  
The First-tier Tribunal may review decisions, and may correct accidental errors in the 
decision or in a record of the decision; amend reasons given for the decision; or set the 
decision aside.
71
 If the First-tier Tribunal sets aside a decision, it must either re-decide the 
matter concerned, or refer that matter to the Upper Tribunal,
72
 who must decide the matter.
73
 
The First-tier Tribunal is mostly concerned with review on the merits and is empowered to 
engage in fact-finding activities. Accordingly, there is the possibility of appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal on points of law.  
5 3 2 3 2 Upper Tribunals 
The Upper Tribunal is established in terms of S3(2) of the TCEA. The Upper Tribunal is 
primarily an appeal tribunal, but can sit as the tribunal of first instance in certain exceptional 
matters.
74
 The Upper Tribunal is also divided in chambers, namely the Administrative 
                                                     
69
 The independence and impartiality, as well as the stature, of tribunal judges are emphasised by naming them 
‗judges‘ as opposed to ‗tribunal members‘ like in the AAT of Australia.  
70
 The provisions surrounding the appointment of judges in contained in Schedule 2 of the TCEA.  
71
 S9(4) TCEA.  
72
 S9(5) TCEA. 
73
 S9(6) TCEA. S9(8) states that any tribunal who acts under Ss9(5) & (6) may also make any findings of fact it 
considers appropriate.  
74
 ‗The Upper Tribunal will also have a limited first instance jurisdiction. This will be for complex cases or those 
dealing with issues which have general application and where the Upper Tribunal may set precedent for the 
First-Tier Tribunal.‘ Transforming Tribunals 28. These exceptions include complex tax, finance and land 
disputes.  
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Appeals Chamber (AAC);
75
 the Tax and Chancery Chamber; the Lands Chamber; and the 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber.  
While the First-tier Tribunal specialises in dispute resolution on the large-scale and serves as 
the primary means for administrative adjudication, the Upper Tribunal is designed to deal 
with appeals, set precedent in administrative law and provide a forum other than the High 
Court for judicial review. The Upper Tribunal   
will lead on developing the law underlying administrative justice. It will deal with 
appeals from the First-tier Tribunal and from some tribunals outside the unified 
system. It will also have power to deal with judicial review work delegated from the 
High Court. The Upper Tribunal will be the highest tribunal to which an appeal can be 
made within the new tribunals structure.
76
  
The main function of the Upper Tribunal is to consolidate the cluttered collection of appeal 
routes from various different administrative tribunals into a singular, coherent avenue of 
appeal. Linked to this unifying function is the Upper Tribunal‘s second function which is to 
be an authoritative and respected appeals body at the head of the system.  
 
The creation of the Upper Tribunal provides the opportunity not only to rationalize the 
procedures, but also to establish a strong and dedicated appellate body at the head of 
the new system. Its authority will derive from its specialist skills, and its status as a 
superior court of record, with judicial review powers, presided over by the Senior 
President. It is expected that the Upper Tribunal will come to play a central, 
innovative and defining role in the new system, enjoying a position in the judicial 
hierarchy at least equivalent to that of the Administrative Court in England and 
Wales.
77
 
 
Like the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal may also review decisions and may also 
correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision; amend reasons given 
for the decision; or set the decision aside.
78
 If the Upper Tribunal sets a decision aside, then it 
                                                     
75
 The AAC is the largest chamber in the Upper Tribunal, both in caseload and in number of judges assigned to 
it. A full breakdown of the number of cases resolved by each chamber can be found in Tribunals Service The 
Quarterly Statistics for the Tribunals Service, 2nd quarter 2010-11 (2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/ docs/tribunals-stats-q2-2010-11.pdf> (accessed 04-03-2011).  
76
 Transforming Tribunals 28. 
77
 Transforming Tribunals 36. 
78
 S10(4) TCEA. 
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must re-decide the matter concerned.
79
 In this instance, Upper Tribunals also engages in 
‗merits review‘.80  
 
Appeals from the First-tier Tribunals are only allowed with permission from either the First-
tier or Upper Tribunal
81
 and only on a point of law.
82
 The Upper Tribunal also has the power 
of judicial review and is empowered to grant the following remedies, namely a mandatory 
order; a prohibiting order; a quashing order; a declaration; or an injunction.
83
 In both its 
appeal and judicial review function, the Upper Tribunal acts more like a court and limits its 
enquiry into the legality of the decision. This is because these remedies are as enforceable and 
have the same effect as relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial 
review.
84
 In deciding whether to grant relief of an order, the Upper Tribunal must apply the 
principles that the High Court would apply in deciding whether to grant that relief.
85
 For this 
reason, the Upper Tribunal is described as a Superior Court of Record.
86
  
 
Cane points out that this combined function of the Upper Tribunal places it in a puzzling 
position in England. He states that by formally restricting the power of the Upper Tribunal to 
appeals on aspects of law, but at the same time granting it equal power as the First-tier 
Tribunal, the section 
 
contains an amalgam of ideas. The provisions that the Upper Tribunal may make any 
decision that the First-tier Tribunal could have made casts it procedurally in the role of 
a merits reviewer.
87
  
 
                                                     
79
 S10(5) TCEA. S10(6) states that when the Upper Tribunal acts in terms of s10(5) it may also make any 
findings of fact that in considers appropriate.  
80
 Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 193. 
81
 S11(4) TCEA. 
82
 S11(1) TCEA. 
83
 S15(1) TCEA. 
84
 Ss15(3)(a) & (b) TCEA. 
85
 S15(4) TCEA. 
86
 This means that a decision of the Upper Tribunal is binding on tribunals and public authorities below it, and 
that it has powers both to enforce its own procedures and the procedures of the First–tier Tribunal. 
87
 Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 193.  
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Cane then discusses two examples of English tribunals
88
 in order to explain some of the issues 
involved when a tribunal falling essentially within the judicial branch engages in a form of 
merits review. While a full account of his discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, his 
analysis concludes that the mode of review employed in English tribunals 
 
shows that UK law embodies a significantly less clear, uniform and developed 
understanding of the role of tribunals than that found in Australian law. It remains to 
be seen what effect the creation and operation of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals 
will have on the juridical concept of administrative adjudication.‘89 
 
The future position of merits review will be discussed in s 5 4 below.  
 
5 3 2 3 3 Other Tribunals 
The Employment Tribunals Service (ETS) became a distinct component of the new Tribunals 
Service, under a protocol made in 2001 between the Lord Chancellor and the (then) Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry. The ETS consists of the Employment Tribunals (ET) and the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT), which have similar status to First-Tier Tribunals and 
Upper Tribunals respectively. Both the ET and EAT remain under the supervision of the 
Senior President of Tribunals, and also form part of the Tribunals Service. They are distinct 
because they deal with party-to-party cases rather than purely administrative disputes.
90
   
5 3 2 3 4 Senior President of Tribunals (SPT)
91
 
One of the most important developments of the reform was to ensure that there were high 
levels of co-operation from key role players within different departments. It was essential to 
                                                     
88
 The Social Security and the Immigration tribunals. Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 194-200.  
89
 Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 200.  
90
 Carnwath notes that this is not problematic. ‗For my part, I see no difficulty in embracing party/party tribunals. 
A rigid division between administrative and non-administrative decision-making does not seem to me a realistic 
way of defining the proper role of tribunals. Tribunals are well-adapted to providing an accessible and flexible 
means of applying the law which most directly affects people in their ordinary lives – their homes, their jobs, 
their health, their welfare. Whether they are provided by state or private agencies is not usually fundamental to 
the nature of the dispute or the best means for resolving it.‘ Carnwath Some Jottings on Administrative Justice 
speech delivered at The Future of Administrative Justice Symposium Toronto 17-01-2008 
<http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ conferences/adminjustice08_CarnwathKeynote.pdf> (accessed 10-06-
2010) 
91
 The Senior President‘s supervisory role will be discussed in more detail in s 5 3 3 2.  
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consider both the nature of the office as well as to identify the most suitable candidate to 
fulfill the very important supervisory position.  
Prior to the creation of a statutory office for the SPT in the TCEA, Carnwath was appointed as 
Senior President Designate (SPD), to provide strategic leadership to the tribunal judiciary 
pending the creation of the statutory office. This appointment coincided with the publishing of 
the White Paper. The primary role of the SPD was to actively engage in and provide 
supervision over discussions about the creation of the TCEA and the establishment of the 
Tribunals Service.
92
 A secondary role was to establish a Tribunal Judges‘ Executive Board, 
and to chair meetings of the Tribunals Presidents‘ Group.93 
At a later stage of the tribunal reform, the TCEA created an independent
94
 statutory position 
for the SPT in Section 2. Carnwath LJ was appointed as the first SPT on 12 November 2007.  
The government was of the opinion that 
strong judicial leadership will be required across both the First-tier and the Upper 
Tribunal, to ensure that the needs of the various jurisdictions are met; there is cohesion 
and continuity across both tiers, and the unified tribunal system has a strong identity 
within the justice system as a whole.
95
 
The Act states that the STP  
must, in carrying out the functions of that office, have regard to the need for tribunals 
to be accessible; the need for proceedings before tribunals to be fair, and to be handled 
quickly and efficiently; the need for members of tribunals to be experts in the subject-
matter of, or the law to be applied in, cases in which they decide matters; and the need 
to develop innovative methods of resolving disputes that are of a type that may be 
brought before tribunals.
96
 
The SPT‘s major functions,97 modeled on those of the Lord Chief Justice, are the following: 
representing the views of tribunal judiciary to Parliament;
98
 training, guidance and welfare of 
                                                     
92
 The contribution of these steps to the development of a Senior President are invaluable. Even at the 
foundational stage of the publishing of the White Paper, key players in the tribunals‘ reforms were identified and 
required to play an active, deliberative role in the establishment of a new tribunal system.   
93
 See s 5 3 2 2 5.  
94
 Although the SPT is essentially a judicial office, the president remains independent of both the executive and 
the Chief Justices in charge of the courts.  
95
 Transforming Tribunals 28.  
96
 S2 TCEA.  
97
 The STP may delegate any of these functions by virtue of S8 TCEA.  
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judges and other members of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals;
99
 organising chambers
100
 and 
assigning judges and members to chambers;
101
 reporting to the Lord Chancellor about tribunal 
cases of specific importance;
102
 taking oaths of allegiance and judicial oaths from tribunal 
judges and other members;
103
 issuing practice directions to the First-Tier and Upper 
Tribunals;
104
 and chairing the Tribunal Procedure Committee.
105
 The STP is also an ex officio 
judge of the Upper Tribunal.
106
  
5 3 2 3 5  Tribunal Presidents‘ Group (TPG), Tribunal Judges‘ Executive Board (TJEB) 
and the Tribunal Services Executive Team (TSET)  
In his Annual Report,
107
 the STP identified the need for his office to be supported by strong 
agencies
108
 underpinned by a sense of co-operation between the role players in government.
109
 
The STP describes a number of different agencies and committees which encourage the 
ongoing functioning of tribunals.
110
 Three important committees which will be described 
below are the TPG, TJEB and the TSET.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
98
 Schedule 1 item 13 & 14 TCEA. 
99
 As well as the judges and members of the ET and EAT. Schedule 2 item 8 TCEA. 
100
 S7(1) TCEA, a function which the STP holds concurrently with the Lord Chancellor.  
101
 S7(6) TCEA. 
102
 Ss43(1)(a) & (b) TCEA.  
103
 Schedule 2 item 9(2)(a) TCEA. 
104
 S23(1) TCEA. 
105
 Schedule 5 item 20 TCEA. 
106
 S5(1)(a) TCEA.  
107
 Carnwath The Senior President of Tribunals‘ Annual Report: Tribunals Transformed (2010) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/EF000745-B38E-4A81-8356-
E3317E1251F5/0/senior_president_tribunals_annualreport_feb_2010.pdf> (accessed 12-07-2010) (Tribunals 
Transformed).  
108
 ‗A major concern in relation to the establishment of the new service was to ensure that there was adequate 
administrative support for the Senior President and other judicial leaders.‘ Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 82.  
109
 ‗The tribunal reform project has been unusual, perhaps unique, among major legal reform programmes, in the 
extent of active involvement of judges at every stage. It has also benefited from consistently friendly but 
respectful working relationships between judges, ministers, and administrators, with generally all-party support, 
and with other vital stakeholders.‘ Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 76.  
110
 These are explained in detail in Carnwath Tribunals Transformed, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
They are important mainly to note that the Tribunals Service and Tribunal Judiciary do not stand alone or 
isolated, but have been established within a comprehensive framework of co-operative and communicative 
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The TPG was originally established by Lord Justice Brooke, acting under authority of the 
Lord Chief Justice, in the period leading up to the publishing of the White Paper. The TPG 
was established to coordinate and consolidate the judicial contributions to the tribunal 
reforms. Carnwath states that the TPG   
brought together the jurisdictional leaders of all the tribunals expected to be affected 
by the changes, working with the civil servants responsible for drafting the paper and 
advising Ministers. Under [Brooke‘s] active direction, the TPG played an important 
part in the formulation of the policies of the White Paper, and in building a sense of 
common purpose between the various tribunals.
111
    
The TPG is chaired by the STP and now consists of all tribunal presidents and judges, the 
chairman of the AJTC, representatives of the Forum of Tribunal Organisations and on 
occasion, senior Tribunal Services officers.
112
 It continues to provide a supporting role for the 
leadership of tribunals by providing an informal forum for the sharing of information, the 
discussion and consultation on the progress of the reforms, and any other pertinent issues 
relative to the broader tribunal judiciary.  
 
However, Carnwath notes that after the implementation of the TCEA, the ‗function of TPG as 
a planning and decision making forum was diminished.‘113 He established the TJEB to be a 
smaller, more focused forum in which issues surrounding tribunals could be discussed and to 
be a ‗smaller policy group which could meet more regularly and engage directly with the 
administrators on policy and operational issues.‘114 The TJEB is the central decision-making 
body of the tribunal judiciary. Although leadership and responsibility rests with the senior 
members and the STP, much of the actual work is done by the TJEB sub-groups. These are 
divided into training, appointments, communications, medical issues, and appraisal and 
welfare.  
 
The TSET is the equivalent of the TJEB in the Tribunals Service. Under the joint 
chairmanship of the STP and the Chief Executive, the two bodies engage in regular meetings 
                                                                                                                                                                     
government agencies. In other words, several agencies and departments work together to provide an integrated 
and comprehensive administrative law system.  
111
 Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 35.  
112
 These attend by invitation and only when required.  
113
 Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 86. 
114
 Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 86. 
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to discuss common issues. According to the Annual Report and Accounts of the Tribunals 
Service
115
 
 
the Tribunals Service (TS) and the tribunals‘ judiciary have maintained a close 
working relationship, whilst respecting each other‘s distinctive constitutional 
position.
116
 
 
This close relationship has helped to strengthen and consolidate the new two-tier system. The 
co-operation between the supervisory executive body, the TS, and the tribunals judiciary has 
resulted in a greater level of service delivery to the users of tribunals. This has ensured that 
the dual goals of administrative dispute resolution, namely administrative justice to the 
aggrieved and enhanced original decision-making, are being realised to a greater extent. 
 
5 3 3 Supervision of Tribunals  
5 3 3 1 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) 
The predecessor of the AJTC, the Council on Tribunals,
117
 has since been abolished.
118
 It was 
criticised during its forty years of existence for limitations on its effective functioning. Some 
of these limitations can be identified as its ‗scanty resources‘ and ‗weak political position.‘119 
Furthermore, the old council was declared by Professor Street to be ‗playing no effective part 
in ensuring that the personnel are discharging their duties competently…Its supervision of 
tribunals is so slight as to be ineffective.‘120 Shwartz & Wade121 identified similar problems 
with the Council, namely that its membership was not suited to the nature of work it was 
required to perform, and secondly that it was ineffective. The former problem arose from a 
lack of sufficient budgetary resources, and the latter from the circumscription of the work of 
                                                     
115
 Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2008/2009 (2009) <http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0809/hc05/0599/0599.pdf> (accessed 04-03-2011).  
116
 Tribunals Service Annual Report and Accounts 2008/2009 42.  
117
 The Council on Tribunals was established in 1958 on the recommendations of the Franks report. See s 5 3 1 1 
above.  
118
 S45(1)(a) TCEA. 
119
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 782.  
120
 Street Justice in the Welfare State 2 ed (1975) 63.  
121
 Shwartz & Wade Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States (1972). 
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the Council. These problems with the old Council were important points to improve in the 
development of the new supervisory body.  
During the overhaul of the English tribunal system, the structure of the tribunal supervisory 
body also required reconsideration. The drafters of the TCEA, on a careful study and 
emulation of the Australian ARC,
122
 established in the Council on Tribunal‘s place a new 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC).
123
 The functions of this council are as 
follows: 
It has the power to keep under review and report on the constitution and working of 
tribunals in general and in particular. And it may scrutinise legislation relating to the 
Lord Chancellor…; unlike the old council, it must formulate a programme of work.124 
In addition to these functions, it also has the task of  
keeping the administrative justice system under review, and considering ways in 
which that system may be made ‗accessible, fair and efficient‘. It may advise the Lord 
Chancellor and the Senior President on the development of administrative justice and 
refer proposals for changes in the system to him.
125
 
Carnwarth LJ explains that the wider role in the administrative justice context ‗will be 
concerned with ensuring that the relationships between the courts, tribunals, ombudsmen and 
alternative dispute resolution routes satisfactorily reflect the needs of users.‘126 The wider 
scope illustrated here is significant in that the AJTC has the right not only to advise with 
regard to tribunal administrative justice, but rather to review the whole of the administrative 
justice system.
127
 This comprehensive supervisory role will contribute to greater consistency 
and collaboration within the various agencies of the integrated administrative law system.  
                                                     
122
 See Ch 4 s 5 1.  
123
 S44 TCEA. 
124
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 781. Schedule 7 Item 14 TCEA. 
125
 Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 781.  
126
 Carnwath Tribunals Judiciary (2007) speech delivered at CCAT 4th International Conference on 
Administrative Justice Without Borders - Developments in the United Kingdom Toronto, 08-05-2007 8.  
127
 These functions are found in Schedule 7 Item 13 TCEA. 
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However, critics have illustrated that while the new ARJC may have valiant aims and noble 
purpose, it still suffers from some of the same limitations as the old Council on Tribunals and 
its only ‗realistic strategy is to act as a co-coordinator of networks, fostering co-operation.‘128  
As it stands, the AJTC has been an effective body in the process of the tribunal reforms in that 
it is given a wider role in its supervisory capacity.
129
 It is not restricted to be merely a council 
on tribunals, but has remit to extend its supervisory influence to the whole of administrative 
law. Carnwath states that  
the AJTC‘s role is not just about the final stage of dispute resolution, but covers the 
whole process from initial decision until final resolution at whatever level.
130
 
5 3 3 2 Senior President of Tribunals (STP) 
The role and office of the STP has been discussed briefly in s 5 3 2 3 4 above. As well as 
holding office as the independent judicial head of the tribunal judiciary, the STP has the 
responsibility of supervision and guidance over that judiciary. He has the responsibility of 
issuing practice directions about the operation of both tier tribunals.
131
  
During the period between the White Paper and the TCEA, a Memorandum of Understanding 
was agreed upon to regulate the relationship of the STP, the Lord Chancellor and the chief 
justices. Defined in this Memorandum was the role of the STP to provide strategic leadership 
                                                     
128
 Harlow & Rawlings Law and Administration 509. One reason for this is that the budget is still insufficient. 
Harlow & Rawlings describe that it can ‗offer advice and assistance on policy issues; comment from time to time 
on Tribunal Service priorities, standards and performances measures; and monitor so far as it is able the progress 
and performance of tribunals against common standards and performance measures.‘ However, this will be 
achieved only if the council ‗seek(s) to build up influence‘ and ‗raise(s) awareness of the different approaches 
within the UK legal systems.‘ The new AJTC must work towards creating an environment that allows it to 
perform the actual role that should be performed by the supervisory body.  
129
 However, the AJTC is one of the bodies that is to be included among the Ministry of Justice sponsored Arms 
Length Bodies to be abolished through the Public Bodies Reform Bill, due to be introduced in British Parliament 
in September 2011. The bill has not yet been assented to, nor is it clear in any way how this will affect the 
functions of the AJTC. The AJTC Chairman notes that ‗whilst recognising the absolute prerogative of Ministers 
and Parliament to take such a decision, the outcome is disappointing and it is unfortunate that we were not 
included in the discussions leading to this decision. However we look forward to contributing to the debate about 
how our functions are to be discharged in the future. The AJTC and the former Council on Tribunals have been 
valued for playing a leading role in the development of tribunals and administrative justice for over 50 years. 
Even if the life of the AJTC itself is to be cut short, we firmly believe that our functions of monitoring, 
influencing and improving the administrative justice system as a whole, particularly from the perspective of the 
users, will continue to be vital. This is especially so at a time when simultaneously we see a wish to reinforce the 
power of the citizen against the state, massive pressures upon public services and a mushrooming in the volumes 
of complaints and appeals.‘ AJTC Annual report 2009/2010 (2010).  
130
 Carnwath First Implementation Review 56.  
131
 S23 TCEA. 
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for the tribunals judiciary; work in partnership with the tribunal presidents and the chief 
executive of the TS to develop and improve the tribunal system; and to oversee the training 
and guidance of the tribunal judiciary.
132
 The implementation of the TCEA captured in statute 
the supervisory role of the STP. Carnwath notes that the successful role of supervision played 
by the STP relies on the office‘s wide scope and that  
unlike the functions of the Lord Chief Justice under the CRA, which are confined to 
England and Wales, the Senior President‘s responsibilities may extend to all or part of 
the United Kingdom, depending on the statutory extent of the each jurisdiction.
133
 
Another important way that the STP can exercise control over tribunals is by virtue of his 
appointment as an Upper Tribunal Judge and member of the Court of Appeal. Through the 
hierarchal management structure in place in the two-tier system, the STP can assist with the 
formulating of judicial precedent and the streamlining of appeal procedures. Carnwath notes 
that  
as the senior tribunal judge and as a serving member of the Court of Appeal, [he] 
regards it as important that [he] should sit regularly in both capacities… The 
establishment of the new Upper Tribunal, as the normal route of appeal for most cases 
within the tribunal system, provides an unprecedented opportunity to build on the 
existing case law of the different jurisdictions and to develop a more coherent 
approach to the many common themes of tribunal justice.
134
 
The STP also retains a supervisory and leadership role over the ET and EAT.  
5 3 3 3    Other forms of Supervision 
5 3 3 3 1 Tribunals Service (TS) 
The supervisory role of the TS has been described in detail in section 3 2 1 above. The TS 
continues to maintain and review tribunal procedures, accounts, case loads and the provision 
of administrative justice through its annual reports. These have been discussed and alluded to 
throughout the discussion of the tribunal reforms.  
An important point to raise here is that although the tribunals are a distinct part of the 
judiciary, they are supervised and monitored by an executive body. This allows for an 
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 This is a summarised version of the comments in Carnwath Tribunals Transformed 12. 
133
 Carnwath First Implementation Review 8. 
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 Carnwath First Implementation Review 10. 
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interchange of ideas between the two and encourages co-operation and co-development across 
the two spheres of government.
135
 
5 3 3 3 2 Court of Appeal 
Although the reformed tribunal system is designed to take over the bulk of administrative 
dispute resolution, the Court of Appeal retains its status as a higher judicial body of appeal. 
The Court of Appeal is the second highest court in the English legal system, subject only to 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. A decision of the Upper Tribunal may be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal,
136
 with permission of the Upper Tribunal or the Court of 
Appeal,
137
 but the grounds of appeal are limited to a point of law.
138
 When considering 
matters on appeal, the Court of Appeal has the same powers as the Upper Tribunal would 
have had.
139
 The judiciary can therefore extend an overarching form of control over the 
legality of decisions made by lower tribunals, but at the same time can also exercise any 
power that the Upper Tribunal may when engaging in a process of merits review. That said,  
the general principle is that an appeal hearing should not be an opportunity to re-
litigate the factual issues that were decided in the First-tier Tribunal. Its purpose is to 
determine legal points and to ensure consistency of approach.
140
  
It is also envisaged that the role of the Court of Appeal will be limited to a supervisory one, 
and that the Upper Tribunal‘s Administrative Appeals Chamber will provide the major avenue 
for administrative appeals. This will have the two-fold advantage of firstly, diminishing the 
workload of the Court of Appeal and secondly, consolidating and streamlining appeal 
procedures. It is hoped that administrative appeals to the Court of Appeal will be limited to 
those of particular judicial importance because  
it is the Lord Chancellor‘s intention to use his powers under s13(6) of the 2007 Act to 
prescribe that appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal will only be 
                                                     
135
 Of course, this exchange of ideas is not without its challenges and there should be an important degree of 
independence between the two.  
136
 S13 TCEA provided it is not excluded in terms of s8.  
137
 Ss13(3) & (4) TCEA.  
138
 S13(1) TCEA.  
139
 S14 TCEA. 
140
  Transforming Tribunals 28.  
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permitted in cases of general importance or for other compelling reason (as for second 
appeals from the courts).
141
 
 
5 3 4 Tribunals Transformed:
142
 The Success of the 2008 Reforms and Future 
Developments 
Unlike the Australian position where tribunals have firmly established themselves in the 
administrative system, it is still relatively early to assess the success of the reforms and it 
remains to be seen how the tribunals system will function in the English context. However, 
there is already substantial evidence to suggest that the reforms are a positive step in the 
direction of a comprehensive system of administrative justice.   
Possibly the most important aspect of the tribunal reforms is that tribunal decisions are no 
longer viewed as second-rate or weak judicial decisions. Their importance in the 
administration of justice has achieved a higher status. According to Hale, 
tribunals were once regarded with the deepest of suspicion but they are now an 
essential part of our justice system.
143
 
Carnwath adds support to this point. In a recent speech, he stated that  
the key message of the new Act is that tribunals are no longer the Cinderellas of the 
justice system. Tribunal justice is real justice, and a distinctive and vital part of the 
judicial system; and tribunal ―judges‖ … are full members of the independent 
judiciary. Section 1 of the Tribunals Act underlines the point, by extending to them the 
statutory guarantee of judicial independence, conferred on the court judiciary by the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
144
  
It will remain to be seen how effective the tribunal system is in the future. Cane‘s prediction 
is that the tribunals will continue to grow in strength, alongside the courts, and that it will 
attain  
effective recognition as a branch of government, the prime function of which is 
adjudication (the adjudicatory branch as opposed to the judicial branch), consisting of 
two separate adjudicatory hierarchies (of courts and tribunals), differentiated primarily 
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 Transforming Tribunals 28. 
142
 Carnwath Tribunals Transformed.  
143
 Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 6.  
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 Carnwarth Tribunal Reform in the UK (2008). 
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in terms of their respective areas of jurisdiction, running in parallel but converging at 
the appellate level and sharing the two highest appellate bodies…In this dispensation 
it will be possible to describe tribunals as a type of court and courts as a type of 
tribunal; or, more accurately, courts and tribunals as species of adjudicative 
institution.
145
 
 
5 4 Merits Review in Tribunals: The Value of the Distinction
146
 
This section requires consideration of the theoretical concepts discussed in both Chapters 4 
and the present chapter. The distinction between merits review and judicial review is an 
important constitutional concept in Australian law, as could be seen in the discussion in the 
previous chapter.
147
 The distinction does not seem to have the same degree of importance, nor 
does it raise the same level of theoretical debate, in England.
148
 Cane states three possible 
reasons for this; it is firstly due to the fact that there is no constitutional bar from tribunals 
from exercising a judicial function, such as judicial review, as there is in Australia, because 
tribunals are a form of quasi-court. Secondly, the English system does not necessarily employ 
a strict constitutional separation of powers and the lines are somewhat blurred between the 
branches of government. Thirdly, there is little or no research on what the actual procedure of 
tribunals is outside of Australia and the real constitutional importance of tribunals has 
received little attention.
149
  
What becomes clear through the discussion of the two models of tribunal justice is that 
although the two different jurisdictions have distinctive systems of tribunals, each fulfilling 
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 Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law in a Changing State 287.  
146
 For a more comprehensive understanding of the value of the distinction, see  Cane ―Judicial Review and 
Merits Review‖ in Rose-Ackerman & Lindeth Comparative Administrative Law, cf Cane ―Understanding 
Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law in a Changing State, cf Cane Administrative Tribunals and 
Adjudication.  
147
 Further, see the discussion relating to the function of tribunals in Cane Administrative Tribunals and 
Adjudication 176-182.  
148
 Cane states that ‗Australian experience supports the prediction that in England, judicial review and non-
judicial review are likely to converge substantively even if they come to be understood as distinctively different 
modes of administrative adjudication…Given the differences of constitutional background between England and 
Australia…it is perhaps unlikely that any contrast in this respect between the two modes of review will be as 
great in England as it is in Australia.‘ Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 270.  
149
 ‗In contemporary public law scholarship, tribunals are often treated as being of great practical significance in 
terms of public administration and government accountability but of little theoretical interest in constitutional 
terms.‘ Cane ―Understanding Administrative Adjudication‖ in Administrative Law in a Changing State 299. In 
Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 139 ‗the focus of attention shifts to what administrative 
tribunals do. This is a topic on which (outside of Australia, anyway) there is surprisingly little literature.‘ 
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supposedly categorically dissimilar roles, what ultimately defines tribunals must be their 
actual function.
150
 To date, the literature surrounding tribunals is far more concerned with 
their practical operations and effective functioning than with their constitutional nature of 
their functions.
151
   
For our purposes, the distinction between judicial review and merits review should be relevant 
as far as it is useful. This means that whether tribunals are seen to fall under the independent 
arm of the judiciary, or as a branch of the executive, their characteristic features must be that 
they are able to fully reconsider the facts of individual cases, usually in light of all the 
relevant material that was available to the reviewer; that they have the power to make a 
decision in substitution for the decision under review; that they provide a speedier, less 
expensive, more accessible administrative dispute forum than traditional courts; and that 
because of these functional qualities that differentiate them from courts they deliver a 
heightened level of administrative justice.   
5 5  Conclusion 
The Australian system of tribunals, within a comprehensive system of administrative justice, 
formed the blueprint for dramatic reform of tribunals in England. The method of reform in 
England, most especially in the process of engagement and discussion, may provide a useful 
outline for the reform of South African tribunals.  
Despite distinct constitutional and institutional differences between the functioning of 
tribunals in Australia and England, there are many similarities with regard to the type of 
administrative relief that they can and should provide. These similarities extend to 
comprehensive structural administrative reform; the role of supporting governmental 
agencies; the necessity of co-operative government strategies for the realisation of efficient 
administrative dispute resolution and the improvement of original decision-making; the 
importance of an adequately and sufficiently resourced, overarching, centralised supervisory 
body empowered to exercise its overseeing capacity over the whole of the administrative 
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 Cane does however stress the need for more theoretical analysis of tribunals. He quotes Thomas ‗Evaluating 
Tribunal Adjudication: Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals‘ (2005) Legal Studies 463 where he states 
that ‗the task of evaluating tribunal adjudication systems…requires a different methodology from that of 
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sphere; the continued supervisory jurisdiction of an appeal court on issues of law; and the 
progressive movement towards speedy, efficient, effective and satisfactory administrative 
relief for citizens.  
The following chapter aims to describe and assess the current state of tribunals in South 
Africa. According to Govender, South African tribunals suffer from the same limitations as 
those identified in the Leggatt report, namely that they have grown up in a haphazard way and 
now exist as a disparate, disorganised and unsystematic collection of tribunals. The following 
chapter will provide an analysis of South African tribunals and evaluate the need for reform.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
129 
 
CHAPTER 6: TRIBUNALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CURRENT POSITION 
6 1  Introduction 
The concept of tribunals as alternative fora for administrative adjudication is not a new one in 
South Africa, nor has the idea only developed in recent years. During the deliberations prior 
to the establishment of the Final Constitution
1
 and the enactment of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act,
2
 the creation of an organised and coherent system of 
administrative tribunals was a fundamental issue of reform and one that received much 
scholarly attention. The establishment of a supervisory administrative body to oversee the 
creation of such a system was also strongly advised. However, since PAJA there has been 
little or no attention paid to the establishment of an administrative review council, the 
implementation of a comprehensive tribunal system or the vital role such a system can play in 
an effective and functioning administrative justice system. Tribunals have continued to grow, 
but the tribunal landscape of South Africa continues to be made up of haphazard, unstructured 
and unsystematic appeal procedures which hinder rather than assist the advancement of access 
to administrative justice.  
This chapter aims to explain the development of tribunals after the end of Apartheid
3
 and to 
explore suggestions regarding the inclusion of tribunals in the new administrative justice 
regime. Reasons for the disparity between the original recommendations of the South African 
Law Reform Commission regarding the inclusion of a comprehensive administrative tribunal 
system into constitutionally ordained national legislation and their eventual disappearance 
from PAJA will be provided. Following the history of the call for tribunal reform, the current 
system of tribunals will be described. Four general examples of the various constructions of 
tribunals are outlined in order to show how varied and far-reaching the differences between 
tribunals are in South Africa. To even describe a ‗tribunal‘ in South Africa is difficult due to 
the vastly inconsistent structural and institutional differences between the various tribunal 
bodies. However, an evaluation of the current successes and failures of tribunals in South 
                                                     
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―the Constitution‖).  
2
 3 of 2000 (PAJA).  
3
 The history of tribunals prior to the end of Apartheid is beyond the scope of this study. For a list of the tribunal 
landscape prior to 1992, see South African Law Reform Commission Project 24 Investigation into the Courts‘ 
Powers of Review of Administrative Acts (1992) (Project 24). 
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Africa will be provided, as well as some brief lessons from the tribunal systems of Australia 
and England. Taking academic support for a coherent system of tribunals, the current 
fractured tribunal system in South Africa, and the lessons from Australia and England into 
account, some important considerations of tribunal reform and tribunal supervision will be 
suggested.  
6 2 Development of Tribunals in South Africa 
6 2 1 History of Tribunals: The Call for Tribunal Reform  
The need for a comprehensive system of tribunals is not a recent development. After the end 
of apartheid and during the deliberations for a constitutional right to administrative justice, an 
organised system of tribunals attracted widespread academic support and was considered an 
important addition to an administrative justice system. Unfortunately, these suggestions were 
not implemented. What remains is a system of tribunals which is fragmented and which does 
not provide any comprehensive measure of administrative justice. The following section will 
describe the major historical developments in South Africa leading to a reformed tribunal 
system. The discussion will provide a possible explanation as to the reasons why PAJA did 
not contain so many of the suggestions regarding tribunals recommended by both academics 
and the South African Law Reform Commission.
4
 Furthermore, the importance of an 
Administrative Review Council will be considered in order to illustrate why its enactment is 
so crucial to the development of a comprehensive tribunal structure in South Africa.  
6 2 1 1 South African Law Reform Commission Report 1992
5
 
The first major South African study
6
 undertaken into the state of appeal and review was 
completed in 1992. The extensive two hundred and sixty one page document provides a 
detailed and comprehensive overview of the administrative justice landscape at the time. The 
report is divided into two sections; the first evaluates the South African system of 
administrative appeals, providing a comparative study of the administrative appeals of several 
                                                     
4
 The recommendations relating to the establishment of the Administrative Review Council will be discussed in s 
6 5 2.  
5
 Project 24 (fn 3 above).  
6
 This is not the first academic work on tribunals, but it is the first major practical project. Professor Baxter 
already refers to the need for a proper system of tribunals in Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 268, and 
Professor Rabie supports tribunals in Rabie ―Administratiefregtelike Appèlle‖ (1979) De Jure 155. However, 
their contributions are acknowledged and discussed in the SALRC Project and will be discussed accordingly 
under the same heading.  
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other jurisdictions and evaluates their suitability in South Africa. The second evaluates the 
current state of judicial review. The main aim of the project was to 
determine whether the present situation regarding appeals is satisfactory. Moreover, 
concerning the review of administrative acts, the aim will be to establish whether the 
grounds of review present effective means of controlling the legality of such acts in a 
modern state.
7
   
In the section regarding Appeals,
8
 the SALRC lists all the various types of administrative 
appeals and categorises each form of appeal into one of the different types.
9
 Following the 
categorisation process, criticism of the South African system of appeals is discussed. The 
major criticism is that ‗appellate bodies have been created on an ad hoc basis.‘10 Furthermore,  
numerous suggestions have been made for the creation of either a fully-fledged system 
of administrative courts or at least a general administrative appeal tribunal. Professor 
Baxter bases his suggestions in this regard on the establishment of the Administrative 
Appeals tribunal (AAT) in Australia…Professor Rabie has also advocated the creation 
of a permanent tribunal for considering administrative appeals…Professor Raath 
comments on the Commission‘s Working Paper 15 and comes to the conclusion that 
the establishment of lower and higher administrative courts for South Africa should be 
given serious consideration. The President‘s Council has on two occasions 
recommended the possible establishment of a branch of the Supreme Court or an 
independent tribunal to function as a general court of appeal for administrative 
decisions.
11
 
Based on these recommendations from academics, the SALRC embarks on a study of the 
administrative justice systems of Australia, the United Kingdom,
12
 France, the Netherlands, 
West Germany, Zimbabwe and New Zealand. In each, the relative value of the different 
appeal procedures is evaluated. The SALRC evaluates the possible success of the various 
suggestions in South African administrative law reform. There is support for the creation of 
                                                     
7
 Project 24 3.  
8
 Project 24 S3 22. 
9
 The categorisation is a combination of the classifications used in Rabie (1979) De Jure 128 and Baxter 
Administrative Law 264 respectively. The categorisations used below in s 6 4 are based on Baxter‘s 
classification and will be discussed in that section.  
10
 Baxter Administrative Law 268 and Rabie De Jure (1979) 154 – 155. Project 24 50 fn 16. This criticism 
remains valid.  
11
 Project 24 50 (footnotes omitted).  
12
 England‘s system has been dramatically reformed since and these reforms are discussed in Ch 5.  
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‗an advisory body‘ to supervise the creation and functioning of a tribunal system.13 The report 
also documents the comments received on the Commission‘s recommendations in Working 
Paper 34,
14
 most of which are in support of the establishment of a tribunal system.
15
 Despite 
the academic support of such tribunal reform, the SALRC is not in favour. Their objections to 
a general tribunal exercising appeal jurisdiction are mostly related to the fact that South 
Africa, in 1992, was undergoing major procedural upheaval with regard to the division of 
provinces, the location of courts and the levels of jurisdiction.
16
 It was considered that the 
creation of a general tribunal at that delicate stage of democratic transition would be too 
complicated. In other words, these objections may not hold as much weight at this stage in our 
democratic development.  
It is at this point that there appears to be a gap in the logic of the Commission.
17
 Despite 
having performed a major comprehensive research project spanning multiple jurisdictions and 
illustrating the effectiveness and importance of administrative appeal tribunals, the 
Commission comes to the abrupt, and seemingly unfounded, conclusion that the current 
system of appeals should remain as is and that the focus of administrative justice should be on 
streamlining and developing judicial review. They state that  
in the light of the views expressed above the Commission recommends that the 
present system of appeals should be retained, that no provision should be made for a 
general right of appeal to the Supreme Court against administrative decisions, and that 
reform should rather be effected with regard to judicial review, that is the extension of 
the grounds of review.
18
  
                                                     
13
 Project 24 97.  
14
 South African Law Reform Commission Project 24 Investigation into the Courts‘ Powers of Review of 
Administrative Acts: Working Paper 34 (1991).  
15
 Report 24 102. Mynhardt states that the introduction of a tribunal system is unsatisfactory because it will only 
lead to a further hierarchy of tribunals being established. Burns agrees that the appeal system should be 
maintained and that attention should be directed towards judicial review. However, Viljoen supports the creation 
of a general tribunal. Corder also supports the creation of a structured form of tribunals. Baxter further supports 
the tribunal reforms. The SALRC‘s major objections relate to the time at which these suggestions were issued 
and so may no longer be a stumbling block to the successful tribunal reform.   
16
 It will be argued that these criticisms do not hold weight anymore now that the dust of constitutional reform 
has settled.  
17
 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 68 notes that ‗this recommendation seems to miss the 
point that administrative appeals are essentially an alternative to judicial review: ideally, a more specialised, 
accessible, cheaper and democratically less threatening alternative. It is difficult to see how improving judicial 
review would solve the problems of incoherence identified by the Law Commission.‘ 
18
 Project 24 106.  
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However, as indicated above, the SALRC‘s biggest objections seem to relate to the time that 
the suggestions were made and the fact that tribunal reform was not an appropriate 
consideration during a period of uncertainty and constitutional upheaval.  
6 2 1 2   Conferences on Administrative Justice: The Breakwater Declarations 
6 2 1 2 1 Breakwater I: Administrative Law Reform
19
 
Fortunately, the investigation did not end there. Although the SALRC recommended that the 
ad hoc and unsystematic system of appeals was to be retained, academics continued to discuss 
the need for tribunal reform and a systemisation of administrative appeals.  
In 1993, a conference on administrative justice was held in the Breakwater Lodge in Cape 
Town.
20
 The conference attracted the attendance of a number of local and foreign academics 
and was largely concerned with debating and considering the next step in the nature of 
administrative justice in South Africa. A major feature was deliberation around whether, and 
how, a right to administrative justice should be included in the final Constitution. Although 
s33 is now a constitutionally entrenched right in the Bill of Rights, it was a highly contentious 
right and one that was hotly contested by academics.
21
 The role of administrative tribunals, 
despite being dismissed by the SALRC‘s 1992 report, also formed a substantial part of the 
discussions. The most important academic contribution will be discussed below.  
6 2 1 2 1 1 Govender: Administrative Appeals Tribunals 
The most direct contribution regarding tribunals was that of Govender. His article provided 
the next analysis of the system of tribunals in South Africa after the SALRC‘s 1992 report.22 
Govender states that ‗effective administrative appeal tribunals breed confidence in the 
                                                     
19
 (Breakwater 1). The workshop was named ‗Administrative Law for a future South Africa‘. Abbreviated 
versions of the papers have been published in Corder & Mclennan (eds) Controlling Public Power (1995), while 
the full texts can be found in Bennett, Cockrell, Jooste, Keightley & Murray (eds) Administrative Law Reform 
(1993).  
20
 The declarations which were drawn up and assented to at this and the subsequent conference received their 
name from this.  
21
 ‗In early 1996 the Constitutional Assembly was not convinced that a right to administrative justice should be 
perpetuated in the final Constitution, seriously weighing the alternative of a mere reference in the Bill of Rights 
to a still-to-be-adopted legislation on the subject‘ Corder & Maluwa ―Background and Some Issues‖ in Corder & 
Maluwa (eds) Administrative Justice in South Africa (1996) 9. Cf Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South 
Africa‘s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 165-170.  
22
 Report 24.  
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administration as they give the assurance to all aggrieved persons that the decision has been 
considered at least twice and reaffirmed.‘23 
He describes the important role of administrative appeals tribunals in the checking and 
controlling of administrative power, while emphasising their role as positive and facilitative 
aspects of good administrative decision-making. Govender illustrates the advantages of 
tribunals as follows: 
By focusing on the same subject matter on a regular basis, tribunals acquire both the 
required awareness of the policy considerations of the administration and a familiarity 
with technical provisions. This expertise fosters a belief within the administration that 
correct and accurate decisions are being taken. As tribunals develop greater flexibility 
in respect of procedure, strict adherence to the adversarial mode becomes less 
necessary. Tribunals are then able to elicit all the relevant information from the 
applicant and, as a consequence, the applicant can more confidently appear on his or 
her own. Moreover, tribunals are more accessible to the public as they are generally 
cheaper and speedier than regular judicial bodies.
24
 
 
Another important advantage which is specific to the South African context relates to the role 
of tribunals in a system on the verge of institutional political changes. In a society which 
strives to effect dramatic democratic change, tribunals may be able to provide an integral 
facilitative role. Govender states that  
 
a structured and co-ordinated system of tribunals will have certain obvious attractions 
for a future democratically elected government. New policies will have to be applied 
by an administration comprising individuals, some of whom would be either reluctant 
to apply them or positively hostile towards them. An effective tribunal system may 
assist in ensuring that policies determined by a democratic government are applied and 
enforced.
25
  
 
Govender uses examples of the different appeal procedures in South Africa at the time to 
illustrate the inconsistencies and vast differences between them.
26
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 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Bennett, Cockrell, Jooste, Keightley & Murray (eds) 
Administrative Law Reform (1993) 77. 
24
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 77. 
25
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 78. 
26
 A similar approach will be followed in s 6 4. However, many of these tribunals no longer operate in the same 
way, or no longer exist, and those that are still relevant will be discussed in s 4 below. 
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A very important element of Govender‘s article is the counter-argument he provides for the 
SALRC‘s dismissal of the reform of appeal procedures.27 Govender contends that although 
the SALRC has decided against the creation of a general tribunal or a reformed tribunal 
structure,  
these recommendations do not deal with the central issue, namely, the reform of the 
tribunal system in order to introduce ‗openness, fairness and impartiality' in its 
operation and thus to ensure justice to the individual while policy is applied 
competently. The recommendations of the Law Commission fail to recognize the 
many advantages that an effective system of administrative tribunals have over 
judicial review. An extension of the grounds of judicial review will contribute to a 
more accountable administration, but will only tangentially contribute to the 
establishment of the effective system of administrative tribunals.
28
 
 
Lastly, Govender expresses support for a supervisory administrative body. In his article he 
likens it to the previous Council on Tribunals of the United Kingdom, but describes it in terms 
which are of general application. He states that  
 
a supervisory body, vested with the powers recommended, will also be necessary in 
order to achieve the desired uniformity in respect of the checks and balances on the 
powers of the tribunals and in respect of the internal procedures adopted by tribunals 
during their hearings.
29
 
 
6 2 1 2 1 2 Breakwater Declaration 
The conference also generated the ‗Breakwater Declaration‘;30 an historical document 
directing the focus of administrative justice in the pre-constitutional era. The Breakwater 
Declaration viewed tribunals as part of a system of positive change, and provided support for 
them in the following way. Firstly, a point of departure of the Breakwater Declaration was 
that  
                                                     
27
 S 6 3 1 1 above.  
28
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 85.  
29
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 84.  
30
 Bennett et al Administrative Law Reform 18-20 (‗Breakwater Declaration‘).  
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South African administrative law currently has a retrospective focus: it concentrates 
on judicial remedies for maladministration. It needs to develop a prospective focus; it 
needs to create procedures and structures which will foster good decision-making.
31
 
A point of agreement among the delegates was that the 
 
legal regulation of public power should include judicial review of administrative 
action as well as a range of procedures and institutions to ensure good governance, 
including:  
(viii) the provision of accessible, appropriate and adequate remedies for 
maladministration, including review of administrative action and, where desirable, 
alternative dispute resolution procedures (having special regard to the dangers of 
informal procedures for those with poor bargaining power).
32
 
 
Lastly, the delegates felt that one of the areas which required more research and investigation 
was ‗(i) the need for and design of administrative appeals, internal or external.‘33 It is clear 
from this document that the delegates were in agreement that judicial review could not alone 
perform the task of a comprehensive administrative law system. The idea of supporting 
structures continued to hold force in the deliberations. 
 
6 2 1 2 2 Breakwater II: Administrative Justice in South Africa
34
  
 
In 1996, between the enactment of the Final Constitution
35
 and the coming into effect of 
ss33(1) and (2), the second Breakwater Conference was held. With the right to administrative 
justice now entrenched in the Constitution,
36
 debate focused more on the implications 
thereof,
37
 the national legislation that Parliament was required to draft and the impact of the 
                                                     
31
 Breakwater Declaration 18.  
32
 Breakwater Declaration  19.  
33
 Breakwater Declaration  19. 
34
 The workshop was initially entitled ‗Controlling Public Power in South Africa‘, but the proceedings have been 
compiled and published in Corder & Maluwa (eds) Administrative Justice in Southern Africa (1997).  
35
 The Constitution.   
36
 The right was initially contained in s24 of the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), but was also included in 
the Constitution in s33 with a series of complex provisions (item 23 in Schedule 6) relating to the suspended 
enforcement of the right, subject to Parliament enacting legislation. See Corder ‗Administrative Justice in the 
Final Constitution‘ (1997) 13 SAJHR 28 for a description of the legislative history and reasoning behind the 
staged approach.  
37
 ‗The purpose of the workshop was ‗to explore ideas about the regulation of public power in an informal 
educative atmosphere‘. The papers were grouped around four themes: defining the scope of public power, the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
right on administrative justice. Breakwater II was more heavily focused on the practical 
implications of how public power should both legitimately and fairly be exercised and 
controlled. Once again, administrative tribunals and their suitability to the South African 
context were raised as significant points of discussion.  
Breakwater II spawned another historical document, namely the ‗Second Breakwater 
Declaration‘.38 The Declaration sets out the basic principles of the role, function and extent of 
public power and how it should be exercised and controlled. In ‗The Way Forward‘, this 
Declaration contains commitment to the establishment of tribunals by saying that 
the constitutional basis of administrative justice must be supported by the enactment 
of a Statute to give substance to the rights given constitutional protection. An 
investigation into the desirability and feasibility of establishing an Administrative 
Appeal Tribunal and a binding Code of Principles of Good Administration should be 
carried out.
39
  
6 2 2 Development of National Legislation to give effect to the Right to Just Administrative 
Action
40
 
6 2 2 1 South African Law Reform Commission Report on Administrative Justice August 
1999
41
 and Draft Administrative Justice Bill
42
 
S33(1) of the Constitution states that ‗everyone has the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair‘. S33(3) of the Constitution places an obligation on 
Parliament stating that ‗national legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights‘. 
Prior to the enactment of such legislation, the rights contained in s 33(1) and (2) were 
suspended,
43
 and s 24 of the Interim Constitution continued to apply. Parliament was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
means of regulating power through the law, realising the regulation of public power in South Africa, and a 
comparison with non-African systems.‘ Corder & Maluwa ―Background and Some Issues‖ in Administrative 
Justice in SA 10.  
38
 Corder & Maluwa Administrative Justice in SA 13-16.  
39
 Corder & Maluwa Administrative Justice in SA 15.  
40
 It must be stated at the outset of this section that it will not contain an evaluation of PAJA in its entirety. The 
discussion will be limited only to those provisions relating specifically to tribunals and tribunal supervision. The 
scope and consequences of PAJA as a whole are too broad and far-reaching to be discussed in detail in this 
thesis. For a thorough analysis of the history, functioning and interpretation of PAJA, see Currie & Klaaren The 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Benchbook (2001).  
41
 South African Law Reform Commission Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice (1999).  
42
 South African Law Reform Commission Draft Bill 1999 (The Draft Bill).  
43
 In terms of item 23 of Schedule 6 of the Constitution. 
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therefore required to enact legislation before 3 February 2000 effectively, that is within a 
period of three years from the commencement of the 1996 Constitution.
44
  
The SALRC was given the task in November 1998
45
 of producing a draft bill which would 
fulfil the constitutional mandate. The first discussion paper containing the first draft bill was 
published in February 1999.
46
 After a series of workshops, deliberations and comments, as 
well as the advice of international experts,
47
 the SALRC prepared a report for the Minister of 
Justice who was responsible for the drafting of the statute relating to administrative justice in 
August 1999. The report contained the recommendations of the SALRC regarding the 
national legislation that parliament was required to draft to give effect to the constitutional 
right to administrative justice, as well as a draft Administrative Justice Bill. 
For our purposes, the most important recommendation of the SALRC relates to the creation of 
an Administrative Review Council (ARC). The reason for this is that the ARC would have 
been responsible for the essential enquiry into the possible creation of an appeals tribunal or 
any other form of tribunal review, and thus the actual topic of tribunal reform was not a topic 
of debate. It was always envisaged that those debates and discussions would take place under 
the guidance of the ARC.
48
  
Chapter 6 focuses on the contemplated Administrative Review Council. As is 
indicated in the appropriate footnote, this has been in contention. There has been an 
understandable aversion (particularly on the part of the Department of Justice) to the 
creation of what is seen to be yet a further governmental structure. The Commission 
has considered this and related objections, and substantial amendments to the original 
proposed body have been effected through successive drafts. The latest indication by 
the Department is that the contemplated ARC would cost in the order of R980 000,00 
per annum to run (this out of the current Justice budget in the order of R300 million). 
Three points to be made in this regard are the following: that if the ARC is what it 
takes to obey the constitutional imperative, this limited funding has to be found; 
secondly, enhanced administrative justice contemplates greater state efficiency and 
thereby savings; and thirdly, that it is not evident that the function to be performed 
                                                     
44
 For a more complete history of the development of the right to just administrative action and the enactment of 
national legislation, see Currie & Klaaren The AJA Benchbook 4-13.  
45
 The Committee that was established consisted of a project leader, Jeremy Gauntlett, Rainer Pfaff, representing 
German Technical Co-operation (GTZ), Hugh Corder and Andrew Breitenbach, appointed as researcher in 
respect of the project. 
46
 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 81: Administrative Law (1999).  
47
 A description of these proceedings can be found in SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 9-10.  
48
 S 6 3 3 1 below explains the important and essential role of the ARC in tribunal reform in South Africa.  
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(given in particular the need for autonomy and public regard) is best served by seeking 
to warehouse the ARC‘s allocated tasks within some other institution or government 
department.
49
 
The SALRC Draft Bill contained detailed and comprehensive clauses relating to the structure, 
appointment, expenditure and functioning of the proposed ARC. Amongst others, the purpose 
of the ARC would be to inquire into the law and practice relating to (i) internal complaints 
procedures, (ii) internal administrative appeals, (iii) the review by courts of administrative 
action; and to inquire into the appropriateness of establishing (i) independent and impartial 
tribunals, in addition to the courts, to review administrative action; and (ii) specialised 
administrative tribunals, including a tribunal with general jurisdiction over all organs of state 
or a number of organs of state, to hear and determine appeals against administrative action; 
and make its first recommendations to the Minister of Justice within two years after the date 
of the commencement of the Act.
50
  
6 2 2 2 Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development:
51
 Things Fall Apart 
When comparing the Draft Bill of the SALRC to PAJA, there are considerable differences. 
Many of the differences can be attributed to hesitation and reservation expressed by the 
Department of Justice,
52
 but it can also be attributed to the deliberations held by the Portfolio 
Committee. Prior to the first meeting of the Portfolio Committee, there appeared to be three 
versions of the Draft Administrative Justice Bill. The first is the version produced by the 
SALRC. The second draft Bill was drafted by Professor Sarkin and resulted from the fact that 
cabinet was unhappy that new structures were created and that the bill was too detailed. The 
then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr P Maduna, asked the Deputy 
                                                     
49
 SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 13-14. The ‗appropriate footnote‘ is fn 35 in the Draft Bill which 
states that ‗The Department of Justice has indicated that there will probably be insufficient funds to establish the 
Council (it now estimates the cost to be about R980 000 per annum), and has questioned the need for a separate 
organization with its own budget and staff. It has been suggested that consideration be given to the establishment 
of a unit within the SALRC (or Human Rights Commission) to perform the functions of the Council, and that 
donor funding be sought for the expenditure associated with establishing the unit and its initially heavy 
workload...Although the SALRC will investigate the feasibility of the Department‘s proposal (which would 
require an amendment to the SALRC‘s founding Act), it considers the Council/unit as one of the keys to 
harmonizing the constitutional requirements of administrative justice and efficient administration and, hence, to 
the success of the Bill. If this capacity is not created, the Bill cannot work.‘ SALRC Report on Administrative 
Justice 36. The debate relating to cost will be more thoroughly considered in Ch 7.  
50
 Draft Bill S15.  
51
Portfolio Committee on Justice & Constitutional Development and Select Committee on Security & 
Constitutional Affairs Administrative Justice Bill [B56-99] (The Portfolio Committee).  
52
 See fn 49 for the objections of the Department of Justice. Also see Ch 7 where the objections to the ARC and 
tribunals are discussed.  
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Dean of the UCT Law Faculty to assist his department in reworking the SALC version to deal 
with those problems.
53
 The third version was apparently drafted by an official within the 
Ministry of Justice.
54
 It is this third version which was submitted to the Portfolio Commission 
for deliberation. This unfortunate turn of events excluded several very important clauses, and 
left some practically irrelevant.
55
 These include specifically the amended requirements of the 
establishment of the ARC.
56
 The regulations clause reads:   
11(1) The Minister may make regulations relating to (g) the establishment, duties and 
powers of an advisory council to monitor the application of this Act and to advise the 
Minister on— (i) the appropriateness of publishing uniform rules and standards which 
must be complied with in the exercise of administrative actions, including the 
compilation and maintenance of registers containing the text of rules and standards 
used by organs of state; (ii) any improvements that might be made in respect of 
internal complaints procedures, internal administrative appeals and the review by 
courts of administrative action; (iii) the appropriateness of establishing independent 
and impartial tribunals, in addition to the courts, to review administrative action and, 
of specialised administrative tribunals, including a tribunal with general jurisdiction 
over all organs of state or a number of organs of state, to hear and determine appeals 
against administrative action; (iv) the appropriateness of requiring administrators, 
from time to time, to consider the continuance of standards administered by them and 
of prescribing measures for the automatic lapsing of rules and standards; (v) initiating, 
conducting and co-ordinating programmes for educating the public and the members 
and employees of administrators regarding the contents of this Act and the provisions 
of the Constitution relating to administrative action;  (vi) any other improvements 
aimed at ensuring that administrative action conforms with the right to administrative 
justice; (vii) any steps which may lead to the achievement of the objects of this Act; 
and (viii) any other matter in respect of which the Minister requests advice.
57
  
                                                     
53
 Submission of Sarkin, Deputy Dean of UCT to the Portfolio Committee 15-11-1999 (AJU 29).  
54
 It is unclear which official was responsible for the drafting of the Draft Bill, but it did originate from the 
offices of the Minister of Justice. Submission of the Legal Resources Centre and Clive Plasket, Former Director 
of the Grahamstown Office of the Legal Resources Centre to the Portfolio Committee 15-11-1999 (AJU 4).  
55‗I do believe that the draft by the department is highly problematic, does not understand the issues around 
administrative justice and does not give meaning to the constitutional right.‘ Submission of Sarkin 15 November 
1999 and ‗It is noted with considerable regret and concern that, from the first version to the third version of the 
Bill, the machinery for meaningful on-going administrative law reform has been systematically dismantled.‘ 
Submission of LRC 15-11-1999.  
56
 The effect of this is described in s 6 3 3 1. While the draft bill officially established the ARC, PAJA requires 
only that ‗the Minister may make regulations relating to the establishment, duties and powers of an advisory 
council to monitor the application of this Act‘. (my emphasis)  S10(2)(a) PAJA. 
57
 S11(g) of the Administrative Justice Bill B-99 15-12-1999 (my emphasis).  
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When the deliberations of the Portfolio Committee began on 25 November 1999, it was 
expressed that ‗the regulations set up an advisory council which will hopefully lead to a 
tribunal system or a review process that is more accessible than the High Courts.‘58 At this 
stage the establishment of an ARC had already been excluded from the draft bill presented to 
the Portfolio Committee and merely included in the regulations. Several of the submissions 
received by the Portfolio Committee indicated strong support for the establishment of the 
ARC and for the reform of administrative tribunals. These include the submissions of the 
South African Human Rights Commission,
59
 South African Law Commission,
60
 the 
Legislative Drafting Project of GZT,
61
 Legal Resources Centre
62
 and several others.
63
 
Furthermore, the deliberations between the 20
th
 and the 26
th
 November included much debate 
about the inclusion of the ARC into the Bill.
64
  
                                                     
58
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ―Deliberations of the Portfolio Committee on Justice & Constitutional 
Development and Select Committee on Security & Constitutional Affairs‖ National Assembly Committees (25-
11-1999) http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 12-06-2011).  
59
 ‗The Minister should be compelled to set up the advisory council and should not be afforded a discretion in 
this regard. This will go some way to addressing section 33(3)(c) of the Constitution.‘ Submission of SAHRC to 
the Portfolio Committee 15-11-1999 (AJU 38).   
60
 A possible constitutional difficulty with the approach adopted in the Bill is that the Minister has a discretion to 
make regulations dealing with the matters listed in clause 11, but is not bound to do so. It may be argued, 
therefore, that the Bill itself does not "provide for" review by an independent and impartial tribunal where 
appropriate as required by clause 33(3)(a) of the Constitution or "promote" an efficient administration as 
required by clause 33(3)(c) thereof. The question which then arises is whether the Bill is "national legislation" of 
the sort envisaged by section 33(3) and, if it is not, what the constitutional implications are. Item 23(3) of 
Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides that section 33(3) will lapse if the legislation envisaged by it is not 
enacted within three years of the date when the Constitution took effect.‘ Submission of SALRC to the Portfolio 
Committee 15-11-1999 (AJU 2).  
61
 ‗It is obviously possible to give the Minister the responsibility to ensure further development of administrative 
justice and refrain from setting up an 'Administrative Review Council' as discussed by the SALC in their 
consultation phase. Nevertheless, I have my doubts whether it passes constitutional muster if it is completely up 
to the Minister's discretion to embark on such further steps - or not… without a clear mandate to the Minister to 
establish such a system of internal and external administrative remedies, the objective of the constitution is not 
met: To ensure that in particular ordinary people have effective tools to have administrative action reconsidered 
in a way which is a economic, quick and as informal as possible. Judicial review on its own, although of greatest 
importance as measure of last resort, is not sufficient. It is expensive, cumbersome and time consuming.‘ 
Submission of GTZ to the Portfolio Committee 15-11-1999 (AJU 36).  
62
 ‗It is suggested that the Bill include provisions relating to an Administrative Review Council or similar 
institution. If necessary, the sections creating and empowering it can be brought into operation at a later stage 
when funding is available or when agreement has been reached with either the South African Law Commission 
or the Human Rights Commission for it to fall under the auspices of one or other of these institutions.‘ 
Submission of LRC 15-11-1999. 
63
 These include Black Sash; SARS and the Western Cape Provincial Government.  
64
 This said, when the Western Cape Provincial Government suggested that ‗a tribunal to review administrative 
action should be legislated for within the Act and not within the regulations‘,  the chairperson pointed out that 
only an advisory council to advise on the appropriateness of a tribunal was set up in the regulations. If a tribunal 
was deemed appropriate it would then have to be legislated for separately.   
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It is at this point where the debate of the Portfolio Committee surrounding the possible 
establishment of the ARC comes to a halt. On the 7
th
 December, a fresh draft of the Bill was 
presented to the Committee with several new options provided for the areas of contention. 
There is debate regarding various other regulations, but there is no change to the word ‗may‘ 
in clause 11(1)(g) and there is no further discussion thereon. The Portfolio Committee seems 
to simply accept that the establishment of the ARC is at the discretion of the minister, and 
does not consider amending the regulations any further in this regard. On the 21
st
 January 
2000, the Portfolio Committee voted on the Bill; 11 Members voted in favour of the Bill, and 
2 abstained. 
In its report to the National Assembly on the 24
th
 January 2000, the Portfolio Committee state 
in its Resolution to the Administrative Justice Bill that  
during its deliberations on the Bill, the Committee's attention was drawn to the fact 
that certain existing laws contain provisions providing for a procedure for the review 
of, or appeal against, an administrative action, other than a review by, or appeal to, a 
court of law. Due to the fact that no audit of such laws has been done and due to a lack 
of time, the Committee was not in a position to conduct an investigation in order to 
determine the impact of the Bill on such laws and the procedures created therein. The 
Committee expressed the opinion that the advisory council contemplated in Clause 
11(1)(g) of the Bill would be the most appropriate body to conduct such an 
investigation. It therefore recommends that the Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development be requested to direct the advisory council, if established, to conduct 
such an investigation and to advise the said minister on its findings. However, the 
Committee recommends that, in the meanwhile, the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development be requested to direct his or her Department to conduct 
the said investigation.
65
 
However, no ARC was ever established, and no report of this nature was ever considered.
66
 
Several of the other regulations were complied with,
67
 such as the drafting of Fair 
Administrative Procedures
68
 and a Code of Good Administrative Conduct.
69
 There are Draft 
                                                     
65
 Justice And Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee; Security And Constitutional Affairs Select Committee 
Resolution To Administrative Justice Bill [B56-99] (24-01-2000) <http://www.pmg.org.za> (accessed 27-06-
2011).   
66
 The Portfolio Committee gave a deadline of six months for the Minister to report on the establishment of the 
ARC, but in their next meeting on PAJA, no such discussion was contemplated. Portfolio Committee 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20011106-regulations-promotion-administrative-justice-act-briefing 7 
November 2011 accessed 12-08-2011.  
67
 The regulations were presented to Parliament on 7 November 2001. 
68
 GG 23674 31-07-2002.  
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Regulations on the ARC that were drafted, but further than that nothing was achieved. They 
exist as nothing more than guidelines on the Department of Justice‘s webpage.70  
The practical effect of the difference between the original Draft Bill of the SALRC and PAJA 
are that important elements that should have been an integral part in the shaping of our new 
administrative justice regime have been relegated to helpful suggestions, and left at the 
discretion of the minister. Hoexter states that the fact that they were not included when 
Parliament was required to include them means that these measures may never now be part of 
the South African landscape.
71
  
6 2 2 3 Criticism of PAJA from the perspective of Tribunals 
The result of seven years of intense work was PAJA which was enacted to give practical 
effect to the right contained in s33 to administrative justice. Although the enactment of 
administrative legislation should have been viewed as a positive and progressive step forward 
for South African democracy, PAJA was not received with equal enthusiasm, least of all by 
those academics and researchers who had been actively and intimately involved with each 
step of its creation.
72
 Two relevant criticisms with regard to tribunals will be discussed in this 
section.
73
 
The first criticism is that PAJA focuses solely on the right to have unfair administrative action 
judicially reviewed.
74
 The constitutional imperative in S33 calls for more than the mere 
control function provided by judicial review. It calls for fair and efficient administrative 
justice. If PAJA provides only for the right to have administrative action judicially reviewed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
69
 Department of Justice ―Code of Good Administrative Conduct‖ Department of Justice 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/paja/docs/unit/PAJA_Code_draft_v2_2006.pdf> (accessed 12-08-2011).  
70
 Department of Justice ―Subordinate Legislation‖  Department of Justice 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/ regulations/r2001%2000%2099.htm> (accessed 12-08-2011).  
71
 Hoexter ―The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative law‖ (2000) 117 SALJ 499. 
However, it will be demonstrated below in s 6 that there is still room within s33 of the Constitution and the 
regulations of PAJA to develop and reform the administrative justice system.  
72
 Hoexter Administrative Law 68.  
73
 See s 6 3 3 1 for the position relating to the ARC. See further criticism in the submissions to the Portfolio 
Committee in fns 59-62.  
74
 Although it allows for this to be by a ‗court or a tribunal‘, no provision is made for non-judicial review or 
appeal.  
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and does not provide for effective alternative forms of redress,
75
 then it is not fulfilling the 
function that the Constitution compels it to perform. Hoexter states that  
in its failure adequately to address the integration of our system, the Act represents an 
opportunity lost. It seems unlikely that the government will ever again have the 
necessary incentive to impose further tedious administrative procedures on itself, or 
the political will to do so.
76
  
A second criticism is that PAJA has allowed the minister too much discretionary power to 
make the necessary regulations, and that without being forced to do so, he may never call for 
the establishment of an administrative review council.
77
 Hoexter states that  
the proposed duties of the ARC to make recommendations for reform within certain 
deadlines have been reduced to a discretionary power to establish a council which may 
(or may not) make such recommendations.
78
  
An important point to bear in mind is the considerable pressure under which the bill was 
drafted.
79
 The right in s33 called for national legislation to be enacted within three years. In 
the end, the president assented to PAJA one day before the deadline of 3 February 2000. The 
research committee was only established in January 1999 and thus were working under 
extremely pressurised circumstances and without a well-resourced, adequately-staffed 
research team.
80
 Although this is a daily reality in the South African legislative environment, 
                                                     
75
 Corder states in relation to the research committee‘s draft bill that ‗what we have attempted to do in the time at 
our disposal is to create a basic platform which satisfies the Constitutional mandate, while at the same time 
pointing many fingers or arrows in the direction of a future reform agenda in the area of Administrative justice.‘ 
Corder SAHRC Workshop on Open and Accountable Democracy: Generating recommendations on the Open 
Democracy Bill of 1998 (1999) as tabled in Parliament and the Administrative Justice Bill, 21-06-1999.  
76
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ  499.  
77
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ  497. Regulations in regard to an ARC were drafted in 2002, but they remain nothing 
more than a document on the Department of Justice‘s website. No actual implementation or serious discussion 
about the feasibility of establishing the ARC has ever taken place within Parliament.  
78
 Hoexter (2000) SALJ  497. 
79
 ‗The appointment of a project committee only in November 1998 has left very little time for this to be 
accomplished. The situation is made more difficult by the extensive current legislative burdens borne by 
Parliament, and the interruption of the legislative programme for 1999 by the national elections. The result, it 
must be stressed at the outset, is that this project has necessarily had to be conducted on an expedited basis.‘ 
SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 4.   
80
 Corder SAHRC Workshop on Open and Accountable Democracy 1999.  
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it is necessary to bear it in mind when reviewing how accurately PAJA fulfils the 
constitutional requirement.
81
  
However, that cannot be the end of the matter. The practical upshot is that there can no longer 
be any excuse for half measures in the fulfilment of a right in the Bill of Rights. Parliament is 
no longer under a time pressure to enact legislation. Rather, they are in the perfect position to 
review the effectiveness of the legislation and to re-evaluate how PAJA gives effect to s33 
twelve years down the line. As Chapter 2 illustrates, judicial review needs to be well-
supplemented by other administrative control and facilitations structures in order to begin to 
fulfil the constitutional imperative.  
6 2 3 Administrative Review Supervisory Body 
6 2 3 1 Administrative Review Council (ARC)
82
  
The role of a central supervisory body in the delivery of a comprehensive administrative 
justice regime is well-established in commonwealth jurisdictions. Chapter 3 provides an 
historical explanation of the development of the concept of a supervisory body, as well as 
illustrating its pivotal role in the development and progressive effectiveness of organised 
tribunal structures. Chapters 4 and 5 outlined the quintessential functions and positions of the 
Australian Administrative Review Council (Australian ARC) and the English Administrative 
Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) respectively. There is considerable academic support 
for a similar central supervisory body in South Africa, and the importance of the 
establishment of this body has been unequivocally agreed upon. However, PAJA has had the 
effect of changing the responsibility of the minister to establish such a council from 
imperative to optional. This section will describe the academic support of a supervisory 
council on administrative justice and evaluate some of the reasons why it was not enacted as a 
statutory necessity in PAJA. The discussion will also briefly summarise why the 
establishment of an ARC would be the first step in tribunal reform. 
                                                     
81
 In the morning session of the Portfolio Committee of 10 January 2000 the Chair acknowledged that ‗there is 
not going to be a 100% perfect Bill - there is too much work to be done in the time remaining‘ and on 11 January 
2000 that the Committee had only one day left to get through the working document and that the committee 
would sit until it was finished. Neither of these comments inspires much confidence in the complete nature of 
PAJA.  
82
 This body will be referred to as the Administrative Review Council (ARC) as per the wording in the Draft 
Bill.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
 
6 2 3 2 Support for the Establishment of the ARC 
The academic support for the creation of the ARC is overwhelming. Especially during the 
deliberations relating to the creation of PAJA, the establishment of an ARC was 
recommended by almost all parties. Govender states that ‗a supervisory body, vested with the 
powers recommended, will also be necessary to achieve the desired uniformity in respect of 
the checks and balances on the powers of tribunals and in respect of the internal procedures 
adopted by tribunal during their hearings.‘83 Corder states that ‗provision should be made for 
the establishment and function of a small but influential research and review 
secretariat…whose chief purpose would be constant oversight of the administrative process 
and recommendations for its improvement.‘84 Furthermore, almost all of the submissions to 
the Portfolio Committee included strong reliance on the possibility that the ARC would be 
established and then charged with the task of investigating alternatives to judicial review.  
However, PAJA has relegated this establishment to a discretionary power of the minister.
85
 As 
Hoexter explains,  
these proposals were watered down considerably in the PAJA, which merely allows 
(and does not require) the Minister to make regulations establishing an ARC to advise 
her on such matter. The creation of an AAT-type body (and indeed any other 
programmatic reform relating to administrative appeals) thus depends on a chain of 
events: the making of regulations to establish an ARC, its giving appropriate advice 
and that advice being heeded and acted upon by the Minister. The reform process, if it 
ever occurs, will certainly be a lengthy and complicated one.
86
  
As was illustrated above, the major reason behind watering down this important clause was 
the department‘s objections relating to the costs of establishing such a council.87 Furthermore, 
the Department of Justice expressed aversion to the creation, and proliferation, of yet another 
governmental department.
88
 Although these may be valid concerns on the part of the 
                                                     
83
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 84.  
84
 Corder (1997) SAJHR 40.  
85
 S10(2)(a) PAJA states that ‗The Minister may make regulations relating to the establishment, duties and 
powers of an advisory council.‘ 
86
 Hoexter Administrative Law 69 (footnotes omitted).  
87
 This cost objection will be discussed further in Ch 7 in the cost debate relating to tribunals as a whole. 
88
 Hoexter Administrative Law 99 ‗...several important innovations proposed by the Law Reform Commission in 
its draft bill of 1999 were rejected or heavily watered down by the legislature...either for lack of funding or for 
fear of the burden some of these proposals would have imposed on a unprepared government.‘ 
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Department of Justice,
89
 the SALRC is clear on the point that the important role of the ARC 
cannot merely be amalgamated into another government institution, nor is it a sufficient 
objection to state lack of funding as a way to avoid the constitutional imperative.
90
 The 
Commission goes so far as to say that it ‗considers the Council/unit as one of the keys to 
harmonizing the constitutional requirements of administrative justice and efficient 
administration and, hence, to the success of the Bill. If this capacity is not created, the Bill 
cannot work.‘91  
The above description of the historical development of tribunals and the failure to develop a 
comprehensive tribunal system shows that despite strong academic support and clear 
indications that a move in this direction was the right one; the process of widespread tribunal 
reform was stopped in its tracks by the enactment of PAJA. However, tribunals continue to 
form part of our administrative justice landscape. In order for their sustainable growth and 
development, a more consolidated and comprehensive system of control is required. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the ARC is the first step in a program of tribunal reform.  
6 3  Tribunals Today: The Current Tribunal Landscape 
This section will analyse the current state of tribunals in South Africa, and provide some 
comparison to the tribunals of Australia and England. This will provide a measure of clarity 
as to why exactly reform is required in the South African tribunal system. From this analysis, 
a brief discussion of the future of tribunals and possible considerations for reform will be 
presented.   
When Baxter originally explained the need for a general administrative appeals tribunal in 
1984, he commented that the current fragmented collection of tribunals failed to represent a 
‗coherent system‘.92 When the SALRC compiled a list of all the existing appeal avenues in 
1992, they reiterated his criticism that administrative appeals were created on an ad hoc 
basis.
93
 When Govender described all the administrative appeal tribunals in 1993, he lamented 
                                                     
89
 In England, the AJTC is being incorporated into another department as part of a cost-saving exercise. See Ch 5 
fn 129.  
90
 See fn 49 above.  
91
 SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 36. 
92
 Baxter Administrative Law 268.  
93
 Project 24 50.  
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that they were ‗haphazard and incoherent‘.94 Hoexter confirmed this position in 2007.95 The 
tribunal landscape today is no different.  
This section aims to classify some of the major types of administrative tribunals in South 
Africa. Not all of these bodies are necessarily called ‗tribunals‘, and several other names are 
also used such as ‗advisory board‘, ‗appeal board‘ and even ‗court‘. However, they reflect the 
characteristics and features of tribunals which were outlined in Chapter 3 and so will be 
considered administrative tribunals for the purpose of this discussion. The rationale behind 
the classification exercise will be to illustrate that although tribunals are being used to 
distribute administrative justice, there is a definite lack of a coherent structure or 
comprehensive system through which these tribunals are administered and against which their 
successes can be evaluated. Furthermore, there is no one ‗type‘ of tribunal nor a common 
standard against which they are created. Rather, various different types of bodies and 
structures have been established and created for specific purposes and continue to operate in 
vastly disparate ways. However, certain tribunals share similar characteristics and in order to 
evaluate their relative successes and failures, it is helpful to group similar tribunals together.  
When analysing administrative tribunal appeals in South Africa, four major types of 
administrative tribunals
96
 are the most prominent.
97
 These can be divided into ‗dispute-
resolution‘ tribunals, ‗administrative appeal‘ tribunals, ‗supervisory‘ tribunals and the 
‗combined comprehensive‘ tribunal.98 Under each type an example of a major tribunal will be 
discussed in order to illustrate the nature, function and setup of the type of tribunal. Other 
tribunals which are similar in form will be listed in each category.
99
 Furthermore, a tribunal 
                                                     
94
 Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 83. 
95
 Hoexter Administrative Law 68. ‗Little or nothing has changed. There is still no coherent system of appeals in 
this country.‘ 
96
 Two of the tribunals that are discussed do not necessarily always adjudicate administrative disputes, but relate 
rather to issues of employment and competition. However, in both Australia and England, the inclusion of other 
branches of law within the overarching tribunal structure have proved both necessary and worthwhile. See Chs 4 
and 5 for the tribunal structures respectively. See also the success of these tribunals in s 4 1 4 below.  
97
This classification is based on that of Baxter‘s in Baxter Administrative Law 268. However, the types of appeal 
tribunals have been grouped differently to his original classifications. Further reference is also made to Hoexter 
Administrative Law 64-66 and Govender ―Administrative Appeals Tribunals‘ in Administrative Law Reform 78-
83.  
98
 These terms have been designed to reflect the type of tribunal and are not official terms.  
99
 However, this is not a complete list of every tribunal in South Africa. The extensive and individualist approach 
that was followed in Project 24 is beyond the scope of this thesis, and is a mammoth task reserved for the ARC 
which will hopefully be established.  
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example comparable to the Australian and English tribunal chambers will be used under each 
type. This will allow for a brief assessment of the tribunal against some of the desirable 
characteristics of tribunals as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as a comparative analysis with 
the English and Australian models. This process should provide an indication of the problem 
of the far-reaching differences in tribunal setup, procedure, hierarchy and success.  
6 3 1 Four Major ‗Types‘ of Tribunals 
6 3 1 1 ‗Dispute-Resolution‘ Tribunal 
The first tribunal type which will be considered is that of dispute resolution. These tribunals 
are usually established when the primary aim of the tribunal is to assist two parties to reach a 
solution, and as a result are not very adversarial in nature. This type of tribunal will require its 
member(s) to conduct investigations and to take personal circumstances into account 
whenever making decisions relating to the type of hearing, the nature of the dispute and the 
recommendations. An example is the Pension Funds Adjudicator (PFA)
100
 which is a body 
established by the Pension Funds Act.
101
 The Pension Funds Act was amended to create a 
special process by which complaints against pension funds could be investigated and decided, 
with the object of disposing of complaints in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious 
manner.
102
 The adjudicator is appointed by the Minister of Finance after consultation with the 
Financial Services Board and must be a person with at least 10 years of legal experience and 
training.
103
  
An interesting feature of this kind of tribunal is its investigative powers. The PFA‘s approach 
to resolving pension disputes is to ensure that proceedings before the adjudicator are informal, 
accessible, swift and inexpensive. The investigative process is as a result more inquisitorial in 
nature. However, the adjudicator must determine a complaint in an impartial manner and there 
is no question of acting ‗on behalf‘ of a complainant. Once an investigation into a complaint 
                                                     
100
 There is also the Special Pensions Board and the Special Pensions Appeal Board, which regulates the 
pensions of those who were involved in the liberation struggle and who on that account lost the opportunity to 
provide for a pension before 2 February 1990. These will not be dealt with in this example.  
101
 24 of 1956 Ch VA.  
102
 The legislation relied substantially on provisions establishing the office of the Pension Ombudsman in 
England. In many respects the two offices resemble each other, function similarly and perform the same tasks. 
Murphy ―Alternative Dispute Resolution in the South African Pension Funds Industry: an Ombudsman or a 
Tribunal‖ (2002) 23 Indus LJ 55.  
103
 The exact requirements are specified in S30(c).  
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has been completed, the adjudicator must furnish written reasons for his determination to all 
parties concerned and a copy of the decision must also be lodged with the registrar or Clerk of 
the Court.
104
 Alternatively, S30E(1)(b) allows the PFA to establish a Conciliation Service 
Unit (CSU), which will first conciliate a dispute before referring it to adjudication.
 105
 The 
CSU allows the PFA to select cases which can be resolved simply to be referred to 
conciliation, which contributes to the efficiency and speed of the resolution of disputes. 
Conciliation also fosters participation of the parties involved and allows for communication 
between parties.
106
 
Section 30A states that a complainant should first lodge an internal complaint with the 
pension fund or their employer participating in the fund, and then if still unsatisfied should 
approach the PFA, and although it is uncertain whether exhausting the internal remedy is a 
requirement, it would seem a logical first step in the resolution of any dispute. The decisions 
of the PFA are binding and have the same status as a civil judgment, and any party who is not 
satisfied with the PFA‘s decision may, within six weeks from the date of that decision, apply 
to the High Court for relief.
107
  
One problem with this kind of tribunal is that the power of the adjudicator to condone non-
compliance with the restrictive time period has been removed, and he therefore has no 
competence to adjudicate the dispute if the complaint is lodged outside the three-year 
period.
108
 This places poor people in the rural areas in a disadvantaged position, because the 
majority of these people are not aware of their pension law rights.
109
 Another problem is that 
                                                     
104
 S30(m).  
105
 The CSU is a new unit in the office but in the two years of its existence it has recorded a settlement rate of 
over 70%. This figure was given by the Head of Conciliation at the Pension Funds Adjudicator strategic 
planning workshop, 2010. See also the OPFA Annual Report (2009/2010) which states that in the 2010 year, 
3 996 cases were conciliated. Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator ―Reports‖ OPFA 
<http://www.pfa.org.za/sitesmart/uploads/files/701E136E-3373-4547-9E74-18261FC53B47.pdf> (accessed 11-
08-2011).  
106
 Unfortunately, communication between parties has not always proved successful in this tribunal.  
107
 S30P.  
108
 S30I of the Pension Funds Amendment Act imposes certain time limits with regard to lodgement of 
complaints before the Adjudicator and states that the Adjudicator shall not investigate a complaint if the act or 
omission to which it relates occurred more than three years before the date on which the complaint is received by 
him or her in writing. 
109
 Nevondwe & Tettey ―The Role of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and Special Pensions Tribunals‖ (2010) I & 
T 31 2.8.  
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the PFA suffers from a large backlog of appeals.
110
 The reason for this backlog can be 
attributed to poor communication between pension funds and applicants, as well as fairly 
simple cases being referred to the PFA that should have been resolved easily through simple 
pension fund complaint management or conciliation.
111
 Lastly, the PFA is modelled on the 
office of the English ombudsman and conducts most of its investigations on documentary 
submissions. There has been call for reform of the PFA and to establish an 
adjudicative tribunal of first instance, supported by an internal separate mediation 
service, with litigants enjoying a limited right of appeal only on points of law to a 
specialist Pensions Appeal Tribunal. It allows first for a process of conciliation, fact 
finding, advisory opinions and preliminary determinations, followed by selective 
adjudication of significant cases, with a limited right of appeal.
112
   
At this stage, however, the PFA remains an office akin to that of an ombudsman. While this is 
not in itself problematic, the role of the PFA in adjudicating disputes should be considered.  
6 3 1 2 ‗Administrative Appeal‘ Tribunal 
This type of appeal tribunal is perhaps the most general and widely used type. In this case, 
special appeal tribunals are established to hear administrative appeals. Hoexter states that 
these types of bodies should ‗exhibit a degree of independence and begin to resemble a proper 
system of administrative courts‘.113 A body of this nature is not merely a court substitute, but 
a tribunal purposely designed to handle administrative appeals in a specific field. Baxter states 
that they try to ‗represent a compromise between the conflicting demands of public policy and 
private rights.‘114 In South Africa, these bodies are established across a wide range of 
administrative areas, but are vastly dissimilar in their structure, procedures, areas of 
jurisdiction and success.  
A recent example of this kind of a tribunal is the proposed appeal tribunal of the South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA). This is one of the largest and most socially 
important areas of administrative law, but has also historically been one of the most 
unsuccessful in rendering a measure of administrative justice which could be considered fair 
                                                     
110
 OPFA Annual Report (2009/2010) 10 describes the level and amount of the backlog.  
111
 OPFA Annual Report (2009/2010).  
112
 Murphy (2002) Indus LJ 15. See also Nevondwe & Tettey (2010) I & T 31.  
113
 Hoexter Administrative Law 65. 
114
 Baxter Administrative Law 267.  
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and efficient. During a recent parliamentary presentation of the South African Social Security 
Agency‘s Strategic Plan 2011/12 to 2013/14,115 questions were raised regarding the massive 
backlog of claims and appeals, the vastly ineffectual distribution of justice and the proposed 
infrastructure and development to address the problem. However, there was little to no 
discussion regarding the value of appeal tribunals to provide redress to maladministration.  
In the Department of Social Development (DSD) and SASSA Budget and Strategic Plans
116
 
parliamentary presentation of 17 June 2009, the DSD gave some consideration to the need for 
‗governance and institutional development and establishing regional and international 
solidarity and engagement‘, or in other words to improving the tribunal effectiveness and 
efficiency, setting up a comprehensive appeals framework, and reviewing and proposing 
reforms on the social security legislation around appeals.
117
 However, it was stated that ‗the 
establishment of the Social Security Inspectorate and Appeals Tribunal would cost a lot of 
money.‘118 It was lamented that ‗there was not a lack of will in the Department, but a severe 
lack of resources constrained the DSD‘s ability to deliver on its mandate.‘119 
These objections aside, the Social Assistance Amendment Act
120
 came into operation on 16 
September 2010 and provides for a mechanism for reconsideration by SASSA of its decisions 
and a subsequent appeal to the Independent Tribunal (IT). Draft Regulations prescribing the 
process to be followed in both reconsiderations and appeals were published for comment in 
December 2010.
121
  
 
The regulations state that when reconsidering a decision, SASSA is allowed, but not restricted 
to, uphold, dismiss or vary the original decision. It must provide reasons for such a decision. 
When an application is made to SASSA to reconsider its decision, no new information may be 
provided that it did not have the opportunity to take into account on the first consideration. 
                                                     
115
 South African Social Security Agency presentation on Strategic Plan 2011/12 to 2013/14 on 2 August 2011.  
116
Department of Social Development (DSD) and SASSA Budget and Strategic Plans parliamentary presentation 
17-06-2009.  
117
 Zane Dangor, Chief Operations Officer, DSD.  
118
 Coceko Pakade, Chief Financial Officer, DSD.  
119
 Vusi Madonsela, Director General, DSD.  
120
 5 of 2010.  
121
 GN R1258 in GG 33908 29-10-2010.  
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One worrying clause is Regulation 3(5) which states that ‗if the Agency fails to reconsider its 
decision within the stipulated period of receipt of such an application, the Agency is regarded 
to have dismissed the application.‘ In light of the enormous backlog and massive delays 
experienced by applicants, a regulation to this effect may simply exonerate SASSA of its 
responsibility to effectively reconsider applications.  
  
The Regulations also empower the minister to establish an Independent Tribunal to hear 
appeals against decisions made by SASSA.
122
 The IT is comprised of a legal practitioner who 
must act as the chairperson; a medical practitioner as an assessor; and a member of civil 
society.
123
 The IT is empowered, but not restricted to, uphold, dismiss or vary the decision on 
appeal and may request any information from any agency which is relevant to the appeal. The 
IT is also empowered to condone an application for appeal lodged after 90 days, provided 
there is good cause shown.
124
 The appeal is conducted on documentary evidence and in the 
absence of the applicant. This last consideration appears to be contradictory to two of the 
important requirements of tribunals; namely that of publicity and of participation. However, 
as long as clear, coherent and comprehensive reasons for the findings of the IT are published, 
these requirements may be met.  
 
To date, these tribunals have not yet been established and their success can therefore not be 
evaluated. Furthermore, their establishment is at the discretion of the minister. SASSA has 
been allocated R25 million to start the process of appointing officials to begin the process of 
internal reconsiderations. They have established reconsideration teams in all nine provinces 
and there are currently approximately 18 teams across the country dealing with 
reconsiderations of applications.
125
 The DSD is also in the process of creating awareness 
around the appeals process by developing a one-page pamphlet in several official languages 
informing people how to appeal and the terms they had to follow for the reconsideration 
                                                     
122
 S4 of Draft Regulations.  
123
 Regulations are also in place to control when the medical practitioner and member of civil society may form 
part of the IT. Reg 5(2) states that ‗a medical practitioner may only form part of the IT in respect of an appeal on 
disability, care dependency, war veteran‘s or grant-in-aid grant‘; and Reg 5(3) states that ‗a member of civil 
society may only form part of the IT in respect of an appeal against the decision of the Agency relating to a 
social relief of distress grant‘. These regulations are in place to ensure the expertise and relevance of the 
members of the IT.  
124
 Reg 15(2) states the factors to take into consideration are the reason for the delay; whether it is in the interest 
of justice that condonation be granted; and if there are reasonable prospects of success.  
125
 DSD and SASSA Budget and Strategic Plans parliamentary presentation of 17 June 2009.  
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process.
126
 The extent or success of these ITs will depend on their eventual establishment by 
the minister.  
 
This tribunal specifically incorporates a right of internal appeal to a higher ranking official 
within the departmental agency (SASSA) prior to a right of appeal to the IT. Despite the 
desirability of having the agency reconsider its decision before referring to the tribunal, this 
internal avenue of appeal is not always available. Whether a right of appeal to a higher court 
is available to the applicant is unclear from the regulations, and therefore the only further 
avenue would be judicial review in the high court.  
 
Further examples
127
 of general administrative appeal tribunals include the Publications 
Appeal Board, licensing appeal boards and town planning appeal boards.
128
 The Film and 
Publications Appeal Board and the Film and Publications Review Board are established by s3 
of the Films and Publications Act
129
 to be independent appeal bodies. Chapter 5 of the Act 
prescribes the procedure for the lodging of a complaint or application to the Board,
130
 as well 
as the procedure to be followed should the applicant need to lodge an appeal with the Review 
Board. Furthermore, s21 allows for an appeal to the High Court.  
Apart from social security, these bodies regulate disputes which are most similar to the 
jurisdiction of the general regulatory chamber of the English First-tier Tribunals discussed in 
                                                     
126
 This will be done after September 2011 as the focus is currently on reducing the backlog on appeals. 
127
 Other examples include a board of appeal in terms of s20 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985 
against decisions taken by the Committee of the Stock Exchange; a board of appeal considers appeals in terms of 
s19 of the Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989; an appeal committee considers appeals in terms of s24 of 
the Medicines and Related Substances Controls Act 101 of 1965; an appeal committee considers appeals in terms 
of s15 of the National Welfare Act 100 of 1978; an appeal committee considers appeals in terms of s25 of the 
Social Service Professions Act 110 of 1978; a review board considers appeals in terms of s9(1) of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.  
128
 The Kwa-Zulu Natal Town Planning Appeals Board was established in terms of s73 bis of the Natal Town 
Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 and is responsible for adjudicating certain town planning decisions emanating 
from the Town Planning Ordinance that are appealed against. The board comprises between 3 and 15 people. 
129
 65 of 1996.  
130
 S19 states that ‗any person who applies for a classification of a film...or who appeals to the Review Board 
against a decision with regard to such an application, shall have the right (a) to appear in person before the 
executive committee, classification committee or Review Board, or to be represented or assisted by a legal 
practitioner or by any other person of his or her choice, to adduce oral or written evidence and, subject to a 
reasonable time-limit imposed by the chairperson concerned, to address that committee or board, in the language 
of his or her choice; and (b) to have his or her case and arguments duly considered and to be informed, in 
writing, of the decision of the Review Board or committee, of the reasons for and grounds upon which such 
decision is based.‘ 
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Chapter 5,
131
 or to the disputes regulated by the Australian AAT in Ch 4.
132
 However, it is 
especially among these kinds of tribunals in South Africa that disparity in proceedings, right 
of appeal, the right to reasons and the level of informality is found. Some, such as the 
proposed SASSA appeal tribunal, allow for an internal appeal and a subsequent appeal to the 
IT. Others, such as the Film and Publications Appeal Board, allow for an appeal to the 
Review Board and a subsequent appeal to the High Court. Most of the tribunals have a 
requirement to provide and publish reasons for their decisions, which is an encouraging trend 
and may lead to an improvement of initial decision-making. However, there is no common 
way to approach the tribunals, nor a general hierarchy of appeals. Each body has their own 
procedure and their own method of adjudication. This was one of the key problems with 
tribunals identified in England by both the Franks Report
133
 and the Leggatt Report,
134
 and 
reflects the problem that tribunals seem to exist for the convenience of the departments they 
review, not for the intended applicants who apply to them. A statement of the Leggatt Report 
applies to these types of bodies in that,  
their training and IT are under-resourced. Because they are many and disparate, there 
is a considerable waste of resources in managing them, and they achieve no economies 
of scale. Most importantly, they are not independent of the departments that sponsor 
them. The object of this review is to recommend a system that is independent, 
coherent, professional cost-effective and user-friendly. Together tribunals must form a 
system and provide a service fit for the user for whom they were intended.
135
  
It is this category of appeals that a tribunal with overarching jurisdiction such as the AAT or 
with a general regulatory chamber, such as the First-tier Tribunal, would be of the most use. 
This would allow for shared resources, especially of staff, computer systems and property; a 
similar hierarchy of appeal; a common procedure and format for appeals; and as a result a 
simplified procedure for the potential applicant.  
However, it is suggested that social security appeals be provided for by a specialised chamber 
of appeal tribunal, and not in the general regulatory chamber. In Australia, social security is 
                                                     
131
 S 5 3 2 3 1.  
132
 S 4 4 3 1.  
133
 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Equiries Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals 
and Enquiries Cmnd 218 (1957). See Ch 5 s 3 1 1.  
134
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (2001). See Ch 5 s 3 1 2.  
135
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users (2001) 1. See Ch 5 s 3 1 2.  
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regulated by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT),
136
 which receives around 10,000 
appeals each year. It provides a mechanism of merits review that is fair, just, economical, 
informal and quick.
137
 Above that, there is also a right of appeal on the merits to the AAT, a 
right of appeal to the Federal Court on questions of law and, with permission, to the High 
Court of Australia.  
6 3 1 3 ‗Supervisory‘ Tribunal 
Where a largely policy-based administrative system operates over a broad spectrum, there 
often exists a right of appeal to a national control body who exerts control over the entire 
system. While there may be several local administrative boards, a right of appeal exists to a 
national board that can regulate and control both the individualised appeals and the policy 
considerations of the sector as a whole.
138
 The significant and ever-increasing area of 
migration is regulated in this way in South Africa. The most important two tribunals in the 
area are the Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) and the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB).  
In 2004 the Immigration Courts were abolished
139
 by the Immigration Amendment Act and the 
IAB was established. The IAB is tasked with advising the minister
140
 in respect of the 
contents of Regulations made in terms of the Immigration Act; the formulation of policy 
pertaining to immigration matters; the implementation of immigration policy by the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA); reviewing decisions of the DHA in terms of S 8 of the 
Act (which deals with adjudication and review procedures) when requested to do so by the 
minister; and any other matters relating to the Act on which the minister may request advice. 
The IAB consists of five experts in the fields of immigration law and policy and four 
                                                     
136
 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) and the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) 
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) set out the powers, functions and procedures of SSAT.  
137
 Buck ―Administrative Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution: the Australian Experience‖ (2005) 
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/ research/2005/8_2005_full.pdf> (accessed 12-08-2010)  24.  
138
 One example is the Financial Services Appeal Board (FSAB) which is an independent tribunal comprising of 
members who are neither employees of the Financial Services Board nor are active participants in the financial 
services industry. The purpose of the FSAB is to hear appeals on complaints received in the financial services 
sector. The sector is a very large and complicated one and requires that the FSAB make decisions which are in 
line with policy and regulation in the industry. Other examples include the South African Heritage Resources 
Agency Council; the Heraldry Council; the South African Council for the Landscape Architectural Commission 
and the Engineering Council of South Africa.   
139
 S37 of the Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004.  
140
 S5.  
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representatives appointed by the minister on the basis of their expertise in administration, 
regulatory matters or immigration law, control, adjudication or enforcement.  
However, there is no longer an immigration appeal tribunal. In fact, the right to appeal against 
a decision of the Director-General lies directly to the minister.
141
 The IAB is only a 
supervisory body and its main task is advising the minister. It is difficult to see how internal 
appeals to the minister can measure up to the requirements of independence and impartiality. 
Furthermore, this is a very current development and is as recent as 2004. The abolition of the 
immigration tribunal may indicate a worrying trend for South African administrative law and 
may point to the fact that appeals are becoming more formalistic and that administrative 
appeals are being retained within the ministerial structure.  
The RAB is an independent body established in terms of section 12(1) of the Refugees Act
142
 
following an agreement between South Africa and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). The purpose of the RAB is to consider all the appeals made against the 
decisions of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs. The RAB consists of a chairman 
and five members and its major functions are to hear and determine questions of law; hear and 
determine appeals; advise the minister or Standing Committee regarding any matter which 
they refer to the RAB; and to either uphold, dismiss or vary a decision of the Status 
Determination Officer. The DHA has published rules for the functioning of the RAB, which 
prescribe its jurisdiction and adjudicatory powers.
143
 However, a bill has been tabled in 
Parliament
144
 which will abolish the RAB and the Standing Committee and establish in its 
place the Refugee Appeals Authority (RAA).
145
 The RAA will be an independent body 
consisting of a chairperson, and any number of members the minister chooses,
146
 and its role 
will be to determine appeals lodged and advise the Minister regarding any asylum matter.
147
 
However, the bill is not yet legislation and many of the amendments are still under discussion 
in parliament.  
                                                     
141
 S8.  
142
 130 of 1998.  
143
 The Refugee Appeal Board Rules GN R 1330 in GG 25470 26-11-2003.  
144
 Refugees Amendment Bill [B30-2010].  
145
 S8A.  
146
 S8B. 
147
 S8C.  
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Unfortunately, the refugee adjudication system is under resourced, in terms of both budgets 
and staff, and beset with problems, including inexperienced adjudicators, poor information on 
countries of origin and the validity of claims, and a tendency to make decisions based not on 
individual circumstances, but simply on the basis of the origin country. In 2008, the backlog 
of claimants was still extremely high, with the DHA reporting over 89,000 applications from 
2006 and 2007 still outstanding.
148
  
In an area of administrative law which is highly policy-related and which generally 
experiences a huge caseload of applications, a two-tiered and systematic approach seems to 
provide the most administrative redress.
149
 The mere supervisory function performed by the 
IAB with an appeal to the minister does not seem a satisfactory remedy for maladministration 
in the extensive field of immigration. In England, immigration and asylum are specialised 
chambers both within the First-tier Tribunal and within the Upper Tribunal.
150
 The First-tier 
Tribunal allows for merits review, or appeal based on the facts. The Upper Tribunal deals 
with issues of law or appeals from the First-tier Tribunal. In Australia, immigration and 
asylum are regulated by the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal,
151
 
both of which provide independent and final merits review of decisions made in relation to 
migration.  
                                                     
148
 Crush ―South Africa: Policy in the Face of Xenophobia‖ Migration Information Source 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=689> (accessed 11-08-2011). 
149
 An explanation of this can be found in the English Senior President of Tribunals Annual Report in the 
discussion about the integration of the asylum tribunals into the overarching tribunal structure. ‗The working 
group concluded that there would be advantages in replacing the system of reconsideration of single tier 
decisions with a two-tier appellate process, whereby initial judicial decisions in immigration and asylum cases 
could be appealed (with permission) to the Upper Tribunal. As well as having the benefit of placing ultimate 
responsibility for permission applications with a specialist Tribunal, (which would nevertheless be able to call on 
High Court input, where appropriate), the creation of a two tier system was seen to have the advantage of 
enabling initially legally erroneous decisions to be remade in the Upper Tribunal, thereby leading to a reduction 
in the immigration and asylum workload of the Court of Appeal, which had also increased to levels that were 
causing concern.‘ Carnwath The Senior President of Tribunals‘ Annual Report: Tribunals Transformed (2010) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/EF000745-B38E-4A81-8356 
E3317E1251F5/0/senior_president_tribunals_annualreport_feb_2010.pdf> (accessed 12-07-2010) 23 (Tribunals 
Transformed).  
150
 This was not always the case, but in early 2010 the Transfer of Functions of the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal Order 2010 came into effect, abolishing the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and transferring its 
functions to the First-tier Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal assumes jurisdiction in respect of appeals against 
decisions of the First-tier Tribunal in immigration and asylum cases. What was a single tier jurisdiction became a 
two tier one, in common with other tribunal jurisdictions in England. Tribunals Transformed 23.  
151
 The Tribunals are established and governed by the Migration Act 1958 and in the 1994 Migration 
Regulations. See also Ch 4 s 4 3 2.  
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6 3 1 4  ‗Combined Comprehensive‘ Tribunal 
The above categories of tribunals have not been the most successful ones in South African 
administrative law. There are thriving tribunals, however, and the fourth type of appeal 
tribunal is also possibly the one that provides the highest levels of effective administrative 
redress.
152
 The tribunals grouped under this type of appeal reflect similar qualities in that they 
allow for a comprehensive approach to the specific area of law concerned; a stratified and 
coherent avenue for appeals against maladministration; and a commitment to the promotion of 
better initial administrative decision-making. The three examples below illustrate a working 
combination of the above three constructions of tribunals; and display aspects of dispute-
resolution, supervisory and administrative appeal tribunals. This may provide a useful 
example for the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive system of tribunals.   
6 3 1 4 1 Competition 
Prior to the promulgation of the Competition Act of 1998,
153
 competition matters in the 
economy were regulated by the old Competition Board.
154
 However, a new framework of 
Competition Regulation was established by the democratic government of South Africa.
155
  
Three independent bodies were created to replace the old board, namely the Competition 
Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court.  The Commission 
is the investigation and enforcement agency.
156
  The Tribunal is an adjudicative body which 
operates as both as a court-like body as well as being an appeal tribunal. The Appeal Court 
considers appeals and reviews against decisions of the Tribunal. 
                                                     
152
 This ‗level of administrative redress‘ will be evaluated against the characteristics of tribunals in Ch 3 s 4 2.  
153
 89 of 1998.  
154
 The Competition Board was not independent of the Minister of Trade and Industry and only had advisory 
powers in relation to competition matters. 
155
 ‗The need for a new competition policy in South Africa must be seen in the context of a historical legacy of 
excessive economic concentration and ownership, collusive practices by enterprises and the abuse of economic 
power by firms in dominant positions. It was also recognized, however, that the South African economy and 
society was in a state of transition, in terms of a broader restructuring of the economy, the effects of 
globalization and trade liberalization and the need to redress past inequality and non-participation in the national 
economy. A fundamental principle of competition policy and law in South Africa thus is the need to balance 
economic efficiency with socio-economic equity and development.‘ Competition Commission ―About Us‖ 
<http://www.compcom.co.za/about-us> (accessed 27-06-2011).  
156
 The Commission‘s functions include investigating anti-competitive conduct in contravention of the Chapter 2 
of the Competition Act; assessing the impact of mergers and acquisitions on competition and taking appropriate 
action; monitoring competition levels and market transparency in the economy; identifying impediments to 
competition and playing an advocacy role in addressing these impediments.  
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The Competition Tribunal is arguably one of the most successful independent appeal bodies 
in South Africa.
157
 It is established in terms of s26 of the Competition Act. Its function is to 
adjudicate competition matters and it has jurisdiction throughout South Africa. In terms of 
s27, the Competition Tribunal may adjudicate on any prohibited conduct;
158
 hear appeals 
from, or review any decision of, the Competition Commission; and make any ruling or order 
necessary or incidental to the performance of its functions in terms of the act. In this way the 
Competition Tribunal has a dual function of being a tribunal of first instance as well as being 
an appeal tribunal. The Tribunal is required to hold hearings in each matter and its 
proceedings are open to the public. Once the Tribunal has arrived at a decision, it is required 
to publish reasons on the official Competition website.
159
 
In terms of s27, the Competition Appeal Court may review any decision of the Competition 
Tribunal; or consider an appeal arising from the Competition Tribunal in respect of any of its 
final decisions; or any of its interim or interlocutory decisions that may be taken on appeal. 
The Appeal Court may give any judgement or make any order, including an order to confirm, 
amend or set aside a decision or order of the Competition Tribunal; or remit a matter to the 
Competition Tribunal for a further hearing on any appropriate terms. The Appeal Court has 
the same status as a High Court.
160
 
Competition law is regulated and controlled through a three-tier structure. The Commission is 
responsible for the investigation and regulation of competition matters, especially those 
related to the abuse of competition regulations. The Tribunal is then responsible to adjudicate 
and to hear appeals in respect of such abuses. For purposes of control and in order to retain 
judicial force, the Appeal Court can hear both appeals and review decisions for legality. This 
structure reflects that of a First-tier and Upper Tribunal,
161
 while also allowing for national 
regulation and the balance between individual rights and the importance of policy 
considerations. This structure provides a coherent and comprehensive avenue of redress, 
while at the same time striving to improve and enhance the levels of an efficient, competitive 
                                                     
157
 In the 2009/10 year, tribunal decisions were issued in respect of 71 of the 85 cases heard; 52 large merger 
cases heard were decided of 63.46% were heard within 10 days of receipt. Furthermore all decisions regarding 
large merger cases were released within 10 days of their hearings. Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2009-10.  
158
 In terms of Ch 2 of the Competition Act.  
159
 http://www.comptrib.co.za.  
160
 S36 Competition Act.  
161
 Ch 5 s 3 2 3 1. 
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economic environment which balances the interests of workers, owners and consumers and is 
focused on development.
162
  
6 3 1 4 2 Employment 
The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is another highly 
successful independent statutory body which provides an avenue of redress in the labour 
environment.
163
 Previously, labour disputes were regulated by Conciliation Boards and the 
Industrial Court. Under the new constitutional dispensation,
164
 these structures proved 
unsatisfactory
165
 and consequently the CCMA was established in terms of s112 of the Labour 
Relations Act.
166
 
The functions of the CCMA are to attempt to resolve, through conciliation, any dispute 
referred to it; or if a dispute that has been referred to it remains unresolved after conciliation, 
arbitrate the dispute; assist in the establishment of workplace forums; and compile and 
publish information and statistics about its activities.
167
 The CCMA is also empowered to 
make and publish regulations and provide training and education in labour-related matters.
168
 
These publications include information sheets and codes and procedures which are easily 
accessible and understandable and available on the CCMA‘s website.169 
Although the CCMA handles the bulk of employment disputes, there is a right to appeal to the 
Labour Courts, and a further right of appeal to the Labour Appeal Court.  
                                                     
162
 Preamble, Competition Act.  
163
 The CCMA was awarded a Public Sector Excellence Award for the Best Reputation in the Legal Sector in 
2009.  
164
 S23 of the Constitution contains the right to labour relations.  
165
 ‗Conciliation Boards and the Industrial Court lacked credibility with the State's social partners, organised 
business and organised labour and resulted in a very low settlement rate of disputes. The explanatory 
memorandum released with the draft bill of the LRA highlighted that the previous dispute resolution processes 
resulted in only 20% of disputes being settled. The failure of the statutory structure to resolve those disputes 
effectively resulted in an excessively high workload for the Industrial Court and the unnecessarily high incidence 
of strikes and lockouts.‘ Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ―About Us‖ 
<http://www.ccma.org.za/> (accessed 27-06-2011).  
166
 66 of 1995 (LRA).  
167
 S115(1) LRA.  
168
 S115(2) LRA. 
169
 http://www.ccma.org.za.  
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The success of the CCMA can be attributed largely to its relative informality and the greater 
variety of approaches and solutions which may be adopted in the settlement of disputes. The 
CCMA embodies many of the characteristics of a successful tribunal identified in Chapter 
3,
170
 namely accessibility,
171
 speed,
172
 efficiency,
173
 informality
174
 and specialisation. 
Furthermore, the CCMA is committed to the education and training of both staff members 
and those involved in the labour sector. This training and producing of rules, guidelines and 
standards is an important part of improving initial decisions and increasing the quality of 
decisions which are produced. Although the adjudication of a labour dispute does not 
necessarily imply that the subject matter is administrative action, the act of administrative 
adjudication may be.
175
 The CCMA provides a valuable model for an effectively-functioning 
tribunal which has been able to dramatically increase the quality, effectiveness and efficiency 
of decisions and ultimately provide complainants with a higher level of redress. The CCMA 
also demonstrates an example of a highly functional tribunal despite high budgetary 
constraints
176
 and in the face of vast socio-political difficulty.
177
  
                                                     
170
 Ss 3 & 4.  
171
 ‗The new system has proved to be very cheap and accessible to workers on the point of entry.‘ Brand 
―CCMA: Achievements and Challenges – Lessons from the First Three Years‖ (2000) 21 Indus LJ 78.  
172
 ‗The CCMA‘s case load has grown by 18 percent in the last five years to an average of 150 000 cases a year, 
making the CCMA the largest dispute resolution body in the world. In the last five years, turnaround time of 
conciliation has improved by 19 days to 26 days and arbitration turnaround has improved by 10 days to 69 days.‘ 
CCMA ―Reappointment of CCMA Director Gives Stability and Continuity to the World‘s Biggest Dispute 
Resolution Body‖ CCMA < http://www.ccma.org.za> (accessed 27-06-2011).  
173
 ‗The commission receives an average of 500 new referrals every working day and processes at least 10 000 
cases every month. Since it came into existence, it has handled more than 1 million cases.‘ Kahn ―CCMA 
Celebrates 10th Anniversary‖ CCMA <http://www.skillsportal.co.za/page/features/389805-CCMA-celebrates-
10th-anniversary> (accessed 27-06-2011). Furthermore, in the 2009/10 Annual Report, the CCMA recorded that 
their caseload increased by 9%, 14% more cases were actually settled and 99% of awards were submitted on 
time. CCMA Annual Report (2009/2010) 17. More detailed statistics are available in the Annual Report 47-48.  
174
 ‗The absence of a requirement for formal pleadings and complicated referral procedures has, it seems, proved 
to be a very successful feature of facilitating access to the CCMA. It has ensured that illiteracy and a lack of skill 
and resources are not an entry barrier to the system.‘ Brand (2000) Indus LJ 79.  
175
 This means that decisions of the CCMA Commissioners are subject to judicial review in terms of PAJA.  
176
 ‗There has been a major deficit between the financial needs of the CCMA and the actual funding given to it 
by the State.‘ Brand (2000) Indus LJ 82. 
177
 The CCMA is not without its failings. However, ‗the CCMA has done all that it could reasonably have been 
expected to do to provide a service within its severe capacity constraints. It has made its service as accessible, 
simple, expeditious and competent as its resources permitted.‘  Brand (2000) Indus LJ 96. 
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6 3 1 4 3 Tax 
The adjudication of tax law disputes is another area of administrative law where an 
administrative tribunal system functions effectively. Despite having jurisdiction over a wide 
range of administrative action, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) provides a high 
level of administrative justice through the structures it provides to taxpayers who are 
adversely affected by tax administrative decisions.  
If a taxpayer is unhappy with a decision of the Commissioner of Revenue, they can issue an 
objection to the Commissioner.
178
 On receipt of an objection, the Commissioner must alter the 
assessment; disallow the objection;
179
 reduce the assessment;
180
 or withdraw the 
assessment;
181
 and must notify the taxpayer of his or her decision in writing. A taxpayer can 
alternatively appeal
182
 to the Commissioner and the dispute will be referred to Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR).
183
 SARS publishes clear and simple guidelines as to how to 
approach the Commissioner in the event of dispute, and step by step instructions for taxpayers 
to follow in the event of ADR. 
A taxpayer is also able to appeal to the Tax Board
184
 or to a Tax Court.
185
 Appeals for 
decisions on amounts under R100 000 must be made to the Tax Board, and over R100 000 to 
the Tax Court.
186
 A decision of the Tax Board can also be taken on appeal to the Tax Court.
187
 
Decisions of the Tax Court can then be taken on appeal to the Provincial Division of the High 
Court or to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
188
 The Tax Board consists of Chairman, who is an 
                                                     
178
 S81 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA). See also Rule 4 and 5 of the Rules Promulgated under Section 107A of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 R 467 1 April 2003 (The Income Tax Rules).  
179
 S81(4) ITA.  
180
 S79A ITA. 
181
 S79B ITA. 
182
Income Tax Rule 6.  
183
 Income Tax Rule 7 and the regulations contained in Schedule A and Schedule B. SARS also provides 
guidelines for taxpayers to show how to approach ADR and what the procedure what entail.  
184
 S83A ITA.  
185
 S83(1) ITA.  
186
 S83A(1)(a) ITA.  
187
 S83A(13) ITA. Income Tax Rules 9 – 29 govern the proceedings of both the Tax Board and the Tax Court.  
188
 S86A(2) ITA.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
advocate or attorney and, if the Chairperson, the Commissioner or the taxpayer considers it 
necessary, an accountant or a representative of the commercial community.
189
 The Tax Court 
is a division of the High Court, and is empowered to confirm, alter or refer the assessment 
back to the Commissioner for re-evaluation.
190
 Hearings of the Tax Court are not public.
191
  
Due to this stratified system of objection, ADR and appeal, very few tax cases are decided in 
terms of judicial review, even though determinations or decisions of the Commissioner are 
mostly administrative action and therefore subject to review in terms of PAJA. In SARS‘ 
2010 Annual Report,
192
 the statistics indicate that there were 125 Tax Court cases, 5 High 
Court cases and only 3 Supreme Court of Appeal cases. These statistics show that objections 
to the Commissioner, ADR and appeals to the tax board are able to effectively adjudicate and 
resolve the administrative tax issues, and there are therefore fewer cases adjudicated on the 
basis of judicial review.  
Although each of the above three tribunals have been set up in very different ways and with 
different purposes, they share some similar trends of establishment and functioning and much 
of their success can be attributed to this. The following section will briefly evaluate why these 
tribunals function, and why other tribunals are not as effective.  
6 3 2  Evaluation of the South African System: Some Lessons from Australia and England 
The above description of some of the current appeal tribunal bodies indicates that the term 
‗tribunal‘ is a vague and far-reaching one in South African law. It encompasses a range of 
distinct and disparate bodies which are established for different reasons, serve diverse 
purposes and are constructed in fairly dissimilar ways. To even begin to evaluate their relative 
successes is a complicated process because some of the characteristics against which we could 
measure them
193
 do not even apply.  
                                                     
189
 S83A(3) ITA.  
190
 S83(13) ITA.  
191
 S83(11) ITA. However, as indicated in Ch 3 s 3, as long as the Tax Court provides clear and well-reasoned 
reasons for their decision, the requirement of a public hearing is still met.  
192
 SARS ―Annual Report‖ SARS (2009/2010) <http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=286> (accessed 12-08-
2011).  
193
 See Ch 3 s 3 for these characteristics. An example of this is the supervisory tribunal. The supervisory tribunal 
does not generally display high levels of independence, but it is established in order to regulate the industry and 
advise the minister on policy while adjudicating disputes. Independence is not a characteristic one would 
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Some tribunals are delivering a high measure of administrative justice, while others are failing 
in their mandate to provide this. Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why some 
tribunals succeed and others do not, there are characteristics in the successful tribunals which 
have contributed to their ability to deliver.
194
 Firstly, sufficient funding and staffing are 
quintessential starting points for the effective functioning of any tribunal. Secondly, tribunal 
members must be in possession of expertise; both judicial expertise and expertise in the field 
they are adjudicating. Tribunal members must be well-trained in the adjudication of 
administrative disputes in order provide high quality decision-making. Thirdly, tribunals must 
be accountable for their decisions and must publish clear and coherent reasons for their 
decisions. Fourthly, a wide range of dispute-resolution structures, as well as a comprehensive 
tiered appeal structure contributes to efficient and speedy resolution of complaints. Fifthly, it 
is important that tribunal users know what the system of appeal and the procedure for 
adjudication are in order to properly present their case. Lastly, tribunals should also consider 
the implications of their decision-making and take into account the policy decisions that 
governmental departments are required to make. This would require a level of communication 
with the department whose decisions they are intended to evaluate in order to assist with the 
improvement of the original decisions of administrative decision-makers.  
What remains clear from the description of the South African tribunal landscape above is that 
it is still made up of a fragmented and unsystematic collection of tribunals. As long as 
disparity in tribunal procedures exists, it will be hard for these tribunals to provide the level of 
comprehensive and supportive administrative dispute resolution that tribunals can provide. 
However, the outline of the tribunal structures regulating the legal fields of competition, 
labour and tax do provide helpful insights into what is required to streamline and consolidate 
tribunal processes and structures.  
Furthermore, there are three common features from the Australian and English systems which 
may be helpful in the reform of tribunals in South Africa.
195
 The first is the creation of a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
necessarily associate with this kind of tribunal. Another example is the dispute resolution tribunal where judicial 
expertise is not necessarily the key characteristic, especially if the dispute is referred for conciliation. 
194
 This is not an exhaustive list of all the characteristics which result in a successful tribunal, but merely a brief 
list of the some important characteristics which can be found in the tribunal systems of competition, employment 
and tax.  
195
 Again, this is not a comprehensive list and there are many important lessons to be learned from these two 
jurisdictions. However, these three trends will be helpful in identifying a direction for tribunal reform in South 
Africa.  
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general appeal tribunal, or the establishment of a tribunal which is empowered to adjudicate 
over a vast range of general regulatory matters. Both England and Australia have had 
success
196
 with this type of structure to streamline appeal processes and allow for easier and 
faster resolution of disputes. Parliament can still regulate the jurisdiction of the tribunal by 
giving it only statutory authority and not inherent jurisdiction.
197
 Furthermore, this type of 
tribunal can save costs in that computer systems, property and resources are shared; and a new 
tribunal does not have to be proliferated for each specific area of administrative law.
198
  
The second important lesson is the stratification of appeals, which allows for dispute 
resolution of relatively simple claims on the first tier, and more complex and specialised 
appeals on the second tier. This is especially important in areas of administration which deal 
with high levels of similar complaints, not all of which need to be taken on review to a high 
court, but can be dealt with in a more informal way.  
A third lesson is that there is no need to completely abolish current tribunals, especially not 
those that are highly functional and provide a solid blueprint for the development of other 
tribunals. The development of the tribunal reforms in England
199
 are especially useful here in 
that the introduction of the new system was brought in systematically and by the gradual 
extension of jurisdiction of tribunals which were providing the highest forms of 
administrative justice. It is especially in this area of reform where a competent supervisory 
body will have the most impact.  
6 4 Future for Tribunals: Legislative Tribunal Reform and the ARC 
Hoexter notes that although South African administrative law has undergone fundamental and 
far-reaching changes, there are still many areas of administrative law where the system is 
formalistic, rigid and is not delivering on the constitutional mandate. Especially in the field of 
non-judicial review or the development of administrative appeals,  
                                                     
196
 See the success of the AAT in Ch 4 s 4 3 1 3.  
197
 See Ch 4 fn 92.  
198
 Ch 4 fn 92.  
199
 Ch 5 s 3 2.  
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it is regrettable that no progress seems to have been made with the reform of the 
existing system of administrative appeals. Reform is urgently needed in this area if the 
system is ever to function as a worthy adjunct and alternative to judicial review.
200
  
In both the English and Australian systems respectively the AJTC and Australian ARC played 
a vital role in the initial implementation of tribunal reform, as well as its continued existence 
and effective functioning. In England, the AJTC was the driving force behind the research 
surrounding and reform of tribunals. They achieved this by constant communication with 
various tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals and by engaging with the academic 
community on areas of research which were of pertinent value. The AJTC was also 
instrumental in assisting with the phased implementation of the new two-tiered tribunal 
structure.
201
 The Australian ARC has proved its important and necessary role and is still 
regarded as a highly relevant role player in the distribution of administrative justice.
202
  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have illustrated the need, importance and characteristics of a successful, 
functioning and relevant central supervisory body. In the South African context, the issues 
that may prove the most problematic will relate to budgetary constraints,
203
 the need for 
qualified and well-trained employees, and the necessary scope to oversee the development 
and reform of the whole of the administrative justice system. South Africa is not unique in 
these challenges, and the development and criticism of the supervisory bodies of Australia 
and England, with specific emphasis on the criticism of the old English supervisory 
council,
204
  can provide useful blueprints for how to overcome such challenges. The English 
Council of Tribunals was criticised throughout its existence for failing in its task to provide a 
coherent oversight role, firstly due to budgetary limitations and secondly because the work of 
the Council was heavily ring-fenced. However, the subsequent restructuring of the Council 
and the development of the AJTC is useful in demonstrating how to structure and design an 
effective supervisory body.   
                                                     
200
 Hoexter Administrative Law 99.  
201
 See Ch 5 s 3 1 3 for a more detailed description of the work of the AJTC.  
202
 Ch 4 s 5 1 3 where the success of the Australian ARC is outlined.  
203
 The importance of budgetary constraints will be discussed in Ch 7.  
204
 See Ch 5 s 3 3.  
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Hoexter notes that 
in spite of all that has been achieved, then, it is clear that work remains to be done. 
However, the prospects of further programmatic reform of administrative law and the 
administrative system are slim. As noted by Pfaff, the Department of Justice does not 
have the capacity to take on the various tasks listed in s 10(2) of PAJA.
205
 In the 
absence of an ARC or some other sort of administrative-law champion within 
government, South Africa is reliant on the will of the Minister of Justice to push for 
reform and on the government‘s preparedness to provide funding for such reform.206  
The above statement indicates the important role to be played by the ARC in tribunal reform, 
and stresses that without this first essential step being taken, the reform of the system will be 
virtually unmanageable and is unlikely to succeed. Chapter 7 will more clearly outline the 
challenges facing tribunal reform in South Africa and will provide some possible arguments 
to the objections that have been raised.  
6 5 Conclusion  
Although the preceding chapter paints a fairly bleak picture of the current position of 
administrative tribunal justice, it does so in order to show the need for an organised and 
structured system of tribunals. Despite the relative failure of Parliament and PAJA to deliver 
on the constitutional imperative to provide a fair and efficient administration, all is not lost. 
The gateway remains open for further administrative reform and the historical developments 
described above outline that South African administrative law is long overdue for reform.  
As is indicated above, tribunals do currently exist and do currently assist in the administration 
of justice. However, they need to be brought into more coherent structures in a systematic and 
phased process of implementation. S33(1) of the Constitution provides for a right to fair and 
efficient administrative action, while s33(3) provides for the establishment of independent 
tribunals. There is strong academic support for the establishment of an ARC, whose task 
would be the investigation of tribunal reform, and even more support for the necessity of such 
tribunal reform. PAJA empowers the minister to issue regulations establishing an ARC. 
Parliament is in a position to enact legislation to govern the ARC without too much of a 
drafting procedure, as the SALRC‘s 1999 Draft Bill already provides a detailed framework 
                                                     
205
 Pfaff ―Implementation Strategies for the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act: State-of-Affairs Report and 
Recommendations for Further Developments‖ in Corder & Van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice 
(2002) 114.  
206
 Hoexter Administrative Law 102.  
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for its functioning, expenditure and constitution. Furthermore, Draft Regulations governing 
the ARC have already been drawn up and are comparable to the Draft Bill. The ARC, 
provided it is properly staffed and adequately resourced,
207
 would be empowered to conduct 
the necessary investigation into the suitability of establishing a general administrative 
tribunal, or any other such tribunal reforms it deems necessary. 
Once the ARC is established, the valuable lessons from the jurisdictions where tribunals 
function effectively, such as Australia and England, could be implemented in a systematic 
phased way which promotes tribunals as valuable contributors to the administering of 
administrative justice. Without the establishment of an ARC, sustained tribunal reform does 
not appear to be a viable option in South African administrative law. 
An important challenge that remains a stumbling block for the establishment of an ARC and 
the subsequent tribunal reform is the question of budgetary limitations. Along with the 
various objections to the establishment of a tribunal reform, this challenge will be considered 
and evaluated in the following chapter.  
                                                     
207
 S 3 3 1 refers to some of the requirements for an effectively functioning ARC. See Ch 3 s 5 1 for more 
requirements in this regard.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
REVIEW COUNCIL AND COMPREHENSIVE TRIBUNAL REFORM IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: THE COMMONWEALTH COMPARISON 
7 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 explains the failure of judicial review to provide comprehensive administrative 
justice in South Africa, and shows the basis for considering alternative forms of 
administrative redress. The remaining chapters illustrate the value of tribunals in 
administering justice; describe two working models of tribunals in two commonwealth 
jurisdictions; and explain the necessary reasons for tribunal reform, as well as their potential 
importance, in South Africa. Tribunals have been shown to be able to assist dramatically with 
the ‗two goals of administrative review: to redress individual complaints; and to improve the 
quality generally of primary decision-making, to the advantage of the many who seek benefits 
or entitlements from government.‘1 
However, objections have been voiced against the potential reform of the tribunal system in 
South Africa, namely; desire on the part of government to avoid the unnecessary proliferation 
of government departments; and the budgetary implications of reform. In a country limited by 
scarce resources and many important institutions and social causes to which those resources 
can be allocated, any new system or institution will only be viable if it considers budgetary 
limitations and the availability of funds. If a new system is to be of any value to South Africa, 
it must reduce costs and improve the access of the population to the new resource. That said, 
the debate surrounding ‗costs‘ cannot simply refer to the actual monetary cost of establishing 
such a new system. The ‗cost‘ of tribunal reform must be considered against the ‗cost‘ of poor 
administrative redress and the ‗cost‘ to society of a system of administrative justice which 
fails to be fair and efficient.  
This chapter will outline the objections raised to tribunal reform in South Africa. Through a 
comparison with the tribunal systems of Australia and England, the general trends 
instrumental in tribunal reform will be highlighted. This chapter then considers whether 
administrative tribunal reform could potentially result in a more cost-effective system in 
South Africa, and whether it may be a feasible alternative to judicial review.  
                                                     
1
 Creyke ―Tribunals and Access to Justice‖ (2002) 2 QUT Law and Justice Journal 64.  
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7 2 ‗Unknown Cost‘ of Poor Decision-Making 
The English Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) recently released a report 
entitled ‗Right First Time‘.2 The report is focused on the importance and need for the 
monitoring and review of decision-making to be more proactive and to actually aim to 
correcting initial decisions, rather than remedying them at a later stage. As was illustrated in 
Chapter 2,
3
 one of the biggest problems with South African administrative law is its 
retrogressive and backward-looking effect. Rather than aiming to prevent maladministration, 
South African administrative law has been disproportionately focused on redress and the 
remedy of judicial review.  
The AJTC highlights one of the problems of such an approach, stating that ‗the precise 
financial cost of poor decision-making and poor service delivery is unknown.‘4 This unknown 
cost relates to the fact that the precise cost of maladministration and bad decision-making 
cannot be accurately measured.  
The high volume of complaints and appeals has implications not just for the 
individuals concerned, but also for the taxpayer more generally, with the failure of 
public bodies to deliver services or get decisions right first time having significant 
consequences for the public purse. Financial costs will be incurred at different stages 
and by different organisations. These include the cost of service delivery or making of 
original decisions, the cost of review or reconsideration, the cost of appeal to the 
original decision-maker or complaint to the original service deliverer in addition to the 
cost of running the Tribunals Service and the offices of ombudsmen. In addition, there 
are of course the financial costs incurred by the appellant or complainant, and their 
family and/or advisers, in pursuing their case.
5
 
In Chapter 2,
6
 the financial criticisms to judicial review were explained. In four separate cases 
emanating from the Eastern Cape High Court,
7
 four different judges
8
 were particularly 
                                                     
2
 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council Right First Time June 2011.  
3
 See Ch 2 for a discussion on the prominence and problems of judicial review.  
4
 AJTC Right First Time June 17. 
5
 AJTC Right First Time June 17. 
6
 Ch 2 s 3 2 4.  
7
 Vumazonke v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape, and Three Similar Cases 2005 6 SA 229 (SE); 
Ndevu v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government SECLD undated 
judgment case no. 597/02; Makalima v Member of the Executive Council: Welfare SECLD 27-01-2005 case no 
1601/03; Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2006 4 SA 478 
(SCA).  
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concerned with the huge financial burden that erroneous decision-making was placing on the 
public purse. Furthermore, all of the judges were concerned about the fact that decisions 
under review were seldom opposed by the administrator or his department. This meant that 
not only was the scarce funding for areas such as social assistance being squandered by poor 
administrative decisions, but that even heavier burdens were placed on the government to pay 
out cost orders for review applications.  
In addition to this, judicial review is seldom able to cure the initial problem and merely treats 
the symptoms. Chapter 2 illustrates that as the primary avenue of administrative redress, 
judicial review is simply incapable of providing systematic improvement of decision-making 
or long-term improvements in the sphere of public administration. The comprehensive and 
overarching tribunal structures in Australia and England that have been discussed go some 
way to showing how tribunals can begin to address the cost of bad decision-making, and how 
they can systematically begin to improve initial decisions and assist with the progressive 
realisation of rights through administrative law.  
7 3 Major Objections to Tribunal Reform in South Africa 
The comprehensive reform of administrative appeals tribunals has not happened in South 
Africa. The first two objections to tribunal reform in South Africa stem mainly from the 
Department of Justice (DoJ). However, it must be noted at this point that actual tribunal 
reform was not objected against.
9
 As was illustrated in Chapter 6, the establishment of an 
Administrative Review Council (ARC) was always considered to be the first step in any 
reform of non-judicial review. The newly-established council would then have been 
responsible for the investigation and possible implementation of any tribunal reform. The fact 
that this council was never created means that government was never required to consider 
tribunal reforms, and had no chance to object to them. The DoJ‘s objections therefore relate to 
the establishment of the ARC, rather than directly to the reform of the tribunal system.
10
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
8
 Plasket J; Erasmus J; Leach J; and Nugent JA respectively, the latter in the judgment in appeal against Kate v 
MEC for the Department of Welfare, EC 2005 (1) SA 141 (SE). 
9
 See the Chairperson‘s response to the submission of the Western Cape Provincial Government in regard to 
tribunal reforms in Ch 6 fn 64.  
10
 The actual written submissions from the DoJ to the SALRC during SALRC Project 115 Report on 
Administrative Justice (1999) are not able to be located as the SALRC have moved offices and the original 
documents have not been found. However, P van Wyk, the Principal State Law Adviser of the SALRC 
confirmed telephonically and via e-mail (27-06-2011) that the information contained in the SALRC‘s reports 
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7 3 1 Practical Implications 
A major objection to the establishment of the ARC relates to the practical implications 
thereof, and the DoJ expressed concerns about how exactly such a council would be 
instituted. One of their suggestions was that instead of creating an entirely new body 
responsible for the investigation and supervision of administrative law, the function merely be 
extended to the SALRC.
11
 Another alternative was that the function be subsumed under the 
Public Service Commission or another Chapter 9 institution.
12
  
The DoJ was clearly expressing concerns about the proliferation of yet another governmental 
department.
13
 If the recent developments in England regarding the abolishment of the AJTC 
are considered, this may be a valid concern.
14
 However, what will be demonstrated below is 
that despite its potential termination, the role that the AJTC played in the development and re-
structuring of the tribunal system was a critical one, and that without the overarching 
supervision and communication structures of the AJTC, the tribunal transition would not have 
been as smooth as it was. One can of course thus argue that the potential abolition of the 
AJCT indicates that the cost of creating a new body, such as the ARC, to guide tribunal 
reform may only be a temporary cost, although in light of the Australian experience this is not 
the best option. Furthermore, the Australian ARC has proved to be an important and long-
lasting institution and it will be illustrated below that the retention of the ARC as an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
would be an accurate summary of the objections received from the DoJ. The points raised in this section are 
based on the information contained therein.  
11
 The SALRC state that ‗it has been suggested that consideration be given to the establishment of a unit within 
the SALC (or Human Rights Commission) to perform the functions of the Council, and that donor funding be 
sought for the expenditure associated with establishing the unit and its initially heavy workload.‘ South African 
Law Reform Commission Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice August 1999 36. These suggestions were 
also made during parliamentary deliberation on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 by various 
parties as an attempt to compromise. One such suggestion was made by the Legal Resources Centre stating that 
‗it is suggested that the Bill include provisions relating to an Administrative Review Council or similar 
institution. If necessary, the sections creating and empowering it can be brought into operation at a later stage 
when funding is available or when agreement has been reached with either the South African Law Commission 
or the Human Rights Commission for it to fall under the auspices of one or other of these institutions.‘ 
Submission of The Legal Resources Centre and Clive Plasket, Former Director to the Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs Portfolio Committee in December 1999 [B56-99].  
12
 These institutions are established in Ch 9 of the Constitution and seek to redress maladministration in a non-
judicial way.  
13
 ‗There has been an understandable aversion (particularly on the part of the Department of Justice) to the 
creation of what is seen to be yet a further governmental structure.‘ South African Law Reform Commission 
Report on Administrative Justice August 1999 s6.11.  
14
 See Ch 5 fn 129 where the Public Bodies Reform Bill is explained.  
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independent and impartial body is critically important to the successful monitoring and 
supervision of administrative law, albeit in the Australian context.  
7 3 2 Budgetary Implications 
Undoubtedly the most important objection and consideration of any tribunal reform is the 
question of budgetary implications. The actual cost of a new system will always be at the 
forefront of any debate relating to its suitability in the South African context.  
As was explained above, the DoJ has not directly expressed reservations relating to a 
reformed tribunal system. Their objections related to the establishment of the first step in 
reform, namely the ARC. The DoJ submitted in 1999 that the ARC would be too expensive to 
establish and that ‗the contemplated ARC would cost in the order of R980 000 per annum to 
run (this out of the current Justice budget in the order of R300 million).‘15  
In response to this objection, the SALRC stated that  
three points to be made in this regard are the following: that if the ARC is what it 
takes to obey the constitutional imperative, this limited funding has to be found; 
secondly, enhanced administrative justice contemplates greater state efficiency and 
thereby savings; and thirdly, that it is not evident that the function to be performed 
(given in particular the need for autonomy and public regard) is best served by seeking 
to warehouse the ARC‘s allocated tasks within some other institution or government 
department.
16
 
The ARC was never established, and Chapter 6 describes the reasons why not. However, 
Chapter 6 also outlined reasons why it should be established,
17
 and an indication that its 
establishment is neither an unreasonable nor a cumbersome burden on Parliament or the 
Minister of Justice. 
The discussion below will indicate that the establishment of an ARC is an important step in 
the development of tribunal reforms, and is therefore a cost that must be borne by the DoJ.   
                                                     
15
 SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 13. However, that figure has not been revised since 1999, and it is 
not known what the cost of establishing an ARC would be today. 
16
 SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 13. 
17
 ‗The SALC…considers the Council/unit as one of the keys to harmonizing the constitutional requirements of 
administrative justice and efficient administration and, hence, to the success of the Bill. If this capacity is not 
created, the Bill cannot work.‘ SALRC Report on Administrative Justice 36. See Ch 6 fn 49.  
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7 4  South African Financial Reality 
In the DoJ‘s report to parliament in June 2011, it stated that the estimated expenditure of the 
DoJ for the next year is about R12 billion, which will be increased to nearly R16 billion by 
the year 2016.
18
 Of this, nearly R750 million is allocated for State Legal Services. It must be 
acknowledged that the DoJ faces many challenging tasks, some of which include the 
upgrading of services and establishment of courts in previously disadvantaged areas.
19
 
Another important task of the DoJ is to try and reduce the massive court backlogs and 
improve efficiency.
20
 In addition, there is the worrying indication that ‗there has been a 
significant increase in litigation against the state that requires interventions such as the 
development of a policy to manage state litigation and increased resources to the Office of the 
State Attorney.‘21  
The report states that litigation against the state ‗is increasing as a result of citizens being 
more aware of their rights; opportunism; a fragmented approach to the management of state 
litigation and the absence of a framework making use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.‘22 The report explains that the DoJ has a strategic plan to reduce the costs of 
state litigation by developing a framework for the efficient management for state litigation; 
increasing the resources allocated to the office to improve its capacity; preparing and 
implementing a standardised fee structure for paying private counsel; and developing an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism process.
23
 However, the reform of the administrative 
tribunal system is not mentioned as one potential mechanism to reduce the state‘s litigation 
costs. 
                                                     
18
Department of Justice Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports Third Session, 
Fourth Parliament (6-06-2011) 1892. National Treasury Estimates of National Expenditure – Abridged Version 
(23-02-2011) 507. Appropriation Act 11 of 2011 Schedule 2 20.  
19
 ‗The Department has a major challenge in addressing the historical imbalances of the court infrastructure: 
prior to 1994, most court services were not situated in townships or in rural areas. When the Department decided 
to increase its services to previously excluded areas; facilities were unsuitable, requiring major refurbishment.‘ 
DoJ Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (6-06-2011) 1897. 
20
 DoJ Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (6-06-2011) 1904. 
21
 DoJ Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (6-06-2011) 1897. 
22
 DoJ Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (6-06-2011) 1904. 
23
 DoJ Committee Report Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports (6-06-2011) 1904. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
176 
 
As Chapter 2 describes, the burden on the public purse of judicial review against state 
departments is exorbitant.
24
 Despite judgements clearly indicating the worrying trend, not 
much has been done to alleviate the burden. As Erasmus J states,
25
  
I have obtained from the Registrar a copy of a bill taxed in a similar matter. On that 
basis these matters tax out at about R4 000.00 per case. It would mean therefore that in 
today‘s cases alone about R100 000.00 will be paid in legal costs in respect of the fees 
and disbursements of the legal representatives of the applicants. Clearly, millions of 
rand in taxpayers‘ money have been wasted in unnecessary legal costs occasioned by 
indolence and/or incompetence on the part of public servants.  
Clearly, wasted litigation costs should be a cause of great concern to government and are an 
expense South Africa simply cannot afford to bear. In addition to this, the pressure on courts 
is extremely high and administrative cases contribute to that backlog. All of the factors listed 
above should cause the DoJ to start considering alternative options to reduce the pressure on 
courts and to consider alternative means of resolving disputes with state departments.  
7 5 General Trends in Australia and England 
The objections above present two important concerns of the South African government, as 
well as a pressing need for the investigation of an alternative to judicial review for 
administrative redress. A brief comparative analysis of the systems of Australia and England 
may provide some counter-arguments to the objections, and indicate the value of a reformed 
tribunal system over a fragmented and ad hoc one. Both the English and Australian system 
can offer useful advice as to what the important elements of reform are. As was illustrated in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the most important attributes extend to comprehensive structural 
administrative reform; the role of supporting governmental agencies; the necessity of co-
operative government strategies for the realisation of efficient administrative dispute 
resolution and the improvement of original decision-making; the importance of an adequately 
and sufficiently resourced, overarching, centralised supervisory body empowered to exercise 
its overseeing capacity over the whole of the administrative sphere; the continued supervisory 
jurisdiction of an appeal court on issues of law; and the progressive movement towards 
speedy, efficient, effective and satisfactory administrative relief for citizens.   
 
                                                     
24
 Ch 2 s 2 7.  
25
 Ndevu v MEC for Welfare, EC 5-6.  
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7 5 1 Australia 
7 5 1 1 Value of the Australian ARC 
The Australian ARC has been a successful supervisory administrative body, and through its 
dual purposes of research and integration, ‗has had a large impact in shaping Australian 
administrative law.‘26 The ARC provided the basis for the establishment of the English AJTC, 
and was the basis for the reason that the AJTC was given a wider spectrum of influence in the 
development of the English tribunal reforms.  
A recent report
27
 on the effectiveness and importance of the Australian ARC considered 
whether it was necessary to continue to support a separate institution or whether it would be 
more sensible and cost-effective to transfer these functions under the auspices of the office of 
the Attorney-General. Based on the submissions received,
28
 the Senate Committee came to 
the conclusion that ‗there is a continuing need for the Commonwealth Government to receive 
advice and recommendations on administrative review and decision-making, and to promote a 
comprehensive, affordable and cost-effective administrative law system.‘29  
The first reason was independence.
30
 The second reason was the ARC‘s public image,31 and 
its ability to provide a ‗whole-of-government approach‘ which was unaffected by 'turf 
protection difficulties which would make it particularly difficult for a unit within a 
                                                     
26
 McMillan Administrative Justice – Adapting to Change 9th Ben Beinart Memorial Lecture delivered at the 
University of Cape Town, 2-08-2011 4.  
27
 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on the Role and Functions of the 
Administrative Review Council (1997). 
28
 A list of the submissions can be found in the Senate Committee Report Appendix 1. 
29
 Senate Committee Report s2.20. ‗The Administrative Review Council should remain as a separate and 
permanent body, provided that it is making a significant contribution towards an affordable and cost-effective 
system of administrative decision-making and review.‘ Senate Committee Report s2.35 Recommendation 1. 
30‗The Committee considers that administrative review and administrative law generally are important aspects of 
personal rights, which justify a separate and permanent administrative law advisory body. Any dilution of the 
independence or powers of the ARC would be undesirable and the worst outcome for the effectiveness of the 
ARC would be if it was absorbed by, or became under the control of, the Attorney-General's Department. The 
quality of ARC's report on rule-making by commonwealth agencies would not have been as good if it had, for 
instance, been passed through the sieve of a Department of State. Submission of the Senate Standing Committee 
on Regulations and Ordinances. 
31
 Submission of the Welfare Rights Centre, New South Wales.  
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government department to take a similar approach.‘32 The third reason relates to cost, and the 
fact that there would be no significant decrease in cost should the ARC‘s functions be 
subsumed under the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) or the Auditor-General.
33
  
7 5 1 2 Cost of Tribunal Reform and Some Suggestions: Queensland 
In a recent article,
34
 Creyke addresses the recommendation of the Queensland Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission (EARC) for the establishment of a general merits review 
body, the Queensland Independent Commission for Administrative Review (QICAR).
35
 The 
EARC report noted the potential costs for establishment of a new system, but also noted that 
there would be cost reductions once the new system was underway.
36
     
By using both the Australian AAT and the development of state tribunals, Creyke outlines 
some of the most important issues for consideration in any tribunal reform. She discusses 
whether the system is in need of reform, what desirable elements should be included in a 
tribunal system, and what essential requirements are needed for a new tribunal structure to 
work. Her recommendations are premised on the development of the Australian tribunal 
system and are therefore a reflection of the valuable elements of the Australian system.  
Her first suggestion is that there should be a single, generalist jurisdiction tribunal, such as the 
AAT. Through a comparison with the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), 
Creyke shows that the generalist tribunal offers the two-fold advantage that it reduces costs 
                                                     
32
 Submission of the Administrative Review Council, evidence of Prof Neave 39-40.  
33‗It is unlikely that there would by any significant economies to be gained in seeking to provide common 
secretariat services for the Council from some other source, for example, amalgamation with ALRC. Rather, it is 
likely that an amalgamation would generate additional cost in the immediate short term and would risk the 
dissipation or dilution of expertise in the longer term. Submission of the Auditor-General‘s Department 6-7. 
34
 Creyke (2002) QUT Law and Justice Journal.  
35
 QICAR would have reduced over 130 existing review bodies reduced to 26, created appeal rights for over 
1000 decisions not then subject to review, and established the Queensland Administrative Review Council as an 
independent body to promote and co-ordinate the whole Queensland administrative review system. 
36
 The report notes that the ‗start-up cost of the development would be about $8.3 million with recurrent 
operating costs being about $10.2 million. That was compared with the existing costs of about $8.75 million a 
year. However, the proposed tribunal system would review nearly double the number of decisions as compared 
with the 2,000 under the existing scheme, so there were considerable cost savings for decisions which would be 
transferred, even excluding the cost of court review, estimated at a further $1 million.‘ Queensland Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission Report on Review of Appeals from Administrative Decisions (1993) 64-66, 
68. 
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and increases efficiency;
37
 and that it offers an informal and flexible service.
38
 In an earlier 
article,
39
 Kirby also explains that the advantages of a general tribunal. It provides a more 
effective remedy to individuals who are affected by administrative action; leads to heightened 
awareness amongst officials of compliance with the law and the content thereof; provides 
greater consistency in public administration; includes the enhancement of the accountability 
of officials and provides for a more open administration; has led to improved internal 
arrangements within departments who have introduced improved systems for training staff 
and improved mechanisms for decision-making; and lastly the AAT provides ‗not only an 
assurance to the individual of justice in the particular case but a safeguard against arbitrary 
decision-making and a stimulus to improved administrative standards.‘40  
There are arguments against the generalist tribunal, specifically to its independence and its 
expertise.
41
 However, McMillan counters these arguments by stating that the courts maintain 
a supervisory oversight role over tribunals through the avenue of appeal.
42
 Furthermore, if the 
appeal statistics are considered, tribunals appear to be handling the challenge competently.
43
 
                                                     
37
 ‗In its first year of operations, the VCAT dealt with 75,076 cases within its budget of $18.3 million. In its 
second year of operations, with a slight increase (9 per cent) to the budget ($20 million), VCAT resolved 89,368 
cases, an increased caseload of 19 per cent. Matters finalised for 2000-2001 exceeded 92,000 with no increase in 
the cost. It is clear that VCAT is demonstrating the greater efficiencies from having a unified, not just a 
colocated, system.‘ Creyke (2002) QUT Law and Justice Journal 72. See also Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Annual Report (2000-200)1 3. 
38
 ‗As to formalism and inflexibility, that too is discounted by the Victorian experience. Despite having members 
of the new tribunal who were formerly magistrates and therefore more familiar with formal court processes, the 
presence in the VCAT headquarters in Melbourne of several styles of hearing rooms, and a concerted focus by 
the presidential members on changing the culture of tribunal members, has helped develop a flexible attitude 
amongst most tribunal members.‘ Creyke (2002) QUT Law and Justice Journal 73.  
39
 Kirby ―Effective Review of Administrative Acts: The Hallmark of a Free and Fair Society‖ (1989) 5 SAJHR 
331-333. 
40
 Kirby (1989) SAJHR 333. 
41
 ‗It has, nonetheless, been fashionable in legal circles to disparage tribunals and compare them unfavourably to 
courts. There are two main themes in the criticism. One is that tribunal members do not enjoy the same 
independence as judicial officers…the second criticism is that tribunal members are not for the most part as 
legally experienced or competent as judicial officers.‘ McMillan ―Re-thinking the Separation of Powers‖ (2010) 
38 Federal LR 12. 
42
 McMillan (2010) Federal LR 12. 
43
 ‗The appeal statistics do not present a damning picture. Of 122 appeals from AAT decisions to the Federal 
Court in 2008–09, 30 per cent were allowed or remitted, 55 per cent were disallowed, and 15 per cent were 
discontinued. By contrast, of the 62 appeals from federal and state superior court decisions to the High Court in 
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Creyke‘s second suggestion is that there are certain pre-requisites that need to be met for a 
sustained favourable systematic reform.  These are sufficient funding; adequate levels of 
expertise both by members and by those in oversight roles; a measure of tribunal 
independence; and a mechanism to monitor compliance with tribunal decisions or to monitor 
the systemic effect of compliance with tribunal decisions.
44
 The first three requirements are 
familiar in the sphere of tribunals and are reminiscent of characteristics identified by the 
Franks Report
45
 and the Legatt Report.
46
 The fourth suggestion is that ‗what is needed is an 
office or body charged with ensuring that decisions are implemented in the individual case, 
that, when courts or tribunals have found anomalies, injustice or inconsistency in legislation 
or policy, the legislation or the policy is changed, and that front-line decision-makers take 
account of court and tribunal findings.‘47 This level of monitoring would lead to greater 
consistency in decision-making and assist with improving initial decisions.  
Lastly, Creyke suggests that the reform of Queensland‘s tribunals can occur by learning from 
the developments in Australia and in England, and by applying the comparative information 
available to the EARC. In this way, the valuable lessons learned from the successful operation 
of tribunals can be collated and be applied in the context-specific jurisdiction facing reform. 
In the South African context, this would mean developing a tribunal reform in line with our 
own constitutional development and instituting reforms which are suitable to our own 
institutional structures.  
7 5 1 3 Success of the Australian Tribunals  
Another important feature of Australian tribunals is the impact they have had on reducing the 
administrative caseload on the courts. The decline in judicial review in Australia and the rise 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2008–09, 68 per cent were allowed, 29 per cent were dismissed, and three per cent were discontinued.‘ 
McMillan (2010) Federal LR 12-13. 
44
 Creyke (2002) QUT Law and Justice Journal 73. 
45
 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Equiries Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals 
and Enquiries Cmnd 218 (1957).  
46
 Leggatt Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (2001). 
47
 Creyke (2002) QUT Law and Justice Journal 81. 
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of reliance on tribunals as primary dispute-resolution structures is evidence of their successful 
approach to correcting administrative injustice.
48
  
The AAT‘s success can also be measured by its output. Since its establishment nearly 30 
years ago, the major federal tribunals alone have handled nearly 500 000 cases.
49
 In contrast, 
the figures for administrative law review decisions in the Australian Federal Court have either 
been stagnant or in decline.
50
 Creyke states that ‗these features have indicated a high degree 
of satisfaction within Australia for tribunal review as an adjudicative option and have led to a 
deserved international reputation.‘51 In a recent report,52 Creyke and McMillan indicate that 
tribunals are also the most satisfactory form of redress from the perspective of government 
departments and ‗tribunals met administrative law objectives by focusing decision-makers‘ 
attention on their task, and by enhancing accountability and compliance with the law.‘53 
Importantly,  
in terms of public impact, the AAT has had a dramatic influence. Especially in the 
area of disputed social welfare benefit entitlement, the AAT has provided a review 
mechanism where previously there was a void…For those members of the Australian 
community at the most disadvantaged end of the socio-economic spectrum, the 
                                                     
48
 ‗In other ways too the role of courts has been diminishing by contrast with that of tribunals and Ombudsman. 
Australia has three federal courts – the Federal Magistrates Court, which reported only 28 non-migration 
administrative law matters last year; the Federal Court, which no longer has a separate statistical listing for 
judicial review, other than for migration cases; and the High Court, which last year handled only five non-
migration cases concerning the exercise of government power. It is possible that those figures will fall even 
further – again, immigration aside – because of a government policy, strongly worded and vigorously pursued, to 
prefer alternative dispute resolution to litigation.‘ McMillan Administrative Justice – Adapting to Change 9th 
Ben Beinart Memorial Lecture 2-08-2011 3.  
49
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice in Australia‖ in Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010) 281 fn 25 
based on the Annual Reports of the AAT, the Migration and Refugee tribunals, the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal and the Veterans‘ Review Board. McMillan states that the ‗caseload is substantial: in 2008–09 the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) finalised 7 231 applications,  while four other specialist tribunals — the 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Migration Review Tribunal, Refugee Review Tribunal and Veterans' Review 
Board — finalised 28 883 applications.‘ McMillan (2010) Federal LR 11.  
50
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice in Australia‖ in Administrative Justice in Context 281 fn 24 based on the 
figures supplied by the High Court, Federal Court and Magistrates court between 2004-2009.  
51
 Creyke ―Administrative Justice in Australia‖ in Administrative Justice in Context 282.  
52
 Creyke & McMillan ―Executive Perceptions of Administrative Law – An Empirical Study‖ (2002) 9 AJAL 
163.  
53
 Creyke & McMillan (2002) 9 AJAL 172-173; 187-187.  
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provision of an effective system of external merits review has proved to be a major 
advance in the securing of individual rights.
54
 
If the current social assistance position in South Africa is considered, this kind of a tribunal 
may provide the level of administrative justice necessary to begin to process the 
administrative backlog. Furthermore, the successful implementation of a coherent and 
comprehensive system of tribunals can lead to increased reliance on alternatives to court for 
the resolution of disputes. McMillan states that ‗tribunals, as those statistics indicate, have 
become the frontline of administrative justice for the public. The large number of people who 
turn each year to tribunals for review of government decisions is itself a measure of their 
importance.‘55 
7 5 2 England 
7 5 2 1 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) and Co-operative Government 
The role of the AJTC in rolling out the tribunal reforms in England was a critical one.
56
 
Despite the fact that the tribunal system is administered and run by the Tribunals Service, an 
executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, the AJTC provides a unique and independent 
element of continued tribunal reform.
57
 Carnwath states that ‗the AJTC‘s role is not just about 
the final stage of dispute resolution, but covers the whole process from initial decision until 
final resolution at whatever level.‘58 The AJTC describes their approach under three core 
areas; carrying out projects to identify improvements; working with others to effect change; 
and exploiting opportunities for their voice to be heard on behalf of users.
59
 Their purpose is 
                                                     
54
 Mendelsohn & Maher ―The Australian Experience in Merits Review Tribunals‖ in Mendelsohn & Maher (eds) 
Courts, Tribunals and New Approaches to Justice (1994) 94.  
55
 McMillan (2010) Federal LR 12. 
56
 A description of the role played by the AJTC can be found in the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council 
Annual Report (2007/2008).  
57
 ‗The AJTC was also established to take a unique perspective of how the various components of the 
administrative justice system – i.e. decision makers, tribunals, ombudsmen, complaint handlers and the courts – 
fit together.‘ Thomas, Chairman of AJTC in Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council Annual Report 
(2009/2010).  
58
 Carnwath The Senior President of Tribunals‘ Annual Report: Tribunals Transformed (2010) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/EF000745-B38E-4A81-8356-
E3317E1251F5/0/senior_president_tribunals_annualreport_feb_2010.pdf> (accessed 12-07-2010) 56 (Tribunals 
Transformed).  
59
 AJTC Annual Report (2009/2010) 2-3.  
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to consider how ‗the components of the administrative justice system relate to each other so 
as to ensure that the system is accessible, fair and efficient….by playing a pivotal role in the 
development of coherent principles and good practice; promoting understanding, learning and 
continuous improvement and ensuring that the needs of users are central.‘60 
In addition, the success of the AJTC can be attributed to the high levels of communication 
and co-operation between them and all the spheres of government. Chapter 5 describes the 
role of the Senior President of Tribunals (STP) and his role in the implementation of the new 
tribunals.
61
 Chapter 5 also describes the role of the Tribunal Presidents‘ Group (TPG), 
Tribunal Judges‘ Executive Board (TJEB) and the Tribunal Services Executive Team 
(TSET).
62
 One of the major strengths of the phased implementation of the tribunals in 
England was the identification of key role-players and the emphasis on clear, coherent co-
operation in the rolling out of the new structures. It is apparent from the successful 
implementation of the new tribunals that collaborative efforts of all key players, under the 
supervision of a separate, independent supervisory body like the AJTC, is essential for the 
transition and phased implementation of tribunal reform.  
The tribunal reform project has been unusual, perhaps unique, among major legal 
reform programmes, in the extent of active involvement of judges at every stage. It has 
also benefited from consistently friendly but respectful working relationships between 
judges, ministers, and administrators, with generally all-party support, and with other 
vital stakeholders.
63
 
As was noted in Chapter 5,
64
 the AJTC is one of the bodies which stand to be abolished 
through the Public Bodies Reform Bill.
65
 The effect of this bill on the AJTC is as yet 
unknown, but does not diminish from the significant implementation and strategic role played 
by the AJTC throughout the initial phases of tribunal reform. Furthermore, there is 
                                                     
60
 See Thomson ―Current Developments in the UK: System Building – From Tribunals to Administrative 
Justice‖ in Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010) 500.  
61
 Ch 5 s 3 3 2.  
62
 Ch 5 s 3 2 3 5.  
63
 Carnwath First Implementation Review 35.   
64
 Ch 5 fn 129.   
65
 ‗The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government has indicated that their reforms of public bodies have two 
objectives: to reduce costs and increase accountability.‘ Public Bodies Bill 188 of 2010 Research Paper 11/50 
13-06-2011 9.  
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disagreement that this exercise will necessarily cut costs, especially in relation to the arms 
length bodies like the AJTC.
66
 
7 5 2 2 Tribunals: Cost and Accessibility 
The main drive behind the Leggatt report was the restructuring and systemisation of the 
disparate collection of tribunals which existed in England. The focus was on the needs of the 
users of tribunals, and the idea behind streamlining and collating tribunals was as much about 
cost reduction as it was about creating an affordable, accessible and user-friendly system.
67
 
Additionally, the purpose of the systemisation of tribunals was to improve the initial decisions 
of administrators and so to progressively move towards a more efficient administration. 
Thomson states that ‗the theme that underpins the reform of tribunal and administrative 
justice is system-building…the system is to be subject to oversight and the twin concerns are 
to put things right and get things right first time.‘68  
In order to achieve this accessible and affordable system, First-tier Tribunals were created 
whose focus is on dispute resolution. Informality and flexibility of tribunal procedures was 
considered a key aspect of speedy resolution, as well as the incorporation of non-judicial 
mechanisms of review, such as the role of alternative dispute resolution.
69
 To preserve a level 
of judicial certainty and to promote the role of judicial independence, the Upper Tribunals 
were given overarching supervision and appeal jurisdiction on questions of law. The Upper 
                                                     
66
 ‗Previous attempts at reform of arm‘s length government in the UK have tended to focus on reducing the 
numbers of ALBs. Ongoing focus on cost is clearly inevitable in the current fiscal climate and some functions 
performed by ALBs may be considered no longer to be affordable. But, based on historical experience, an 
excessive focus on the number of bodies will be unlikely to yield long-term improvements to arm‘s length 
government, and it neglects the fact that ALB spending is concentrated in just a handful of larger bodies. 
Restructurings can be an effective way of achieving economies of scale but, given the costs and disruption 
involved, care should be taken to ensure that any such moves are justified by a clear business case…‘ Gash 
Institute for Government Read Before Burning: Arm‘s Length Government for a New Administration (2010) 52. 
Arms length bodies are bodies whose day-to-day decision making is independent from government, although 
ministers are ultimately responsible to Parliament for their independence, effectiveness and efficiency.  
67
 For a detailed explanation of the processes involved in the restructuring of tribunals, see Thomson ―Current 
Developments in the UK‖ in Administrative Justice in Context 485. 
68
 Thomson ―Current Developments in the UK‖ in Administrative Justice in Context 499.  
69
 See Le Seuer ―Courts, Tribunals, Ombudsmen, ADR: Administrative Justice, Constitutionalism and 
Informality‖ in Jowell & Olivier (eds) The Changing Constitution 6 ed (2007) 317 for a more complete 
explanation of the relationship between informality, ADR and tribunals.   
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Tribunal was also created to alleviate the massive burden on the upper courts.
70
 An important 
lesson of English tribunal reform is the two-tiered structure of appeals, which allows for both 
rapid and simplified dispute resolution and more complex, formalistic dispute resolution 
within the same overarching structure. This approach has been shown to work in South Africa 
too, especially in the tiered dispute resolution found in the tax and competition tribunal 
structures.
71
  
The success of the English reforms can also be attributed to their phased implementation. The 
disparate collection of tribunals were gradually upgraded and systemised through coherent 
and well-planned strategic movements, rather than displacing them entirely and beginning 
with a new system from scratch. Carnwarth points out that  
the key to realising the benefits of the new arrangements, while maintaining the 
quality of decision-making and the confidence of users, is to proceed gradually, 
adapting and building on the strengths of the system as it is, rather than by dramatic 
change. The legal and administrative changes required to establish the new tribunal 
structure are necessarily complex. However, our aim should be to achieve these 
changes with as little disruption as possible to the experience of ordinary users.
72
 
This is an important consideration to bear in mind, especially in light of the three highly-
functional tribunals in South Africa. There is scope to widen the jurisdictions of these 
tribunals, to gradually phase in a more coherent and general tribunal and to draw from their 
current success stories in order to progress to a more efficient system of tribunals.  
7 6 Conclusion: Advantages and (outweighed) Disadvantages of Tribunals  
The South African government currently spends, indeed wastes, a significant amount of 
taxpayer money on administrative law litigation.
73
 Due to the limitations of judicial review as 
outlined above, even after the high costs of litigation and the long duration of court 
proceedings, the results achieved may still be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, judicial review is 
                                                     
70
 ‗Over time the Upper Tribunal should come to play a central, innovative and defining role in the new system, 
enjoying a position in the judicial hierarchy at least equivalent to that of the Administrative Court in England and 
Wales.‘ Tribunals Transformed 20. 
71
 See Ch 6 s 3 1 4.  
72
 Tribunals Transformed 56.   
73
 See Ch 2 s 3 2 4. 
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unsuited to giving effect to systemic administrative change and the improvement of initial 
decision-making.  
Two other commonwealth countries, also concerned with the negative and retrogressive 
limitations of judicial review, have begun to move away from the traditional court model for 
the resolution of administrative disputes. Both Australia and England have indicated a 
preference for the important role of tribunals in the administration of disputes. Tribunals have 
been shown to offer the advantage of being speedier, cheaper, more efficient, more 
participatory and more accessible than traditional courts.  These advantages contribute to 
tribunals being a more available resource for lay people or people without sophisticated legal 
knowledge, and provide wider access than courts.  
What is clear from the discussion of the English and Australian models is that there are a few 
important trends which need to be applied universally to ensure a sustained tribunal reform 
and a system which will provide a higher level of administrative redress than the over-
burdened and institutionally inept courts currently do. These have been described in detail 
above, but relate specifically to co-operation among government departments and tribunals; 
open and accountable systemic change; the need for supervision and evaluation of the whole 
of administrative law by an independent and competent body; and ultimately a focus on the 
needs of users of the services of the state.  
At the same time, there are arguments against the establishment of administrative tribunal 
reform. These arguments relate to the costs of reform; the ways to establish tribunals; and the 
level of independence shown by the tribunals. These arguments are especially relevant in the 
South African context, where the government faces huge social problems and a scarcity of 
resources. However, from the above analysis of the valuable characteristics of tribunals and 
the role that they serve in the day to day administration of justice, it is difficult to see how any 
objections to tribunals can outweigh their potential importance in the administrative justice 
system.  
The need for sustained systematic reform in South Africa is one that cannot be ignored. 
Tribunals offer a valuable alternative to judicial review for the resolution of administrative 
disputes, and the value of a comprehensive and coherent structure for the establishment and 
administration of tribunals is apparent from the above discussion. Furthermore, the tribunal 
systems of Australia and England have demonstrated how the effective creation and continued 
use of comprehensive tribunal structures contributes firstly to cost reduction and secondly to 
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ease the administrative burden on courts who are not suited to cure large-scale administrative 
error. 
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